SPECIAL ISSUE

Problems of COMMUNISM

10 YEARS AFTER STALIN

INTERNAL POLITICS • ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS

CULTURAL SCENE • REHABILITATIONS

FOREIGN AFFAIRS • INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM

EASTERN EUROPE • CHINA AND RUSSIA

THE ROLE OF STALIN • BOOKS ON STALIN

VOL. XII No. 2
Mar-Apr 1963

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Problems of COMMUNISM

NUMBER 2 MAR-APR VOL. XII 1963

Ten Years After Stalin

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TEN YEARS AFTER STALIN

TO OUR READERS: On March 6, 1963, the international edition of *The New York Times* carried the following story by its Moscow correspondent, Seymour Topping:

Moscow, March 5. The Soviet Union commemorated today the 10th anniversary of the death of Sergey Prokofiev, the composer. Nothing was said here officially about the death on the same day of another noted Soviet figure, Stalin.

This journal would hardly deny the enduring importance and the poignant tragedy of the life and death of Sergey Prokofiev. Yet in the perspective of history surely the life and death of Yossif Vissarionovich Stalin looms larger than that of the gifted composer? Surely the Soviet leaders themselves have made it clear that whatever Stalin's merits when he was alive (about the precise nature of which there seems to be some doubt), the consequences of his demise have been immense—immense for the Communist movement as well as for the world at large?

And so, unlike Soviet journals, *Problems of Communism* does commemorate the 10th anniversary of Stalin's death. We do so, first, by examining the events in the Communist world since 1953—from general developments in the USSR to the problem of relations between Moscow and the East European "people's democracies." And we do so, too, by attempting to take stock, once again, of those grim decades to which the Soviets refer, with what strikes us as an unfortunate lack of a sense for the dramatic, as "the period of the personality cult,"—by asking ourselves, What *was* the reason, the meaning of Stalin and Stalinism?, and by recalling some of the things that were said and written about Stalin and Stalinism at that time. The survey here presented is far from exhaustive; and the questions posed will no doubt continue to be debated for generations to come. We do hope, however, that with this special issue we shall have contributed to some clarification of a slice of contemporary history, and that by doing so we shall also have helped to fill the void left by the editors of journals published in Moscow.

—The Editors

MARCH 6, 1953


ПРАВДА

Орган Центрального Комитета Коммунистической партии Советского Союза

5 марта в 9 час. 50 минут вечера после тяжелой болезни скончался Председатель Совета Министров Союза ССР и Секретарь Центрального Комитета Коммунистической партии Советского Союза Иосиф Виссарионович СТАЛИН.

Бессмертное имя СТАЛИНА всегда будет жить в сердцах советского народа и всего прогрессивного человечества.

ОТ ЦЕНТРАЛЬНОГО КОМИТЕТА КОММУНИСТИЧЕСКОЙ ПАРТИИ СОВЕТСКОГО СОЮЗА, СОВЕТА МИНИСТРОВ СОЮЗА ССР И ПРЕЗИДИУМА ВЕРХОВНОГО СОВЕТА СССР

Ко всем членам партии, ко всем трудящимся Советского Союза.

ЛЕНИНИЗМ ЗАВЕЩАНИЕ

MARCH 5, 1963

ПРАВДА

Орган Центрального Комитета Коммунистической партии Советского Союза

ОПЫТ ПЕРЕДОВИКОВ — КАЖДОМУ КОЛЛЕКТИВУ

МОСКВА — ЛЕНИНГРАД

ХОРОШЕМУ ПОЧИНУ — ШИРОКУЮ ДОРОГУ

ПО ПРИМЕРУ УСТЬ-АБАКАНЦЕВ

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Internal Developments: A Balance Sheet

By Wolfgang Leonhard

A DECADE HAS NOW passed since Stalin's death—a period that already accounts for one-sixth of the history of Bolshevism and almost one-fourth of the lifetime of the USSR. In the course of those years many changes have taken place in Soviet life, and the question of their nature and import dominates most discussions of Soviet affairs today. This is only natural since the internal evolution of the Soviet Union is directly relevant to all the major problems of East-West relations.

How important are these changes? Are we concerned here with only minor corrections of tactics and style within an otherwise intact Stalinist system, as some analysts would have it? Or are we able to speak—as some more optimistic observers do—of a basic change, a far-reaching democratization, and a development that could perhaps in the near future lead to an assimilation with the political and economic systems of the industrialized democracies of the West? Or, finally, if one should reject both these extreme views—as in the opinion of this author one should—how and on what basis can the post-Stalin development be objectively evaluated?

That there exist widely differing evaluations of the current Soviet situation is not surprising, as the post-Stalin development has been anything but a consistent and continuous process. The first decade after the dictator's death was marked by frequent zigzags and alternating periods of progress and regression; moreover, the history of that era is further complicated by the fact that the degree of destalinization varied widely from one sphere of Soviet life to another. As a result, the adjustments of the decade have brought forth many contradictions in Soviet life: on one hand, many of the fundamental traits of Stalin's system have remained unchanged; on the other, some important reversals of Stalinist practices have indeed taken place.

To draw a proper balance, a detailed analysis of each sector of Soviet life would be necessary. This of course is impossible to do within the confines of a short article, and so we shall merely attempt here to summarize the developments of the first post-Stalin decade and arrive at a few conclusions.[1]

Methods of Political Rule

To what extent, then, if any, has the Soviet totalitarian system changed? In its fundamentals, one has to acknowledge, hardly at all. Now, as in Stalin's time, absolute power rests in the hands of a small group of party leaders in the Presidium and the Central Committee Secretariat, who alone have the right to decide all questions—this in spite of the fact that neither one of these bodies is as much as mentioned in the Soviet constitution or otherwise legally empowered to discharge

Mr. Leonhard spent many years in the Soviet Union as a refugee from Hitler's Reich, later serving as a Communist official in East Germany before finally renouncing the party and moving to West Germany. He has since published several books on the USSR, the latest being Sowiet-Ideologie Heute *(Frankfurt, S. Fischer Verlag, 1962).*

[1] For the same reason, no source references are appended. For documentation readers are referred to the author's recent study, *Kreml ohne Stalin* (Cologne, Verlag für Politik und Wirtschaft, 1959; published in English as *The Kremlin Since Stalin*, New York, Praeger, 1962), which contains references to some 380 articles, commentaries and analyses of Western experts on the Soviet Union dealing with post-Stalin internal developments.

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such a function. The Supreme Soviet, constitutionally the highest legislative organ, remains today as it was under Stalin, without any power or influence. The government, *i.e.* the Council of Ministers, remains similarly subordinated to the party leadership, whose principal executive instrument is the party apparatus. The party members in turn are publicly committed to defend and faithfully to execute the decisions of the higher party bodies. All other organizations and associations remain subservient to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and to its apparatus.

The average Soviet citizen is still powerless to influence the destinies of his country. His only political function is to approve every four years—usually on a Sunday in March—a candidate selected for each electoral district by superior party authorities; thus "elected," the deputies to the Supreme Soviet have no other role than to give their approval to measures previously decided by the party leadership. The citizen of the USSR still lacks legal protection of his personal safety as well as the opportunity to express in the press or over the air or at public meetings his own political opinions. It is his duty not only to approve the program of the party leadership, but also to help put it into effect.

Just as important as these prevailing Stalinist characteristics of the present system, however, are the newly instituted methods and forms of political control. The most decisive difference is to be found in the fact that mass terror—an integral component of Stalin's system—is no longer used. The feared and detested police apparatus, through which Stalin dominated all centers of power in the state, including the party and its top leaders, has been considerably limited in its functions and subordinated to party control.

The taming of the police has been accompanied by public criticism of the security organs and prosecution of a number of their former leaders. At the same time, many of the victims of Stalin's terror have been released from imprisonment and some posthumously rehabilitated. Various crimes of the Stalin era have been publicly condemned, and far-reaching reforms of the penal code have been instituted. All this, to be sure, has not made a return to Stalinist terror impossible, but it has made it considerably more difficult.

The recent reforms represent a transition from the completely uncontrolled despotism of a single dictator to a new form of party dictatorship, which, to be sure, is far from approaching the norms of a state guided by the rule of law, but which in some areas may now be taking a few tentative first steps in that direction. In any case, the brutal coercive measures which Stalin employed—usually in the form of mass arrests—to intimidate the population and to push through his industrialization plans, have been largely discarded during the recent decade. The present leadership uses them only to the degree it considers indispensable for the maintenance of its control over the population; no more and no less.

Another new development of the post-Stalin period has been the changing role of the leading stratum of Soviet society—by which term we mean those groups who occupy a social position far above that of ordinary citizens but who on the other hand do not belong to the top group of Soviet leaders; the "leading stratum" would thus include managers and chief engineers of large enterprises, marshals and admirals of the armed forces, high officials of the central and republic administrative bodies, regional party secretaries, editors of important journals and newspapers, leading scientists, jurists and artists. All these people, who under Stalin were without rights and at any time subject to arrest, now not only enjoy a certain degree of security but are also beginning to assume an increasingly independent political role. They are now able to express their views and sometimes—albeit still within rather narrow limits—to influence policies of the regime. This is in part the result of the growing practice of consulting specialists, *i.e.*, members of the leading stratum, before important policy decisions are taken by the top leadership. Thus, a group of leading Soviet educators were largely responsible for the watering-down of the recent school reform as originally proposed by Khrushchev. The relatively tolerant official attitude towards unorthodox artists and writers is also illustrative of the changed conditions.

The Party Apparatus and the Leadership

With the abatement of terror and the new prominence of the intelligentsia, the role and the operational methods of the ruling Communist Party have changed as well. During the Stalin era the party apparatus was only *one* of the pillars of the power system, the others being the secret police, the army, the state-administrative organs and the economic bureaucracy. Among all these, to be sure, the police and the party were the predominant organs, but neither one of them, and especially not the party, could claim a monopoly of power in the state. Since Stalin's death, however, following a series of power struggles, all the former pillars of the system have been subordinated to the party, which is now the one absolute center of power in the Soviet Union. The extension of the functions of the

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party apparatus, especially in the sphere of the economy, has already had important consequences. The conflicts that once took place between the several power centers are now fought within the party apparatus—between the political-ideological and the economic departments as well as among the "economic" functionaries themselves (mainly between those responsible for the industrial sector and those responsible for agriculture).

Furthermore, the post-Stalin reforms and reorganizations and the frequent switches in the party line have given rise to a more pronounced differentiation of opinions within the party apparatus. The extent and speed of destalinization is probably the one issue that generates more conflicting views than any other: opinions range all the way from a conservative, pro-Stalinist ("dogmatist") orientation to a reformist outlook, whose protagonists advocate a more far-reaching and more rapid repudiation of Stalin's heritage. Political disputes of this kind are often connected with power struggles in regional party centers (Leningrad, Ukraine, and others).

The enlarged tasks of the party apparatus in the economic field have placed a higher premium on the professional qualifications of the party functionaries. The important changes in the educational plan for party officials clearly bear out this fact: since the spring of 1956 the course of studies in the existing 29 four-year party schools has been so reformed that at the present time only 40 percent of the curriculum is devoted to ideology and the remaining 60 percent to 22 subjects in applied economics. Moreover, economic-technical knowledge and a "feeling for the new" (*i.e.*, a readiness to accept reforms)—in addition to dedication, rigor, ideological firmness and absolute loyalty to the leadership—are now being demanded with increasing emphasis from the students. Even popularity and an understanding of popular moods are regarded today as necessary qualifications for party workers. The characteristics of a party functionary are thus beginning to change—from those of an obstinate and tough *apparatchik* of the Stalin era to a modern party manager capable of solving technical-economic problems and "fulfilling" norms, yet also sensitive to the political sentiments of the citizens.

This change of outlook is reflected in the composition of the top party leadership. For the first time in the history of Soviet communism, almost one-half of the members of the party Presidium are graduates of technical institutes who spent several years working as technicians before beginning their career in the party apparatus.

Moreover, changes in the Presidium membership are now carried out in a considerably more civilized way; no longer are demotions accompanied by arrest or execution. Of all the Presidium members dismissed since the death of Stalin, only one, Beria, was shot (in December 1953). In the subsequent five years (1953-58), defeated Presidium members were still subjected to harsh political attacks (Malenkov, Molotov, Kaganovich, Shepilov, Marshal Zhukov, Bulganin) and some of them found it necessary to humiliate themselves through public self-criticism, but none was arrested. Lately, several leaders have been dismissed (Kirichenko, Furtseva, Mukhitdinov, Ignatov, and Aristov) without the accompaniment of the usual political defamation. The rotation system announced in the new party program and party statutes, promising a periodic membership turnover in the various party bodies, indicates that in the future changes of personnel may proceed more smoothly and without political convulsions (with the possible exception of another succession struggle).

The party leaders' modes of operation have also changed to a certain extent. In contrast with the past, the Presidium and the Central Committee now meet on a regular basis, and the latter body, while still subordinated to the Presidium, is more influential.

Furthermore, the atmosphere of secrecy with which the leaders used to surround themselves has been lifted somewhat. While even today not all decisions are made public, the party members and the population are considerably better informed about government activity than ten years ago. In short, the citizens now command somewhat more respect. The tone of the party edicts is still often harsh and dogmatic, yet in comparison with the Stalinist past, the government explains its policies somewhat more explicitly and decisions of the leaders are announced in less dictatorial tones.

The personal relationship between leadership and population, too, is beginning to change. While in Stalin's time the leaders kept themselves in aloof isolation not only from the people but even from the party apparatus, today they travel widely throughout the Soviet Union, meet with middle and lower-level functionaries, visit local party conferences, collective farms and industrial enterprises, and mingle with foreigners of various political views both in Moscow and abroad.

Social and Nationality Policies

In the area of social welfare, much as in the political sphere, many of the basic features of Stalinist policy have been retained. The primacy of heavy industry still constitutes the general line, even if the emphasis is less categorical than in the past. The living standard

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of the population is still far below the level of other industrialized countries. The labor unions are still organs of the party apparatus rather than independent organizations. In sum, the Soviet Union today remains about as far from the workers' autonomous administration of their own affairs, which Marx and Engels described as the decisive characteristic of a socialist society, as it was under Stalin.

Yet there have been some changes. The priority of heavy industry in investment planning has in actual practice been extensively modified by frequent deviations from the proclaimed principle, by various "consumer goods programs," and by a continuous tug-of-war for investment funds. The total neglect of consumer-goods production that marked the Stalin era has not been carried over into the present period; while the needs of the consumers are by no means adequately satisfied even today, they are taken into consideration to a much larger extent.

Another advance is the rise during the past decade of the real wages of industrial workers and of farm incomes. The establishment of minimum wage rates and shorter work hours, the repeal of the "Twenty-Minute-Law" (under which an employee who was more than 20 minutes late could be punished by compulsory labor at his place of employment for periods up to six months and with a 25-percent pay-cut), the restoration of the right to quit a job, new regulations on industrial safety and hygiene, new old-age pension laws, and the intensification of housing construction are all additional evidence of new trends in social policy in the post-Stalin era.

The labor unions, which under Stalin served no other purpose than to induce workers to increase production, retain that function today, but they have since been given more opportunities to promote the material and social interests of the employees. Thus in 1957 and 1958 new regulations were put into effect which direct the unions to check on compliance with collective agreements on the part of not only the labor force but also the management. Union committees in plants are much more active today than they were under Stalin in enforcing observance of industrial safety and health laws. Management officials who fail to meet their obligations and violate work laws can be called to account. Managers can neither discharge employees nor set wage rates or production standards without union approval, and the unions also have more of a voice than before in the appointment of supervisory personnel and management officials.

Furthermore, a gradual change is beginning to be noticeable in human relations within the plants. The principle of "one-man-direction" (*yedinonachalie*) is still maintained officially, but emphasis has shifted from absolute authority of the manager to harmonious cooperation between manager, the engineering and technical personnel, and the workers. The "production conferences," which fell into disuse at the end of the 1920's have been reintroduced and made a permanent institution. Although the principal function of these bodies is again to stimulate production, there are now indications that the work force is to be given a larger part in the management of the plants. Additional evidence of this trend can be found in Khrushchev's recent proposal, made before the Central Committee Plenum in November 1962, to organize in all plants and on construction sites so-called "production committees" which would be elected at general meetings of the workers.

In the treatment of minorities, on the other hand, little improvement can be noted. Stalin's policy of Russification and Great-Russian chauvinism (in a country where, according to the official census, 54.8 percent of the people are Russians and 45.2 percent are members of non-Russian nationalities) has not been materially changed during the past decade. It is true that in the first post-Stalin years a few hopeful signs appeared on the political horizon: in 1953-54 there seemed to be a move afoot to appoint minority representatives to positions of greater prominence; in 1956, at the 20th Party Congress, criticism was leveled against nationalistic Russian history writing; and early in 1957 there followed the official rehabilitation of the Chechens, Ingush, Balkars, Kalmucks, and Karachaians, who were allowed to return to the territories formerly occupied by them (no mention was made of the similarly deported Volga Germans and Crimean Tartars).

This hopeful trend ended in 1958, however, when a return to Stalin's Russification policy, although in different form, became noticeable. Greater emphasis has again been placed on the study of Russian, and charges of "nationalistic deviation" have filled the pages of Soviet newspapers. When in the 1959 census 10.2 million non-Russian Soviet citizens indicated Russian as their mother tongue, the event was praised by *Pravda* as "progressive." There have been other indications of the same trend, such as the declarations of the new Party Program about the "amalgamation of peoples" on the road to communism, the proclamation of the Russian language as the "general language of intercourse" of all peoples of the USSR, and the establishment of new economic regions, cutting across ethnic boundaries, which has led to a further weakening of the non-Russian union republics. In short, Russification is in full force,

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and the first halting steps of the middle 1950's toward equal rights for all peoples of the USSR have been effectively reversed.

Cultural Policy and Ideology

Somewhat more significant changes have been achieved in the realm of cultural policy, but even here a distinction must be drawn between retention of the basic principles and variations in actual practice. The party remains as much in control of the arts and literature as in the past; and indeed, the right and the duty of the party to exercise such control is being stressed over and over again. Similarly, the concepts of "socialist realism" and "party-mindedness" are being officially upheld as much as before.

Nevertheless, party control in the cultural field is now exercised with greater circumspection and restraint. Administrative measures against writers and artists are relatively rare, as compared with the Stalin era. "Socialist realism" and similar precepts are interpreted more broadly and require less rigorous adherence than in the past. Political "guidance" articles written by party publicists on questions of culture and art no longer have anything like the authority they used to have. Conversely, the role, importance, and influence of Soviet writers and artists, including those paying little or no attention to the officially prescribed principles, have increased in considerable measure.

This new measure of tolerance has enabled Soviet writers and artists to represent the Stalinist past and its terror with a refreshing degree of frankness, even if still with considerable restraint. Furthermore, for the first time in three decades, books of an entirely non-political character dealing with purely human problems are now being published in ever increasing numbers. Some of the poems and stories currently appearing in print contain not only denunciations of the Stalinist past but also oblique criticism of the present system.

The progress toward greater freedom of expression, however, is uneven: periods of advance and retrenchment follow one another in rapid succession. Nor is the pace of relaxation identical in the various fields of art. The repudiation of Stalinist precepts has gone furthest in literature, while in painting, for example, official conservatism and control remain more restrictive.

This raises the question of how the political and social changes briefly outlined here have affected official Communist ideology. Without doubt, the function of ideology in the USSR, officially described as "Marxism-Leninism," remains the same: it provides the self-perpetuating leadership with a justification for the rule of the party, and it infuses the faithful with firmness, self-confidence, and optimism. All party members are required to study "Marxism-Leninism"; it is also taught as a compulsory subject—even *more widely* than under Stalin—in universities and the upper grades of secondary schools. And in simplified form, it is carried to the people through a gigantic propaganda apparatus.

The traditional division of "ideology" into philosophy ("dialectical and historical materialism"), economics ("political economy of capitalism and socialism"), and political doctrines (recently described as "scientific communism"), has likewise been retained. Even many of Stalin's crucial theses propounded for the ideological justification of the system, such as his assertion in 1936 that "socialism" had been achieved in the Soviet Union at that time, his thesis of the "motivating forces" and the "moral and political unity" of Soviet society, and his pronouncement on the "non-antagonistic contradictions" (contrasted with the "antagonistic contradictions" in capitalism) are still in force—with the difference, however, that no one mentions today that these theses are Stalin's.

What then has changed in official Soviet ideology? Aside from several interesting and by no means unimportant revisions of traditional formulations in the fields of philosophy, economics and foreign affairs (which for lack of space cannot be outlined in this article), certain major Stalinist propositions affecting internal policy have been significantly revised. Thus Stalin's thesis of the "capitalist encirclement" of the USSR has been considered "obsolete" since the spring of 1958. Stalin's pronouncement of March 1937 associating the intensification of class struggle with the evolution of "socialism," which the dictator used as his ideological justification for the Great Purge of the 1930's as well as the terror of the post-World War II period, is considered today not only "obsolete" but downright erroneous. In 1959 Soviet ideologists also banned as inadmissible the military terminology which Stalin frequently used in explaining political problems (a habit still followed today by the Chinese party ideologists).

ASIDE FROM THE replacement of certain fragments of Stalinist doctrine by new theses adapted to the goals of the present party leadership, there has also been a change in the manner of presentation of doctrinal subjects. Stalin's "Short Course" of party history (which had replaced all other textbooks), has been supplanted by a more comprehensive exposition of current party

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ideology. The new ideological textbooks, including *Foundations of Marxist Philosophy*, *Political Economy*, and *Foundations of Marxism-Leninism* (the first attempt to bring all doctrine together in a single volume), are still marked by a dogmatic approach, but in comparison with the ideological publications of the Stalin era, these new texts are couched in a less absolutist manner and include more analysis and elucidation. More important, certain concessions have been made to contemporary reality and recent findings of sociology, economics, and political science. The terminology applied to political dissenters has been moderated somewhat: such politico-zoological epithets, common under Stalin, as "jackals," "hyenas," "sharks," "wolves," "curs," or "pygmies," are now hardly ever used; Trotsky, Bukharin, and their followers are no longer "spies," but merely "party enemies." By the same token, and in keeping with the increasing involvement of the party in practical economic activity, a wide range of technical-economic detail has now become part of ideology. Finally, in contrast to the Stalin era, ideological theses are no longer valid for prolonged periods of time; the frequent shifts in practical politics have forcibly foreshortened the life of ideological propositions. Even ideological textbooks are out of date within two or three years of publication and must be replaced by new, and in many instances extensively revised, editions.

The most significant change in the realm of ideology, however, is the downgrading of Stalin from the infallible Marxist-Leninist and "genius of human science" to the status of an ordinary party leader and statesman who was guilty of many mistakes and not a few crimes. The main targets of the frequently self-serving and slanted criticism have been Stalin's "personality cult," the crimes committed during the great purge and other "violations of socialist legality," his military blunders during World War II, the ideological misinterpretations in his works, his erroneous economic, cultural, and nationality policies, his isolation from the people, and lately also his forced collectivization of Soviet agriculture. In its critical reexamination of the Stalinist past the present leadership has sought the following objectives: (1) to free present-day Soviet communism from the millstone of Stalin's heritage; (2) to carry out reforms reversing Stalinist policies and doctrines; and (3) to obtain a better position from which to combat dogmatic Stalinist forces both within the Soviet Union and in the world Communist movement generally. At the same time, the leadership has tried hard from the beginning of the anti-Stalin campaign to draw a distinction between Stalin's crimes and "blunders" and the "correct" policy of the Soviet Communist Party (which for 31 years, from 1922 to 1953, was led by Stalin)—an endeavor that has turned out to be singularly unsuccessful. Even faithful Communists were encouraged by Khrushchev's revelations to think critically about the past and the future. The thesis of the "infallibility" of the party has suffered a grievous blow.

The joint impact of the foregoing factors has been to diminish the influence of ideology in the USSR, and the party leadership has lost much of its earlier power to direct at will the thought of millions of people.

A Few Conclusions

This very fragmentary summary of post-Stalin developments in the principal areas of Soviet domestic policy raises a number of important questions. What prompted the changes discussed here? And what are their significance and possible limits?

To begin with, it is necessary to distinguish between the underlying causes which made the post-Stalinist reforms necessary, and the more immediate reasons for bringing them about. The former should be sought primarily in the contradictions of Stalinism as a method of rule. This system, established by Stalin and his followers in the late 1920's and early 1930's, had as its primary purpose the industrialization of the country by coercion and terror, and the transformation of Soviet society from a backward agrarian country into a modern industrial state. But the more advances were made in accomplishing this task and the nearer the USSR drew to this goal, the more the system became incompatible with the conditions and requirements of an emerging industrial society. Stalinist methods—police terror, the slave labor camps, the periodic decimation of the ruling elite through arrests and executions, and the clumsy centralized bureaucratic regulation of all areas of life—proved uneconomical and politically ineffectual in promoting the growth of Soviet society.

Toward the end of the Stalin era, and even before in some particular realms, the Soviet Union had reached a level of industrial and social development that required sophisticated methods of government as well as men and women capable of initiative and personally motivated to cope with complex new problems. It was essential to free the party and state bureaucracy, the officer corps, the intelligentsia, as well as workers and kolkhoz farmers, from the fear that was crippling them, and give them at least some measure of personal security and a chance for personal initiative, if Soviet society was to progress.

The immediate impulse for the post-Stalin reforms sprang from the situation that had evolved in the

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last months of the Stalin era. The "*Zhdanovshchina*" (1946-48) and the various "affairs" of the postwar years (the Leningrad affair, 1949-50; the Crimea affair, 1950; the Minrelian affair, 1951-52), had been merely ingredients, as subsequently revealed at the 19th Party Congress (October 1952), in the preparation of a new Great Purge. The swiftly intensifying vigilance and purge campaign in the last weeks of 1952 and the "Kremlin doctors affair" (mid-January 1953) were an unmistakable sign to thousands of officials as well as to the top leaders that their own lives were in danger. This explains why immediately upon the dreaded dictator's death the top leadership not only lost no time in putting a stop to the purge but also took the first steps to curtail the power of the State Security Service and provide conditions which, in the words of an official statement of April 1953, would permit the people to work in "peace and safety."

KROKODIL Discovers Stalin

Caption above: The Life of an Heir

Sign on Wall: 20th Congress of the CPSU—Resolutions and Decisions

Middle and lower captions: At work . . . and at home. (The portrait is of Generalissimo Stalin).

—*From* Krokodil *(Moscow), Dec. 10, 1962.*

By these first measures, adopted for the sake of their own safety, the post-Stalin leaders took the first steps toward repudiating Stalin. Increasingly thereafter they were faced with the basic problems and contradictions of Stalinist rule. They had to find ways of introducing reforms which would clear away outdated practices of the Stalin era without undermining the basic features of the Communist system—and their own control. Inevitably conflicts and controversies arose with regard to both the "general line"—*i.e.*, the tempo, scope and methods of implementing the process of destalinization—and the allocation of supreme power (involving primarily the relationship between party, state, and army)—*i.e.*, the question of who would *control* this process. These controversies in turn compelled the various apparatuses and leaders to seek support for their "line" among party and state officials, and even to appeal to the people at large. Thus ever new forces were being drawn into the contest.

On top of that, every repudiation of some single aspect of the Stalin era raised a new set of problems which called for additional new reforms, until finally the point was reached where it was no longer sufficient to treat Stalin with mere silence; it became necessary to criticize and denounce him publicly so that a sharp line could be drawn separating the present from the Stalinist past. All of this suggests that de-stalinization was not at all a process carefully planned beforehand, but in many respects a series of reactions of the leadership to changing political and administrative requirements. Herein lies also the explanation for the zigzag course and the frequent alternations between advance and retreat which have become typical of the destalinization process.

This political evolution, which has followed so irregular a course, has exhibited only one constant trait: the leadership has never swayed from the policy of waging a two-front war—on one side, against the retarding post-Stalinist forces ("dogmatists" and "conservatives") who wanted to cling to Stalin's old methods and opposed the reforms, and on the other, against those ("rotten liberals," "revisionists") who wanted to make the repudiation of Stalin more complete and to

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carry out destalinization more swiftly and comprehensively than the top leaders thought advisable. Depending on the circumstances, the party leadership has aimed its blows at one or the other group, but it has constantly sounded its warning against "dangers" from *both* sides and attacked both "deviations." The point of significance here is that the leadership has successfully prevailed in all essential matters, and so has retained absolute control throughout the years of change.

The future is likely to show that the changes accomplished during the first post-Stalin decade amount to much more than merely minor corrections effected on the body of a rigidly unreconstructed Stalinist system; the argument that there had been "softer" and "harder" periods under Stalin too cannot be considered analogous. On the other hand, the power of the leadership and the party apparatus and their control over all areas of life are still too complete to permit characterizing the post-Stalin evolution as "liberalization" or "democratization." It must be borne in mind that while a return to Stalinist methods of rule is anything but likely, no assurances exist which would positively preclude such a reversal.

The sum of the post-Stalin development appears to be about this: While most of the crucial features of the old political system remain intact, certain important reforms are now in effect which have altered the power relations as well as the patterns and methods of rule in the state. Thus a new situation has been created in many areas of Soviet life.

One of the two basic tendencies in this evolution is the modernization of Soviet communism, aimed at resolving the "unnecessary contradictions" left by the Stalin regime to its successors and adapting the existing "superstructure" to the realities of present-day Soviet industrial society. The other is the sustained and thus far successful effort of the party leadership to assure for itself continued absolute control over the state by keeping all the necessary changes within the bounds of the system. These two factors define in turn the scope as well as the limits of the post-Stalin changes in Soviet internal development.

Foreign Policy from Malenkov to Khrushchev

By Helmut Sonnenfeldt

WHEN STALIN'S LEGATEES assumed the reins of power on March 5, 1953, the USSR possessed formidable assets for the conduct of its international policy. It had made enormous strides since the end of World War II in restoring its physical strength. The material wounds of war had been substantially healed and the basis laid for new economic progress, especially in heavy industry. Militarily, the USSR maintained the largest land army in the world, commanded growing modern air and submarine forces, and—since 1949—atomic weapons; and the new Soviet leaders could anticipate that this arsenal would shortly be supplemented by vastly more powerful hydrogen weapons and the beginnings of a formidable missile force. The Soviet Union, in short, was acquiring the military power with which to reach beyond the confines of Eurasia.

The Soviet Union itself had long since ceased to be a lonely Communist island. Russia's European frontiers had been moved several hundred kilometers farther west and were now buttressed by a belt of Communist-ruled countries completely under Moscow's domination and

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garrisoned by Soviet military and police forces. Not only did this seem to provide the USSR with as secure a western flank as it could possibly obtain, but Soviet dominance of Eastern, Central and Southeastern Europe afforded a powerful wedge pointed at the rest of Europe. To the east also, the Soviet Union now had a great revolutionary ally in Red China, guarding the USSR's Pacific flank and casting the shadow of Communist power over the adjacent regions of Asia.

Yet, the new Soviet leaders must also have been aware that in many ways the USSR was at a standstill in world affairs. Stalin's expansionist policies had isolated the Soviet Union and evoked accelerated responses on the part of the non-Communist world that, at the least, narrowed Soviet opportunities for further advances and, at worst, might lead to a military clash with the United States. Western Europe and North America had erected the framework of an alliance structure which, militarily, opposed dangerous obstacles to further Soviet expansion; politically, produced an unprecedented degree of Western unison, restricting Soviet international maneuverability; economically, set in motion a process of dynamic regeneration in the countries of the Western alliance; and, psychologically, created a mood of determination to resist Soviet encroachment and put the West's own house in order so as to defeat Communist expectations of "capitalist" degeneration.

In Korea, Stalin left his successors saddled with an abortive adventure—the product of his own miscalculation—which was beyond their capacity to carry through and which, if not closed out by a compromise, might well embroil the USSR more directly and damagingly.

In another area, there were indications that the new leaders in Moscow were far from satisfied with the state of Soviet relations with the underdeveloped countries, especially those newly independent since the war. Here, Soviet influence was negligible or wholly absent; formal relations were minimal; and the voices of the newly sovereign countries seemed to be bolstering the Communist-alleged US "voting machine" in the United Nations, emphasizing Soviet isolation. In the UN, it is true, the Soviet Union had managed to prevent direct action against countries of the Communist bloc (except in the cast of Korea); but the generally negative Soviet attitude in UN deliberations had served to highlight American leadership and to prompt reforms enabling the organization to conduct business despite or without the Soviet Union.

Besides being faced with these evidences of stagnation and danger, the new Soviet leaders could not help but be conscious of the fact that with the death of Stalin the Soviet Union, in its world relations, had lost the one man in whose hands all the strands of policy had merged; who, whatever his failings, had accumulated immense experience in handling Soviet foreign policy; and—perhaps most important—who, though hated and distrusted around the world, had also inspired a fear that served as an important asset to Soviet policy, at least in a tactical sense.

Search for a New Style

While there is always some danger in generalizations, it is probably accurate to view Soviet foreign policy in roughly the first four to five years after Stalin's death as designed to achieve new maneuverability and to enable the USSR to capitalize on its position as the second most powerful state in the world.[1] These also were years marked by the efforts of the new leadership to adapt the conduct of affairs to Stalin's absence, to experiment with and introduce a new style of Soviet international behavior.

In retrospect, the amount of activity exhibited by Soviet diplomacy and the Soviet foreign policy-making machinery in the first year after March 5, 1953, is remarkable. It testifies to the perhaps insufficiently recognized fact that, even under Stalin's iron and capricious hand, the top Soviet leadership group did acquire considerable experience in the conduct of affairs and in the techniques of decision-making. The members of the elite had, after all, spent virtually their entire adult lives in the occupation of governing the USSR—perhaps not always at the center in Moscow, but certainly at one place or another up and down the party or government apparatus. The group of leaders that assumed the reins in 1953 had—purges, rivalries, and manipulations notwithstanding—been relatively stable for some fifteen years and undoubtedly had developed procedures for staff work and policy-making that now stood them in good stead.

In any event, there was perceptible movement in Soviet foreign policy almost from the moment of Stalin's death. Much was done, for example, to mitigate the most flagrant aspects of Soviet isolation from the outside world. To cite a minor but not insignificant symptom, in 1953 Russian wives of foreign nationals on assignment in the USSR were granted the right to obtain exit visas so that they could leave the country

[1] A persuasive case can be made that several of the policy lines which became evident after Stalin's death had their origins well before that event. It is undeniable, however, that Stalin's disappearance imparted new momentum and, in many cases, new directions to the conduct of Soviet foreign affairs.

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with their husbands. On a much more important plane, the leadership moved with dispatch to break the deadlock in the Korean armistice talks over the repatriation of North Korean prisoners of war; in effect, Moscow showed itself prepared to grant that some of the prisoners might indeed prefer not to return home.

Soon after Stalin's death, the Soviets also came to terms on the deadlocked question of who should succeed Trygve Lie as Secretary General of the United Nations —a move which, whatever other motives may have been behind it, at least signified a willingness to see the world organization function once again with some degree of normality. And in still another gesture, Moscow renounced its untenable claims on Turkish territory, seemingly presaging a turn away from Stalin's implacable hostility towards non-Communist neighbors.

By the end of 1953, Stalin's successors had managed to achieve quite a substantial degree of elbowroom in the major areas of Soviet foreign relations. A four-power conference with the West on Germany and a new round of disarmament negotiations had been arranged; ambassadors had again been exchanged with Yugoslavia; relations with India, whose independence Stalin had refused to recognize, had been normalized to the point of bringing into being the first Soviet-Indian trade agreement; and the first Soviet hydrogen bomb had been exploded, incontestably demonstrating the military power of the USSR. Despite the internal succession struggle and severe differences over domestic and foreign issues within the CPSU Presidium, the leadership had, in less than a year, set in train the major lines of Soviet foreign policy which, with numerous but not fundamental modifications, have remained in force through the past ten years. Broadly speaking, the foreign policy goals and characteristics that emerged were as outlined below.

New Directions of Policy

In its relations with the Western allies, the USSR sought to limit the danger of major war, whose devastating consequences the Soviet leadership came to view with increasing realism. At the same time, the Soviets sought to utilize these dangers to urge upon the West the necessity and prudence of accepting the great power status of the USSR and hence its right and ability to pursue its interests on a world scale. The revived doctrine of "peaceful coexistence"—revived, incidentally, even before Khrushchev, who is usually identified with it, attained full power—was, in its most practical aspects, a doctrine laying down ground rules under which the USSR would be able to conduct an activist world policy at minimum risk of evoking forcible Western reactions. These objectives led the Soviet leaders to seek broader contacts with Western statesmen, through conferences at all levels and other forms of personal diplomacy, in order both to generate an atmosphere of understanding about the ground rules of competition and, in selected instances, to achieve actual agreements.

At the same time, the Soviets sought to slow down, if not disrupt, the process of Western coalescence which had been born in reaction to Stalin's postwar pressure westward. In the early post-Stalin period, this effort was chiefly directed against the integration of West Germany into the Western defense system. While it perhaps caused some delay and led, in some quarters, to second thoughts about missed opportunities to reunite Europe, this Soviet effort suffered from the fatal flaw that the USSR, certainly by 1953-54, if not already by 1946, was basically unwilling to relinquish the Communist foothold on the Elbe and therefore could offer no real and attractive alternative to the Western design.

But the broader Soviet policies toward the West that were noted above did not necessarily depend on the success or failure of European regeneration and unity. Obviously, failure would have pleased Moscow since it would have opened many new opportunities, whereas actual Western success over the years has confronted the Soviet leaders with difficult problems. Yet, as the Western powers took successive steps to organize themselves, to the constant accompaniment of Soviet protests, threats and inducements designed to deter these developments, the Soviet leadership nevertheless continued to keep open the lines of communication, especially with the United States, and to preserve at least an understanding that recourse to warfare must be avoided.

Vis-à-vis the underdeveloped countries, Soviet policy sought in the first instance to create some sort of contact. To achieve this, Moscow needed not only to establish diplomatic, commercial and cultural relations where they had previously existed either not at all or only *pro forma*, but also to demonstrate an active interest in the concerns of the underdeveloped countries. Whatever its innermost beliefs, the Soviet leadership had to begin to act as if it really acknowledged the independence of countries like India, Burma, and Indonesia. Because of the sterile and hostile nature of Stalin's policy toward these emerging countries, even relatively small Soviet shifts in the direction of a more sympathetic and understanding policy in the early post-Stalin years produced disproportionately and perhaps deceptively impressive results. Evidences of apparent Soviet influence began to manifest themselves increasingly in Asia and the Middle East, and later in Africa and Latin America.

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Moscow's goals in the underdeveloped areas were to remove, or at least limit, Western influence and conversely to acquire for the USSR a larger and more effective role. As the new Soviet effort gathered momentum in 1955, Moscow evidently began to look forward to a major breakthrough in which one or more of the underdeveloped countries would be permanently detached from the capitalist West and tied politically and economically to the Soviet bloc. It is doubtful that the Soviet leadership was so sanguine as to expect the early establishment of Communist regimes (though in a case like Syria its hopes may have run fairly high). For the moment this seemed a matter of lesser priority, partly because the Soviet leaders were realistic enough to recognize that for the most part there were no local Communist movements capable of assuming power, partly because overt Communist seizures of power might precipitate forceful Western reactions which Soviet power could not prevent or repel, and partly because Moscow may have calculated that once a country was severed from the West and brought substantially under Soviet influence, there would be time enough to set "revolutionary transformations" in train.

The Soviet policy of developing contacts with and influence over the existing nationalist regimes of emergent nations of course posed problems where these regimes were anti-Communist and actually repressed indigenous Communist movements. But in such cases, the Stalinist tradition of sacrificing the momentary interests of local Communists to Soviet needs and policies stood the post-Stalin leadership in good stead, although it would be wrong to suppose that the Soviets made the choice with relish.

The Soviet leadership decided to move into the underdeveloped world because it saw there the most promising arena for battle against the capitalist West. It was here that the West appeared most immediately vulnerable and that the danger of Western military reaction seemed least acute. The Soviet decision was thus a product, on the one hand, of the Western allies' political and military programs which had made direct encroachments against them too risky and, on the other hand, of Soviet recognition that forces had been set in motion in the emergent areas of the world which, if properly stimulated and harnessed to Soviet purposes, could usher in a promising period of "revolutionary flux."

Bloc Relations and Destalinization

Within its own Communist empire, the post-Stalin leadership seemed to recognize quite early that new relationships must be found. Not only was it questionable that the new leaders themselves were capable of running the bloc in the same manner that Stalin had; but the bloc also had now been in existence for several years, and various nationalistic tendencies, submerged at first, were beginning to assert themselves. Moreover, it must already have appeared doubtful that China would for long remain willing to defer to total Soviet pre-eminence.[2]

If the stagnation and isolation that had characterized Soviet external relations in the closing Stalin years were to be overcome, the rigidities and repressions that had contributed to those conditions clearly had to be corrected in the USSR's relations not only with non-Communist countries but also with the members of the Communist bloc. Almost certainly this latter aspect of post-Stalin policy has been one of the foremost areas of controversy among the leadership. It has both reflected and further stimulated disagreements between the more and the less rigid members of the leadership group.

The problem of how to rationalize intra-bloc relationships was intimately related to the problem of destalinization at home. As events soon demonstrated, however, it was easily the more explosive of the two because the Kremlin's ability to control the process was naturally greater at home than in Eastern Europe. The resentments and frustrations that lurked beneath the surface in the East European satellites were caused by, and hence directed at, not only domestic repression but also alien domination. The outbreaks that erupted first in East Germany in June 1953 and later on in other East European orbit countries were prompted by aspirations both for the liberalization of the local Communist regimes and for the termination, or at least limitation, of Russification. Stalin had sought to make the satellites small-scale replicas of the USSR—and he had not hesitated to apply, or threaten to apply, Soviet military and police force to accomplish this end. The roots of the East European regimes in their own national soil were, for the most part, shallow indeed. Hence, as many in the new Soviet leadership seemed to view it, Moscow's task lay in nurturing these roots so that the

[2] Developments within the Communist world are dealt with elsewhere in this issue and are therefore touched on only very briefly here. Clearly, however, Soviet policies within the Communist bloc and international Communist movement are closely related to overall Soviet foreign policy, if only because they affect the home base from which that policy operates. Moreover, if it is true, as this author believes, that Moscow remains dedicated to the creation of a world-embracing Communist system, then the question of how the Communist bloc arranges its affairs has a very fundamental bearing on the Soviet world outlook generally.

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satellite regimes could stand on their own. However, the question that had to be answered—and Molotov and some others in the leadership evidently argued that the answer must be in the negative—was whether the East European regimes, if allowed to strengthen their autonomous national foundations, could be counted upon to remain firmly tied to Moscow's apron strings.

Finally, all these external goals and policies rested, of course, on further development at home. The continued rapid growth of the Soviet economy and the effectiveness of the whole political, economic and social system were prerequisites for the pursuit of Soviet ambitions in the world at large. If the Soviet Union was to be universally accepted as a great power, and its system to exercise any attraction as a model for other countries to adopt, it must not only command the tools of power essential to the conduct of international policy but also satisfy the material and spiritual needs of its own people. With Stalin gone, the old prescriptions for making the system work and the people produce were no longer practicable—unless one of his successors should manage to establish himself in the dead dictator's image. But this, obviously, Stalin's heirs were not prepared to let happen. Moreover, if the new leaders were indeed genuinely concerned with restoring momentum to Soviet world policy, they must very quickly have realized the necessity of doing away with the human and material waste and the other evils of Stalin's later years. They almost certainly recognized that Stalinist brutalities and repressions had not escaped notice abroad despite the curtain of secrecy and isolation that had been drawn around the Soviet Union. They recognized further that their international policy goals would be subverted if they tried to preserve the seclusion of Stalin's day, and that even a slight opening of the curtain must necessarily go hand in hand with a curbing of internal terror. Thus, the effort to break out of the stagnation in Soviet foreign policy was organically linked with the more difficult and painful effort to reform the Stalinist tyranny.

Although it has become fashionable among some observers to view the policies of the post-Stalin leadership as an attempt to liberate the Soviet outlook and conduct from the shackles of Marxist dogma, there is slight evidence that the leadership itself had any such thing in mind. On the contrary, it almost certainly regarded at least the latter days of Stalinist rule as dangerously divorced from Marxist-Leninist insights into the laws of history and social development. At any rate, the Soviet leaders were conscious of the need to repair and revitalize the theoretical stucture within which they were conducting their practical policies. In the foreign field, they had to come to grips especially with such problems as the outlook for capitalism (Stalin had left them with a dogmatic doctrinal premise of inevitable open warfare between capitalist states); the relationship between capitalist and Communist countries in the short, medium and long term and, in that context, the role and likelihood of war; the role of national liberation struggles and the prospects and forms of revolution; and the relevance of national social and economic peculiarities to the applicability of the Soviet revolutionary model. In short, the Soviet leaders were as much concerned with the theoretical underpinnings of their conduct as with that conduct itself. Unity of theory and practice remained, or at least became once again, a vital precept.

The Soviet Position in 1956

By the end of 1955, the leadership was prepared to convoke the first post-Stalin party congress in order to take stock of its accomplishments and chart its further course. The 20th CPSU Congress was a vitally important milestone in the process of adjustment to the disappearance of Stalin, but only a milestone, and one that left many of the pains and problems of adjustment still acute and unresolved. Not until late 1957 and early 1958 did the Soviet leaders view themselves as entering a substantially new historical phase.

When the 20th Congress convened, it was against the backdrop of three broad and interconnected developments in Soviet relations with the outside world. In the first place, the onward rush of military technology had given both the USSR and the United States weapons of unprecedentedly destructive power. While the United States retained significant superiority in the means of delivering these weapons, the Soviets were confident that they possessed a substantial deterrent, and indeed that their own strategic military strength was beginning to have a powerful "sobering" effect on the USSR's enemies. Khrushchev's speeches in India late in 1955 (subsequently echoed by his remarks in Britain in April 1956) indicated that he at least believed that Soviet military strength had reached a point where it could be turned to substantial political advantage.

It was under the umbrella of the anticipated approach of US-Soviet strategic military parity (or at least of growing Soviet capacity to damage the United States) that the second major complex of developments had occurred. There had been a period of active Soviet communication with the West, highlighted by the summit conference in the summer of 1955, the upshot of which was a tacit understanding that major war

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between East and West should be avoided. For the Soviets, this meant attainment of at least passive Western acceptance of Stalin's territorial acquisitions and of Communist domination of Eastern Europe. It meant further that a certain degree of practical cooperation could occur and that some of the more acute irritants in East-West relations might profitably be removed through negotiation and compromise (as, for example, by the Austrian treaty and the Geneva accords on Indochina)—without, however, affecting the basic, long-term, and (in the Soviet view) historically decreed capitalist-communist antagonism. Because of this steadfast Soviet commitment to the concept of fundamental East-West antagonism, more far-reaching settlements involving vital interests (for example, German unification and general disarmament) were still shunned, if not altogether precluded; and efforts to disrupt Western defense arrangements and impede the progress of European and Atlantic integration remained imperative in Moscow's judgment and would continue, albeit with indifferent success.

Thirdly, the USSR had projected itself energetically and successfully into the underdeveloped regions of the world. Soviet leaders had exchanged visits with leaders of India and several other non-aligned countries, and Soviet economic, technical and military assistance had begun to flow to those countries in substantial quantity. In particular, Moscow's program of military assistance to Egypt had injected the Soviet Union into the conflicts of the Middle East and established an unprecedented commitment of Soviet prestige in an area not contiguous to the USSR. The Soviets had also made progress in identifying themselves with the aspirations of the underdeveloped countries, largely through a policy of supporting these countries in their grievances against the West.

The Soviet leap into the Middle East highlighted the duality of Moscow's response to, and utilization of, the developing strategic-military situation. For while, on the one hand, Moscow seemed intent upon preserving some understanding with the United States that both sides should refrain from open warfare, on the other, it calculated that its own military power now permitted it to play an active role in distant regions even when this role impinged on interests deemed vital by some, if not all, the Western powers. Eventually, however, the Suez crisis of 1956 and other crises in more recent years were to drive home to the Soviet leaders the realization that an activist policy abroad, if pursued to the limit, would sooner or later come into conflict with the USSR's overriding desire to avoid direct military clashes with the West.

The 20th Congress drew several theoretical conclusions from the broad developments outlined above. The chief one, with the most far-reaching implications, was that Soviet power had progressed to the point where it effectively restrained the "imperialist" impulse to aggression, and that therefore war was no longer "fatalistically inevitable." It will be noted that this finding (which, incidentally, had been foreshadowed in somewhat different terms by Stalin himself five years earlier) rested on the assumption of Soviet ability to maintain the USSR's relative military position; hence, in proclaiming the non-inevitability of war, the Soviet leadership was simultaneously committing itself to a continued heavy emphasis on those sectors of the economy which provide the sinews of military power.

A further conclusion, flowing in part from the foregoing, was that in some cases socialist revolution could be accomplished by non-forcible means. The Soviets did not make an absolute of this proposition—although the Chinese and Albanians have since alleged to the contrary—but made ample allowance for the use of force in cases where the revolutions might encounter resistance. Nor did they envisage the coming of socialism *without revolution*, as some in the West have asserted; on the contrary, they emphatically maintained that drastic social, economic, and political transformations remained a prerequisite for the introduction of socialism, and they merely allowed that these transformations could, in favorable circumstances, occur without bloodshed.

The effect of this greater emphasis on the possibility of peaceful roads to socialism was to provide theoretical justification for collaboration between Communists and various non-Communist, non-proletarian forces, especially—though not exclusively—in underdeveloped countries, thus imparting new flexibility to Soviet and Communist tactics around the world. It carried with it, however, the danger of diluting the militancy and "vanguard" character of the Communist parties and eventually supplied ammunition to the more orthodox critics of Soviet policy within the international Communist movement.

Carrying this tactical flexibility a step further, the 20th Congress sought to establish a close identity of interests between the USSR and the emergent countries by proclaiming a "zone of peace" in which the Communist bloc linked itself with the non-aligned underdeveloped countries—offering, in effect, Moscow's answer to the Western concept of the "free world."

In broader theoretical terms, the 20th Congress enunciated the Soviet view that national liberation struggles and the quest of underdeveloped countries for

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modernization were linear precursors of socialist revolution and hence stages in the historically determined evolution of world society toward communism. This permitted the Soviets to identify themselves with the forces at work in the underdeveloped world and to view the process of decolonization as part of the general shift in the balance of power toward the Communist bloc, even though the Communists played little or no part in the termination of the old colonial empires and had little prospect of attaining power in any of the newly emerging countries. Thus, even though the post-Stalin leadership had not succeeded in blocking, or even delaying significantly, the consolidation of the capitalist West, it represented itself as leading a powerful, globe-spanning movement which would ultimately surround and engulf the capitalist coalition.

Gains and Frustrations

Much water was to flow under the bridge, however, before the Soviet leaders could speak of this glittering prospect in terms of an attainable reality. The Communist world itself was to be shaken by profound convulsions as it wrestled with the implications of destalinization. Yet, by the 40th anniversary of the October Revolution in November 1957, it was apparent that the Kremlin saw the dawning of a new historical phase. For at this point, four and a half years after Stalin's death, the forward progress of the Soviet Union seemed truly remarkable. At home, the succession struggle seemed settled, with Khrushchev firmly in the saddle and the opposition and its "ossified" views overwhelmed and repudiated. The economy was humming, and the chronic agricultural problem seemed capable of being finally solved by the virgin lands program and organizational streamlining. The Communist empire had withstood the explosions of 1956 and now seemed to be functioning on a rational and viable basis under Soviet hegemony. Even the Yugoslavs seemed willing to inch closer to the Communist community and thus show that a nation might identify itself with that community while still retaining its autonomy. The expanded and expanding Soviet role in the underdeveloped world appeared to be accepted—grudgingly but seemingly helplessly—by the West. And to cap all this, the Soviet Union had launched the first Sputnik into space and successfully tested an intercontinental missile, thus jumping out ahead of the West in military technology. The "correlation of forces," the Soviet Union proclaimed, had shifted irretrievably in favor of the Communist camp. One could now begin to think in terms of a finite date for worldwide Communist victory.

In the preceding issue of *Problems of Communism* Mr. Richard Lowenthal [3] traced the course of international developments and the fate of Soviet expectations since 1957, and his account need not be repeated here. The fact is that as early as 1958 it was beginning to be apparent that Moscow's view of the world was overly optimistic, or at the very least premature. The shock of Soviet technological and military achievements had roused the West to great new efforts in these fields, with the result that the USSR did not achieve the strategic preponderance that would have permitted it to extract significant political concessions. By May 1960 at the latest, *i.e.*, after the U-2 incident, the Soviets must have recognized that the shift in the "correlation of forces" had not been as drastic as they had estimated; and it must also have dawned on them that the West knew enough about Soviet military strength to take Soviet claims with a grain of salt. By 1961-62 Moscow seemed finally convinced that the United States had shed the notion of an adverse "missile gap," and that the impact of the sputnik had largely spent itself.

Meanwhile, the United States had made it abundantly clear in the spring of 1958 that it would not let itself be enticed or dragged to a new summit conference in the shadow of the Soviet sputnik and ICBM. Moreover, in the summer of the same year, the United States demonstrated in Lebanon that it could move military forces to the Middle Eastern doorstep of the USSR in defense of Western interests without encountering Soviet interference. This demonstration to some degree offset the Iraqi revolution and showed that while the West might suffer further losses of position and influence in such regions as the Middle East, it retained the power to prevent such losses from being transformed into Soviet gains. Again, in the Far East, the United States marshalled its forces to deter Communist aggression in the Taiwan Straits and brought home to the Chinese, the Soviets, and the world, the limits of Communist power.

PERHAPS OF EQUAL significance was the fact that Egypt, which had seemingly fallen farthest under Soviet influence, moved in 1958 to regain some freedom of maneuver and to pursue interests which were not congruent with those of the USSR. Nasser's refusal to countenance local Communist activity showed that while Moscow's sputniks and rockets might enhance Soviet prestige and threaten New York, they could not force the release of a single Communist from a Cairo jail—in

[3] "The End of an Illusion," *Problems of Communism*, No. 1 (January-February), 1963, pp. 1-10.

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other words, that Soviet military and technological prowess was not necessarily translatable into tangible political gains.

The Yugoslavs, too, were not sufficiently impressed by the changed "correlation of forces" to align themselves unreservedly with Moscow. Their new party program of 1958 embodied a degree of national peculiarity which, at least at that stage, the Soviets were unwilling to accept.

It was under the impact of these disappointments that Khrushchev launched his campaign to dislodge the West from Berlin, evidently calculating that, there at least, the correlation of forces was such as to assure a visible, concrete success. In the four and a half years since, Khrushchev's Berlin offensive has in fact resulted in some gains for the USSR: the East German regime has obtained a greater degree of recognition; and the West has been drawn into negotiations concerning a reduction of its vital Berlin position, while the Communist position in East Berlin and East Germany has achieved further acceptance. In addition, Khrushchev received the benefit of an edifying and prestigious trip to the United States. But the big prize has thus far eluded the Soviets: it must now be clearly realized in Moscow that whatever arrangement may at some point be made regarding Berlin, the withdrawal of Western forces is not in prospect, and that in spite of Western differences of opinion over methods of handling the Berlin problem, there is unanimity on the preservation of the vital Western rights and interests at stake.

Other at least temporary Soviet disappointments may be briefly alluded to. In the Congo since 1960, the USSR has been unable to control or profit by the course of events, even though initially it seemed on the way to building a significant foothold. Elsewhere in Africa, initial Soviet inroads have levelled off; indeed, in Guinea, where Soviet prospects appeared brightest, a reversal has set in. In Asia, too, something of a plateau seems to have been reached in the growth of Soviet influence, although promising opportunities for developing new momentum continue to exist in particular areas.

At the United Nations, in 1958, 1959, and especially in 1960, the Soviets saw a steady growth in the power and role of the Secretary General, and in at least two places—Laos in 1959 and the Congo in 1960—they felt the brunt of that power being exercised in a manner detrimental to their interests. Moscow's reaction to this was a violent attack on Mr. Hammarskjöld and an effort to force a reorganization of the Secretariat that would, in effect, have paralyzed its functioning. Fate took a hand in removing Hammarskjöld, and his successor has acted with rather more caution where Soviet sensibilities were involved, but nevertheless Moscow fell short of its goal of substantially increasing its influence over United Nations activities.

In Europe, despite the fact that the earlier rapid pace of integration has now been slowed by serious divergencies, there has been a net increase in strength, stability, and self-assurance. The Soviets may take some comfort in the emergence of disagreements between the United States and its West European allies, but it seems unlikely that they will fail to realize that these differences are primarily a reflection of Europe's new strength and therefore may offer the USSR nothing more than a fleeting tactical advantage.

ALMOST CERTAINLY, Moscow's gravest problem is how to organize and unify the Communist world, for unless it can solve this problem, it cannot claim the capacity to organize a viable Communist world society of the future. The apparent inability of Communist states to live side by side as equals and to function except in a hegemonic system is bound to reduce the prospects for the kind of transition to communism which the 20th Party Congress proclaimed feasible. By the same token, if Khrushchev or his successors should succeed in demonstrating that a pluralistic Communist world system is possible, then the appeal of communism as an approach to multinational organization would be greatly enhanced. The issue is a crucial one, and the Soviet leadership is likely to give it ever-increasing attention.

As the Soviet leaders survey the world scene on the tenth anniversary of Stalin's death, they are undoubtedly still digesting the lessons of Cuba. That story, of course, is not yet fully written. But the events of October 1962 certainly demonstrated once again that the prevailing strategic balance does not permit the USSR to achieve a major and sudden breakthrough. On the other hand, Castro remains in power, a declared member of the Communist camp at the doorstep of the United States, and the USSR still maintains a substantial presence in Cuba which, though not a direct military threat to the United States, constitutes a Soviet bridgehead in the Western Hemisphere. Moscow undoubtedly recognizes that if the United States chose to do so, it could eliminate Castro and the Soviet bridgehead in one fell swoop; and Khrushchev probably knows also that to threaten to unleash World War III in response to such eventual US action is not wholly credible. It has therefore been the chief Soviet aim to create a political climate in which the United States would invite serious damage to its political and moral position if it were to

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THINGS THAT DO NOT CHANGE

I. The Image of Uncle Sam

The three cartoons on this page, all depicting the avaricious designs and barbaric characteristics of the United States, are reproduced from the Soviet satirical weekly, *Krokodil*. Their dates of publication (shown below each cartoon) span more than a decade of recent Soviet history, from the time just preceding Stalin's death, through the immediate post-Stalin period and the Khrushchev era. There seems to be little to choose from: the 1952 cartoon (entitled "In Search of Cannon Fodder") deals with ostensible American attempts to recruit Japanese soldiers for the Korean front; the second, accompanied by an apposite "poem," refers to General Alfred Gruenther, then chief of NATO (the mask is for "peace" though none is deceived!); and the most recent one, entitled "In One Team," again depicts the bellicose designs of Uncle Sam—this time drawing the menacing chariot not only with another old warrior, the West German general, but also with (!) Enver Hoxha, the staunch friend of Peking and—as everybody well knows—the closest ally of the United States. . . . The first cartoon was drawn by B. Yefimov,

—*February 20, 1953.*

and the other two by Kukryniksy, the pen name used jointly by three caricaturists: Kuprianov, Krylov, and Sokolov. All have been active since the 1920's; all have specialized in anti-American (or generally anti-foreign) cartoons; all have obviously served to the best of their abilities.—*Ed.*

—*May 20, 1955.*

—*December 20, 1962.*

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use force against Cuba—and would fear that damage to such an extent as to be deterred from taking action which is clearly within its physical capacity. The Soviet leaders presumably calculate that if this political deterrence can be made to last long enough, communism in Cuba will come to be accepted *de facto,* allowing in time a reduction of the Soviet physical commitment there. For the Soviet Union, preservation of the Cuban bastion is of particular importance because losing it would be another demonstration that the great expectations enunciated by Moscow in recent years were premature. Moreover, a viable Communist Cuba would not only serve as an example for other countries in the Western Hemisphere; it would also represent the first genuine accretion to the Communist world since Stalin's death.

The Reckoning

The balance sheet for Soviet foreign policy since Stalin's death is thus a mixed one. Soviet power has vastly increased, and Soviet influence in the world is several orders of magnitude greater than in 1953. Yet the West has also greatly expanded its power, and its world influence remains potent. What is more, today's weapons are such that, unless one side achieves a preponderance that paralyzes the other (an unlikely though perhaps not wholly impossible development), the threat to use them will be increasingly less effective for the purpose of achieving political ends. At any rate, as long as the West keeps up its end of the power balance, Soviet military strength may inspire caution among the USSR's weaker non-Communist neighbors and respect elsewhere, but in and of itself, it is unlikely to produce Communist states or bring non-Communist states under irretrievable Soviet control.

In these circumstances, the extent to which the USSR can turn the process of decolonization and the aspirations of the underdeveloped nations for rapid modernization and industrialization to its own advantage assumes great importance. So far, Soviet hopes and expectations in this direction have been only partially fulfilled. It is true that the old metropolitan countries of Europe retain only a shadow of their former power and influence in these areas, and that many of the new states pursue a far from benevolent neutrality towards the United States. In several countries, indeed, Communist or pseudo-Communist groups are waiting in the wings with some hope of eventually participating in or at least influencing the national governments. Still, the Soviets have not been able to establish and maintain footholds of influence and control to nearly the extent they were led to expect six or eight years ago. In some places, the Congo and Guinea for instance, they have suffered sharp setbacks. Moreover, Soviet differences with China over issues within the bloc have had reverberations outside, and Soviet policy must now take into account Chinese ambitions in the underdeveloped world—ambitions which, as events in India have shown, can be at cross-purposes with Soviet aims. While it would be incorrect to write off Soviet policy toward the underdeveloped world as a failure, it is apparent that Moscow's effort to appropriate the "national liberation struggle" has no more led to a breakthrough than did Soviet acquisition of sputniks and intercontinental missiles.

Whether these realities have led or will lead the Soviet leadership to a fundamental re-evaluation of their analysis of contemporary history, and hence of their general policy line, is difficult to say, but this writer at least is inclined to believe that this will not come about in the near future. The Soviet leadership has undoubtedly become much more sober in its expectations and more aware of the complexities of contemporary world relations than it was five years ago. But it does not seem given to pessimism about its prospects either: for every setback in the Congo, Guinea, or most recently Iraq, it is likely to see opportunities elsewhere to exploit.

Certainly, there can be little doubt that the Soviets have been heartened by recent signs of Western disunity, if only because they see in them a substantiation of their conviction that eventually capitalism will succumb to its innate contradictions. Moreover, it is probably true that the prospects for any retrenchment of Soviet goals are at present complicated by pressures from the "dogmatists," which compel the Soviet leadership to demonstrate continuing success for the broad policies which it has proclaimed as valid for a whole historical era. Finally, although Moscow has in recent years portrayed the march to communism as a continuous process, the Soviet leadership does in fact have a well-developed doctrine that envisages periods of great progress, interrupted from time to time by periods of temporary recoupment and reconsolidation by the capitalist states.

Thus, it would probably be at least premature to expect any fundamental change either in the Soviet assessment of the world situation or in the broad policies to which that assessment has led the USSR in the recent past. The tenth anniversary of their succession to power will undoubtedly prompt those of Stalin's heirs who have been hardy and clever enough to remain this long at the top of the Soviet leadership pyramid to take stock. The result is likely to be a more dogged, if less ebulliently hopeful, pursuit of the policies we have seen in operation for the past several years.

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The Rise and Decline of International Communism

By Richard Lowenthal

THE DEATH OF STALIN ten years ago foreshadowed the abandonment of a historically unique enterprise—the attempt to transfer the centralism of a ruling totalitarian party to an international movement. The rise of Khrushchev to leadership of the Soviet empire was linked with the endeavor to replace the outlived model of a totalitarian World Party by a more flexible, but still single-centered form of international cooperation, under which organizationally autonomous Communist parties and governments would nevertheless voluntarily submit to the ideological authority of the "leading party." By the end of 1960, the CPSU reacted to Chinese attacks on its policy by renouncing this "leading role" in the hope that it would thus escape the need for defending itself in recurrent ideological argument, yet maintain international unity on the basis of pragmatic compromise. Since then, Chinese insistence on unremitting ideological struggle has foiled that hope, and produced factional schism instead of pragmatic unity.

Some Basic Questions

Today we are entitled to look back on the four main stages of the Communist world movement as on a finished period of history. The creation of the centralistic World Party was preceded by a loose alliance of rather heterogeneous revolutionary groups, developing from the "Zimmerwald Left" during the First World War and formalized under Bolshevik leadership by the foundation of the Communist International in 1919. The centralistic stage was by far the longest: it started well before Stalin's reign with the Second World Congress of the Comintern in 1920 and long outlived the formal dissolution of that body in 1943. The third stage opened with Khrushchev's first moves to establish his new type of international leadership in 1954; it was fully developed by 1957, but had become untenable by 1960. The final stage—the attempt at maintaining unity by compromise—can hardly be said to have worked at all.

In retrospect, one is struck both by the strangeness, not to say absurdity, of the concept of international centralism underlying more than 30 years of the Comintern's activity under Lenin and Stalin, and by the quick disintegration of the more "sensible" alternatives developed after Stalin's demise. The centralist structure of a totalitarian party serves to make it a fit instrument for the revolutionary conquest and preservation of total power, and the centralism of the Communist World Party was originally intended to serve this very purpose. Yet revolutionary parties have to win power within existing states by exploiting conditions of national crisis with the utmost flexibility and ruthlessness; they are bound to be inhibited if subjected to the instructions of an outside body tied to a foreign government, and in fact not a single Communist party was victorious for twenty years after the World Party had been formed. Conversely, once one or more non-Russian Communist parties succeeded—whatever the exceptional conditions—in conquering power by their own efforts without receiving it from Russian hands, the eclipse of international centralism became merely a matter of time.

It may be argued, of course, that Stalin soon ceased to believe in the possibility, and even the desirability, of

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independent Communist revolutions, and that he increasingly used the centralist discipline of the World Party to turn its sections into mere tools of Soviet imperial interests. But while it is true that the centralism of the Comintern was more suitable for such employment than for its original purpose, such a view leaves us with two basic questions. One is why non-Russian revolutionaries should ever have accepted the concept of the centralist World Party under Soviet leadership with such blind faith as to allow their groups to be transformed into derivative totalitarian parties that could be used at will as tools of Russian foreign policy. The other is why a few of these derivative totalitarian parties nevertheless succeeded at a late stage in emancipating themselves from total dependence on Soviet instructions, to an extent that enabled them to work out a revolutionary strategy of their own and pursue it to the victorious conquest of power. The first question raises the problem of how the Communist World Party could ever arise; the second amounts to asking how, once its rigid discipline had been established, it could ever decay —how the fatal pluralism of independent Communist states could ever develop within such a system.

Finally, the ideological disintegration of world communism also raises the question of why it has proved impossible to maintain a single doctrinal authority for a movement ruling a plurality of independent states—why the unity of doctrine could not survive the diffusion of power. The answer must be sought in the "Caesaropapist" nature of modern totalitarianism, with its inseparable unity between ideology and state power: here lies the fundamental difference between the structure of international communism and that of the Catholic Church. A spiritual movement may preserve its worldwide doctrinaire unity so long as—for all its determination to influence the conduct of peoples and governments in this world—it refrains from seeking to exert political power directly. But in a movement constructed on the Byzantine model, where loyalty to the faith and obedience to the state coincide, ideological fragmentation is bound to follow the growth of political pluralism.

Revolution and Democracy

Totalitarian parties are not born ready-made. Lenin created his Bolshevik party only by a long and difficult struggle to transform the ideas and organization of the Russian revolutionary Social Democratic movement into an effective instrument for the conquest of power. Loose, dispersed, democratic circles expressing the political needs of the awakening Russian working class had to be turned into a disciplined party ready to tap all sources of discontent, to combine the use of legal propaganda and illegal preparations for armed insurrection and to follow the leader in meeting each new situation by sudden tactical changes. A Marxist belief in the necessary victory of the working class, which would find in each country its appropriate road to emancipation by trial and error, had to be replaced by the conviction that the revolutionary overthrow of Tsarist despotism depended entirely on the "correct" strategy for rallying all revolutionary classes under the leadership of "the party," and that this strategy could only be worked out by the "right" leader combining profound scientific insight with tireless revolutionary zeal. Not a democratic party expressing the development of the working class, but a "Jacobin" party "linked" to the working class and using it to overthrow Tsarism was what Lenin set out to create; and what he in fact created was an instrument of power that did not depend on any one class, but could use and abuse all classes at need.

No corresponding party existed outside Russia when the Bolsheviks seized power. None of the minority groups of revolutionary Marxists or syndicalists who became Lenin's allies during and immediately after World War I had similar ideas. On the contrary, German Spartacists and Dutch Tribunists, British shop stewards, French syndicalists and American "Wobblies" (members of the IWW) all agreed that strict democracy in working-class organizations was the only road to revolutionary action: for they believed that the workers would inevitably be revolutionized by their experience, and that reformism could be imposed on them only by the bureaucratic tricks of parliamentarians and trade union officials. The outlook of all these groups was thus much closer to that of Trotsky and of the revolutionary wing of the Mensheviks than to Lenin's concept; and Rosa Luxemburg, who was not only the foremost theoretician of the German Spartacists but had for many years participated in the factional struggles of the Russian underground as a leading member of one of the Polish socialist groups, was fully aware of these affinities.[1] Hence when these revolutionary minority groups rallied to the support of the Bolsheviks after the latters' seizure of power in November 1917, this was at first due to the Bolsheviks' claim to represent the rule of the Soviets

[1] *Cf.* Rosa Luxemburg, "Organizatsionnye voprosy russkoi sotsialdemokratii" (Organizational problems of the Russian social democracy), *Iskra*, July 1904, now in English as "Leninism or Marxism", in *Russian Revolution and Leninism or Marxism*, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1961.

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and above all to their determination to end the war, but not to any sympathy for Bolshevik ideas of party centralism and party dictatorship.[2]

Nor had Lenin tried to convert them to those ideas even when he had most opportunity to do so—during their wartime cooperation in the "Zimmerwald Left";[3] for at the time, Lenin himself did not believe that those ideas were applicable to the broad working class movements of Western and Central Europe. Until the very eve of World War I, he had accepted the revolutionary declamations of the European Social Democrats at face value; then, shocked by the support most of the parties gave to national defense and by the resultant collapse of the International, he had tried to explain it as the "betrayal" of a few leaders, backed by a thin upper stratum of "working class aristocrats" who had been bribed with a share of the spoils of imperialism. He thus agreed with the European revolutionary minorities that the bulk of the working class in their countries was "really" revolutionary and that it was only the machinations of reformist bureaucrats that prevented them temporarily from expressing their true attitude in action. His logical conclusion was that a clean break with the reformist leaders was needed both nationally and internationally—that the revolutionaries must organize in separate parties and set up a new Communist International in order to unfold the true banner of revolutionary Marxism and rally the majority of the workers to their side.

But it did not then occur to Lenin that the new Communist parties of Europe, working in quite different conditions, should be organized on the Bolshevik model; nor did he or any of his associates advance that demand when the Communist International was actually founded in the capital of the new Soviet state in March 1919. All that was then asked from its future members was that they support the new Russia, adopt a program of "proletarian dictatorship" exercised through Soviets, and make a clean break with the "reformists"; the expectation of an immediate, rapid advance of proletarian revolutions over most of industrial Europe precluded by itself any claim to lasting Russian leadership, or any thought of the need for laborious, preliminary transformation of existing revolutionary parties and groups.

Yet only a year later, the international outlook of Lenin and his team changed completely. By then, the Bolshevik regime had emerged victorious from the most critical phase of the Civil War, and its prestige among the war-weary European workers stood high. But instead of the expected rapid spread of proletarian revolutions, the Bolsheviks' allies had suffered a number of sanguinary defeats, notably in Germany and Hungary, and the old order showed signs of consolidating itself.

The Logic of Bolshevization

In spring 1920, Lenin for the first time called on foreign Communists to study the tactics of the Bolshevik struggle for power as a model for their own action;[4] in the summer, at the Second World Congress of the Comintern, he took the decisive step of trying to impose the Bolshevik organizational model as well. The Red Army was then pursuing its offensive in Poland in the hope of giving a new impetus to Communist revolutions in Europe; and leftwing admiration for Soviet Russia caused a number of European Socialist leaders to apply for the admission of their parties to the Comintern, on condition of retaining full autonomy in their own affairs, as a means of avoiding a split. The Bolsheviks saw this as an attempt on the part of the reformist leaders to use the prestige of communism as a fig leaf while carrying on their policies of "betrayal" —and that at the very moment when true revolutionary action was more needed, and apparently more promising, than ever before. They reacted by making the Congress adopt 21 doctrinal and organizational conditions as the *sine qua non* for any party's admission to the Comintern.

The immediate, tactical purpose of the conditions was to deter the "reformist leaders" and to force the "waverers" to break with them; but this in itself implied that the revolutionary purity of each party and of the Comintern as a whole could be assured by organizational devices—a thoroughly Bolshevik idea. In detail, the conditions followed the Bolshevik model of "democratic centralism," with its strict subordination of the actions of party members in parliament, trade unions and all other organizations to the Central Committee, and with the explicit obligation for legally operating parties to maintain an underground apparatus for the preparation of armed risings. But the idea of organizational discipline as a guarantee against opportunism presupposes that the leadership—and ultimately one leader—possesses the "correct" scientific understanding of the road to victory; and that understanding in the Bolshevik view, was fully developed only in the Bolshevik leaders

[2] *Loc. cit.*

[3] The "Zimmerwald Left" represented that faction of the anti-war socialists (meeting first in Zimmerwald, Switzerland, in 1915) which advocated the transformation of the war into a revolutionary war, and a complete break with "reformist" social democrats.—*Ed.*

[4] In his pamphlet "Left-wing Communism, an Infantile Disorder": *Selected Works*, Vol. X, London, 1938.

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themselves who had proved it by winning and holding power. Faced with the unforeseen problem of making sure that the international alliance of true revolutionaries would retain its ideological purity yet gain in effectiveness, the Bolsheviks automatically fell back on the organizational devices of their own party structure.

In form, Lenin and his associates did not demand the subordination of all Communist parties to Russian leadership—only to the democratic decisions of a World Congress and to the Executive Committee elected by it; by statute, the ruling Russian party was just as much subject to this international discipline as its weaker brethren, and despite its overwhelming strength it held no majority in Congress and ECCI. But in practice, the placing of the Comintern's headquarters on the territory of the only Communist-ruled country, the staffing of the secretariat with Russians and exiles living in Russia, the dependence on Soviet financial and technical support for underground contacts with countries where the parties were banned, did combine with the explicit ideological recognition of the Bolshevik model to make Soviet influence irresistible in this framwork. The statute created the structure of a centralized World Party; the ideology combined with the facts of power to ensure that it should be Russian-directed.

The transformation of the non-Russian revolutionary parties into "parties of the new type" thus proceeded under an impulse from outside; they were turned into *derivative totalitarian parties*. Moreover, this was done not by a leader of the stature of Lenin, who had other work to do, but by the people whom the ruling Bolsheviks could spare for this work and by their exile associates. At first, many of the leaders of the old revolutionary groups tried to resist this process, defending the tradition of inner-party democracy and arguing that only an autonomous national leadership could win the confidence of the working-class and develop a strategy in accordance with national conditions. But in country after country, the *apparatchiki* of the Comintern and their local stooges, though often inferior in knowledge of the national situation and the traditions of the movement concerned, as well as in character and general ability, defeated the home-grown revolutionary leaders with comparative ease.[5] The reason seems to have been that almost all these leaders, impressed by the success of the Bolshevik revolution and by the failure of their own movement to equal it, had at least temporarily revised their own beliefs and adopted Leninist ideas as embodied in the 21 conditions. They had abdicated their own authority in favor of the Soviet myth, and now had no means to resist the authorized manipulators of that myth.

Moreover, the fact that the split in the working class movement had now become permanent and that professed revolutionary parties continued to exist separately in what was often clearly a non-revolutionary situation meant that some of these parties had to rely increasingly on attracting a new type of followers, with few roots in the pre-1914 movement and little respect for the old revolutionary leaders, but with strong emotional ties to "Moscow"—a type far less self-reliant than the old revolutionary cadres and far more dependent on external sources of hope. In short, the political survival of the Communist parties in non-revolutionary milieus had become dependent on Moscow's moral even more than on its material support; hence leaders who defied the will of Moscow found themselves in conflict both with the vested interest of their own party machine and with the emotional loyalties of their rank and file, and could easily be isolated and forced to submit or expelled.

As the efficacy of the Comintern machine in imposing the new type of control was closely linked to the recession of the revolutionary wave, it came to bear little relation to Lenin's original purpose of making these parties fit for revolutionary action; and Lenin did indeed express doubts whether the process was not going too far for the future of the international revolution. At the Fourth World Congress of the Comintern in 1922, the last one he attended, he raised the "unleninist" query whether the resolution on organizational questions was not "too Russian," in the sense of being based on conditions alien to the foreign Communists and therefore unlikely to be fruitful for their practice.[6] This was the time when Lenin was also worried by the unintended consequences of the regime he had created in Russia itself—such as the growing power of the bureaucracy and the declining chances of its popular control. Yet as with the Soviet regime, so his doubts did not suffice to reverse the trend in the Comintern—the momentum of the new machine had already become too strong.

From Bolshevization to Stalinization

Stalin, in turn, was as little plagued by such doubts in the international as in the national field: the logic of totalitarianism, which had confronted Lenin with the unwelcome results of his actions, presented Stalin only with the welcome means of his ascent to power.

[5] I have tried to analyze the first example of this process in my study on "The Bolshevization of the Spartacus League," published in *St. Antony's Papers*, No. 9, *International Communism*, London, 1960.

[6] Lenin, *Selected Works*, Vol. X, London, 1938, p. 332.

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By the time of Lenin's death, after the final flare-up in Germany in 1923, the European postwar crisis with its potential for revolutionary change had definitely ended, and Stalin recognized this fact in announcing the "relative stabilization of capitalism" and proclaiming the possibility of "building socialism within a single country." He could therefore have neglected the Comintern for the time being—but for two circumstances. One was the fiction which made the Russian Bolsheviks formally subordinate to the World Party (which they in fact controlled); the other was the knowledge of the foreign governments with whom the USSR was now trying to establish normal relations that the Soviet leaders had the power to issue instructions to the Communist parties of their countries.

The formal subordination of the CPSU to the Comintern gave each of the contenders in the struggle for Lenin's succession a powerful interest in securing control of the Comintern and its affiliated parties for his own faction. As Zinoviev had headed the new International from its foundation and Trotsky enjoyed great authority in the international Communist movement, Stalin started with a serious handicap; to insure himself against the use of this potential instrument of moral pressure by his domestic rivals, he had to get rid of their supporters both in the top personnel of the Comintern and in the leadership of many affiliated parties. As he had done before at home, Stalin first removed the followers of Trotsky with the help of Zinoviev; then, to get rid of Zinoviev and his associates, he inaugurated an international "right turn" with the help of Bukharin; and a few years later he instigated an international "left turn" to disembarrass himself of Bukharin and his international friends. The means used for this international extension of the inner-Russian power struggle were the same old Bolshevik methods which the *apparatchiki* of the Comintern had begun using against independent-minded foreign Communists in Lenin's lifetime; these methods were now justified as necessary to assure the "Bolshevization" of the non-Russian Communist parties. By the end of the 1920's, this "Bolshevization by purge" had succeeded throughout the world in installing as party leaders "obedient blockheads" who would follow Stalin's every command without a murmur; to guard against any unexpected insubordination, Stalin's men also prevented the formation of homogeneous leading teams and kept alternate leaders in reserve within each party.

When Stalin first carried his domestic struggle for power into the Comintern, he may not have been as firmly convinced as in later times that no independent revolutionary victories by foreign Communist parties were to be expected or even to be desired. But he clearly did not regard the chance of such victories as topical, and he had no compunction about using these obedient tools in the meantime for the benefit of such Soviet foreign policy objectives as the normalization of relations with the "capitalist" powers and the promotion of conflicts among them. He soon found that to make Soviet friendship for any particular non-Communist government credible, the policy of the local Communists had to be adjusted accordingly, and he proceeded to do so without hesitation.

It is sufficient to recall in this connection Soviet instructions to the Chinese Communists in the middle 1920's, when the latter were made to join the Kuomintang as a logical counterpart to Stalin's support for Sun Yat-sen and Chiang Kai-shek, and when during the northward offensive of the Chinese Nationalist armies they were instructed to avoid measures of land distribution which might endanger the unity of the national revolutionary forces, because Stalin regarded a united, nationalist China as the best chance of stopping further Japanese expansion on the Asian mainland. Despite the spectacular failure of this policy in the spring of 1927, when Chiang suppressed the Communists and denounced Soviet interference in Chinese affairs, many of its features were repeated in the middle 1930's, when Stalin not only urged an anti-Japanese United Front of Chinese Communists and Nationalists, but inaugurated the Popular Front policy in Western Europe in order to underpin his diplomacy of collective security against Nazi aggression: then, too, the Communists in France and above all in Spain were instructed to put the alliance with the democratic section of the bourgeoisie against the "fascist powers" ahead of all thought of social revolution. Finally, after Hitler's attack on the Soviet Union, the Communists of all the Allied Nations were bidden to give unconditional support to their governments, while seeking to occupy key positions in the administrative organs of the free countries and in the resistance movements of the occupied countries—a policy that reached its logical culmination in the 1943 decision to "dissolve" the Comintern officially while maintaining its machinery in secret.[7]

FAR FROM EXPRESSING a renunciation of Soviet control over the Communist parties of the world, the "dissolution" of 1943 may be said to have marked one of the high points of their subordination to Soviet interests. By then, experience had long proved the con-

[7] For first-hand evidence, see Wolfgang Leonhard, *Child of the Revolution*, Chicago, Regnery, 1957.

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genital inability of these foreign-directed, derivative totalitarian parties to win power by their own efforts. It was not only that at some critical moments in their history some of the more important parties had been directly prevented from making a bid for power by specific Soviet orders issued for reasons of foreign policy, but that by virtue of their dependence on an outside center they were permanently deprived of the main advantage enjoyed by an independent, homegrown totalitarian party over its democratic competitors—the single-minded concentration on the conquest of power.

In a grave social crisis, democratic parties are frequently handicapped by the fact that they are tied to specific interests, traditions and methods—they cannot suddenly leap over their own shadow. A totalitarian party, which does not represent a particular section of society but a vision of its total transformation, is enabled by is centralist organization and by its belief in the overriding importance of the conquest of state power to exploit the crisis with ruthless opportunism, provided its leader is adequate to the task. In a homegrown totalitarian party, the leader is also the creator of the party: by forging his instrument he has already proved his ability as a technician of power and has established his authority in the process, and he will let nothing stand in the way of his ambition. But in the derivative totalitarian parties created by the Comintern, the leaders are as much creatures of a foreign will as are their organizations; they have been trained to act like subordinates who look for instructions before every decision; they have not established their authority in a struggle to get to the top, but have received it ready-made from outside as a reward for faithful service, and they feel that it may be taken from them at any moment. Such a party is hampered in exploiting a crisis not only by the common knowledge of its dependence on outside orders, but by the fact that its drive to power is liable at any moment to be diverted by such orders—that its leaders have to look over their shoulder all the time instead of looking only to their goal. In the end, a tie to the interests of a foreign state must prove an even greater handicap than any tie to domestic sectional interests.

Because their will to power is conditional on foreign permission, such parties have never won power by their own efforts—they can only receive it from the conquering armies of their sponsoring country, as did the Communist parties of the Baltic states and of Eastern Europe during and after World War II. But this limitation, which might have worried Lenin, had long been consciously accepted by Stalin in his doctrine that the interests of World Revolution were wholly comprised within the interests of the Soviet Union, and that any good Communist must willingly put the Soviet Union first. If the centralist World Party was a poor instrument for promoting independent revolutions, it was a useful weapon in the armory of Soviet power politics.

Ferment from Within

Yet even while Stalin's centralized control of the World Party and its subordination to Soviet interests seemed perfect, the germs of independence and pluralism were at work within the supposedly monolithic structure. When the Yugoslav Communists got power during the Second World War and the Chinese Communists soon afterwards, they did not receive it from the hands of the Soviet army. But these two seeming exceptions to the rule that derivative totalitarian parties are unable to win power by themselves did in fact confirm the rule—for both Tito and Mao Tse-tung gained victory by defying Stalin's "advice" at the most critical moment.

In the Yugoslav case, that moment occurred when Tito's partisans refused to seek cooperation with the Yugoslav exile government in London as Stalin had urged, and set up an "Anti-Fascist Council of National Liberation" as a virtual counter-government in the Bosnian mountains—a decision described at the time by the Comintern veteran Manuilski, on Stalin's authority, as "a stab in the back of the Soviet Union." [8] In the Chinese case, Mao appears to have defied Soviet pressure to negotiate not only an all-Chinese coalition government with Chiang, but also the integration of the Communist armed forces into a single all-Chinese army after the end of the Japanese war in August 1945; [9] Mao's final decision to pass from partisan warfare to an all-out, southward offensive in the summer of 1948 may also have been taken against Soviet advice.[10]

None of the later crises leading to the present pluralistic decay of the former World Party could have occurred without the independent conquest of power by these two Communist parties. Yet neither victory would have been possible without acts of defiance against the

[8] Quoted in V. Dedijer, *Tito Speaks*, London, 1953, p. 207.

[9] This was stated by Stalin in conversation with Bulgarian and Yugoslav Communist leaders, including Dimitrov, Kostov, Kardelj and Djilas in February 1948. *Cf.* the accounts of Dedijer, *op. cit.*, p. 331, and of M. Djilas, *Conversations with Stalin*, London, 1962, pp. 164-165.

[10] Reports to that effect which reached the West at the time are quoted in C. P. Fitzgerald, *Revolution in China*, London, 1952 pp. 103-4.

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Soviet leadership—acts which stand in stark contradiction to the customary posture of derivative parties led by obedient agents dependent on an outside center. In other words, the germs of independence must have been present, at least in those two parties, *before* the final acts of defiance. In both cases, independent-minded leaders with a will to power must somehow have succeeded during the preceding years in building their own teams and emancipating themselves and their parties from total ideological and organizational dependence on the Comintern. If so, they must have worked by methods entirely different from those which had been attempted, with uniformly disastrous results, by the early Communist opposition groups: open appeals for party democracy and national autonomy were out of the question; in fact, they must have applied the utmost conspiratorial caution in order to avoid any open conflict with Moscow until their position was strong enough. Though such "emancipation by conspiracy" cannot, in its nature, be directly documented, this author believes that some of its main stages may be indirectly traced in both cases.

THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS, whose final victory occurred after that of the Yugoslavs, were in fact ahead of them in this internal emancipation. Here we may start from one by now well-established fact—that Mao Tse-tung was the first, and for many years the only, Communist party leader who achieved his position without investiture by Moscow. He was elected party chairman during the Tsun-yi conference in January 1935, at a stage on the Long March when even radio contact with Moscow was interrupted;[11] and he defeated his opponents at that time because his strategy of partisan warfare based on rural "Soviet areas"—tolerated at first by the preceding party leaders and by Moscow as a mere sideline to underground activity in the urban centers—had proved eminently successful, so much so in fact that the areas under his control had eventually become the only remaining refuge for the Central Committee. Mao had thus become party leader with an independent strategic concept of his own. As to the crucial question of why Stalin subsequently confirmed the independent choice, the most plausible answer seems to be that Moscow was then interested in using the limited but real strength of the Chinese Communist partisans to urge on the Nationalist government a truce in the civil war and a common front against Japan; and that Mao was both willing to accept this policy and able to carry it out successfully.[12] His potential value as an ally thus must have seemed to Stalin to outweigh his failings as a subordinate.

Once confirmed in office and successful in pursuing the immediate tactical task, Mao proceeded with further steps of emancipation—still avoiding any open conflict with Moscow. By 1939, he developed his original strategic concept of the "New Democracy," arguing that the four-class alliance envisaged by Lenin and Stalin for the first stage of the anti-imperialist and anti-feudal revolution in colonial and semi-colonial countries was indeed necessary, but that it must be formed from the start under the leadership of the Communist Party. By 1941-42, he began to subject his entire party organization to a thorough ideological reeducation—the "rectification of thought," intended to make them proudly conscious that the Chinese CP had its own peculiar style of inner-party life (with special emphasis on the constant remolding of the consciousness, i.e., "brain washing"), which was clearly superior to the crude methods of Stalin's blood purges. It was the moral and political unity thus forged by years of common danger and hardship, by improbable successes, and by deliberate training in a new spirit, that finally enabled Mao to defy Stalin's advice after 1945; and once the plan for a Chiang-Mao coalition had been foiled—by Chiang's intransigence no less than by Mao's—the solid unity of Mao's team and the need for a counterweight to the "American party" in China forced Stalin to go on supporting him, even though with marked reserve.

IN CONTRAST TO MAO, Tito was invested with the leadership of the Yugoslav party by Stalin, but in most peculiar circumstances. The decision was taken in Moscow in late 1937, in the middle of the blood purge, and after some wavering whether it would not be wiser to dissolve the Yugoslav party altogether as too hopelessly disrupted by "enemy agents"—a fate that was soon to befall the Polish party. Of the top Yugoslav leaders then available in Moscow, Tito alone seems to have got out alive—and with full powers to reorganize the Yugoslav underground party from top to bottom. Not surprisingly, Tito has never revealed how he suc-

[11] This account, given in Robert C. North, *Moscow and the Chinese Communists*, Stanford, 1953, pp. 165-67, on the basis both of official Chinese Communist versions and of an interview with the leading ex-Communist Chang Kuo-t'ao, seems now to be generally accepted.

[12] See North's account of the coincidence between the decisions in favor of an Anti-Japanese United Front by the Mao-erh-kai conference of the CP, and by the Seventh World Congress in Moscow with a Chinese delegation led by Wang Ming, at the beginning of August 1935: *op. cit.* pp. 175-77.

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ceeded in obtaining that decision.[13] What seems clear, however, is that he used his powers to build up an unusually homogeneous leadership loyal to him personally (the Croat leader Andrija Hebrang seems to have been the only watchdog kept in reserve by Moscow from the start) and to make the organization as far as possible financially self-supporting. It also appears that he envisaged at an early stage the possibility of Nazi occupation and partisan warfare as his chance: there is evidence, both in his wartime conduct and in his final report on the partisan campaign given to the 5th Yugoslav Party Congress immediately after his excommunication in 1948, that he had carefully studied Mao's partisan tactics even before the war, though these were not then generally accepted as a model in the Comintern.[14]

With Tito, too, defiance of Moscow, when it finally came in 1943 over the issue of relations with the exile government, occurred at a time when he had become too important as an ally for open attack; and when the British government decided to send a military mission to Tito despite his open proclamation of his aims, the Soviets had to swallow their resentment at his insubordination and to take a meager share in aiding him as well. Under cover of the wartime alliance, the transition from secret to open emancipation had been accomplished.

We can now see in what special conditions the emancipation of derivative totalitarian parties from Soviet control has been possible. First, unlike the luckless Communist opposition leaders of the 1920's, who were democratic revolutionaries unused to totalitarian methods, the new rebels against Moscow are authentic totalitarians, skilled in the arts of hiding their thoughts and picking their cadres, and ruthless in the pursuit of national power. Second, both Mao and Tito have had the chance to build up homogeneous leading staffs in underground movements, where detailed observation was almost impossible for Moscow, and to strengthen the loyalty and cohesion of their teams in a prolonged struggle amidst great danger and hardship, followed by success. Third, both impressed their followers by their strategic originality, and it is conceivable that both, at an early stage, shared with a narrow circle of trusted associates the esoteric truth about the horrors of Stalin's blood purges. Fourth, both took the risk of openly defying Moscow's orders only when their armies already represented a force of military value to Russia, so that an open attempt to use Soviet authority to disrupt them would have damaged the Soviets themselves. Even given all these conditions, the successful emancipation of these two parties must have been immensely difficult—hardly less difficult, in fact, than the original creation of the first totalitarian party by Lenin. Yet once these two had succeeded, the monolithic shell of the World Party was cracked, and further rifts were bound to appear.

The Effects of Pluralism

The turning point towards the pluralistic decay of the World Party was thus reached in Stalin's lifetime with the victories of the Yugoslav and Chinese Communists, achieved against his expectations and in defiance of his advice. With the emergence of the first independent Communist states outside Russia, further enforcement of centralistic discipline on a world scale became impossible, regardless of the intentions of the Communist leaders. Mao and Tito, who had emancipated their parties from Soviet control before they achieved power, were now bound to see the interests of world communism as much from the viewpoints of their respective states as Stalin saw them from the viewpoint of the Soviet Union. Common principles would henceforth be interpreted in the light of different state interests.

Stalin was not prepared to admit this. True, when the Communist Information Bureau ("Cominform") was created in 1947 to coordinate the policies of the ruling Communist parties of Eastern Europe and the leading West European Communist parties in the struggle against the Marshall Plan, it was officially stated to be an ogan for mutual consultation and exchange of experiences only. Moreover, it was located in Belgrade as a tribute to the achievement of the

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[13] Tito's account of these events is in Dedijer, *op. cit.*, pp. 109-10. It shows him profiting from the official charges of "anti-party activity" against Gorkic, his factional enemy and predecessor as party leader—charges which have been retained in Yugoslav party publications even after the break with Moscow; he must have appeared to his masters as the most loyal Stalinist in the Yugoslav party!

[14] Tito's report to the Fifth Congress of the CPY describes the organization of the partisans and the successive enemy offensives in terms that closely parallel Mao's account of the early years of his partisan army as given to Edgar Snow in 1936, and known outside China in the late 1930's from that writer's *Red Star over China,* rather than from official party publications. From independent testimony on Yugoslav partisan warfare, it seems clear that the parallel really existed at the time and was not only "put on" in retrospect. After the defeat of the Greek Communists in their second civil war, Tito's chief liaison man with them, Svetozar Vukmanovic, reproached them with having failed to learn from the Chinese partisans as the Yugoslavs had done. See Vukmanovic, *Über die Volksrevolution in Griechenland,* Belgrade, 1950.

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Yugoslav Communists, and the latter were even allowed to present their own militant strategy as a model for the less successful brethren. But in practice Moscow insisted on retaining rigid control of the machinery and publications of the Cominform and sought to infiltrate its agents into the Yugoslav party and state machine, while the Yugoslavs began to compete with Soviet influence in the Balkan satellites. When the resulting friction led, early in 1948, to acute conflicts concerning the plans for a Communist Balkan Federation and the prospects of the Greek civil war, Stalin determined to break the independence of the Yugoslav Communists by excommunication, followed by economic and military pressure; but he succeeded only in breaking the facade of a united World Party.

With Communist China, Stalin applied far more caution than with little Yugoslavia: he does not seem to have attempted infiltration on any serious scale, nor to have tried to interfere in China's internal affairs. Mao's claim that Chinese strategy should become the model for the conquest of power in colonial and semi-colonial countries was at first explicitly endorsed in the Soviet and Cominform press,[15] and a regional bureau for the Communist-directed trade union movements of Asia and Australia was established in Peking. Yet there is no evidence that Stalin ever delegated to the Chinese Communists organizational authority over the Communist parties in that region, and even in state relations he could not bring himself fully to accept their independence and equality: at his insistence, they not only had to recognize formally the "leading role" of the Soviet Union and the CPSU, but also, after prolonged negotiations, had to grant the Soviets military and economic privileges on Chinese territory under the 1950 treaty of alliance. Soviet persistence in the obsolete claim to leadership of a single-centered World Party, a persistence which in the Yugoslav case had destroyed the very facade of unity, thus led in the Chinese case to preservation of the mere facade—at the price of hidden tensions.

Stalin's heirs seem to have realized from the start that this claim had become untenable in its old form, and Khrushchev in particular soon developed the concept that Soviet political leadership of the forces of international communism could no longer be based on their subjection to the organizational discipline of a World Party, but only on the ideological authority of the CPSU over parties which were in principle recognized as independent equals. This new concept was to apply both to parties that had in fact won power on their own (in the meantime, the Vietnamese Communists of Ho Chi-Minh had joined the Yugoslav and Chinese in this category) and to others aspiring to do so. The concept was embodied in the 1954 revision of the Sino-Russian treaty, formulated on a basis of equality; in the 1955 attempt to persuade the Yugoslavs to rejoin the Soviet bloc as independent partners; in the 1956 statement, made in Khrushchev's report to the 20th CPSU Congress, that each Communist party must find its own road to power according to national conditions; and also in the dissolution of the Cominform that followed two months later. It was not, however, intended to apply to those East European Communist parties which had received power from the hands of the Soviet army and were therefore subject not merely to international discipline but to imperial domination: here Khrushchev was willing to loosen and modernize the form, but not to renounce the substance of Soviet control.

Yet, in fact this control was threatened almost at once by the crisis of Soviet authority in Eastern Europe caused by Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin's crimes, including the persecution of East European "Titoists." The conflicts caused among the leading groups of the satellite parties by these disclosures led not only to the Hungarian popular revolt and its suppression, but also to the unique attempt of the Polish Communists to achieve emancipation from satellite status by a change of leadership, carried out in defiance of Russia and with broad popular support. This attempt was partly successful: though unable to gain real independence, the Polish Communists won a higher degree of autonomy than Khrushchev had originally been willing to grant them, and similar autonomy henceforth had to be conceded to the other satellite parties as well. The indispensable measure of imperial control was safely assured again only when the Moscow Declaration of November 1957, forced upon the reluctant Poles by the joint pressure of the Soviet and Chinese Communist parties, defined the limits of the new autonomy by laying down a set of common principles binding on all ruling Communist parties and, above all, by establishing the right of the CPSU, as the leading party, to interpret these principles.

The Failures of Compromise

Khrushchev's attempt to replace the centralistic discipline of the former World Party by the ideological authority of Moscow over an alliance of formally equal

[15] The report by Liu Shao-ch'i to the Peking conference of WFTU, held in November 1949, which explicitly made the claim, was reprinted in "*For a Lasting Peace . . .*," Dec. 30, 1949, and in *Pravda*, Jan. 4, 1950. It was editorially supported in "*For a Lasting Peace . . .*," Jan. 27, 1950.

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and independent parties was bound to meet its crucial test, however, not inside the region where this authority could always be supplemented at need by imperial pressure, but outside it. Khrushchev's concept was based on the illusion that effective political unity among independent Communist governments and parties could be maintained by the mere ideological authority of the center, even though that center was no longer the only center of Communist power; and that illusion could last only so long as no other Communist power had serious reasons, in the light of different state interests, to prefer an interpretation of the common doctrine that differed from Moscow's. As soon as major differences of interest emerged between the Soviet Union and China, as they did in 1958 and more persistently since the winter of 1959-60, different interpretations of the doctrine were bound to lead to a challenge of Moscow's ideological authority; and in the absence of the former means for enforcing a binding decision by centralistic discipline, such a challenge could only lead either to an agreement to tolerate different points of view and reach adjustments by recurrent compromises, or to a permanent factional struggle for ideological leadership. By the time of the 1960 world conference of Communist parties in Moscow, it had become obvious that the doctrinal unity of international communism could no more survive the pluralism of Communist powers than could the centralist structure of the World Party; henceforth, the choice lay between pragmatic unity based on compromise and ideological struggle leading to schism. Moscow's explicit renunciation of the "leading role" marked both its recognition of that fact and its preference for the pragmatic solution.

That preference had its solid reason in Moscow's superior power. China, the weaker and dependent ally, might hope to exert pressure on Russia's policy by submitting it to constant ideological scrutiny in the forum of international communism; hence, China's interest was to insist that there could be only one "correct" interpretation of Communist doctrine, and that it must be found by unending worldwide (though preferably esoteric) debate. Though Peking's followers might be a small minority at first, the common framework and the ideal of doctrinal unity must be preserved in order that the factional argument might continue and the "temporary" minority eventually emerge as a majority strong enough to impose its views on the mighty Soviet Union itself.[16] Conversely, once it was obvious that the Chinese minority could not be forced into submission, it was Russia's interest to foil the Chinese pressure by admitting that some differences of interpretation were inevitable in the present stage of historical development, thus making the ideological debate appear comparatively pointless. For in any adjustment of differences by pragmatic compromise, the superior weight of Soviet power was bound to ensure that Moscow's point of view would prevail with only minor concessions. In advocating unity based on toleration of a natural measure of disagreement, Moscow sought to silence ideological criticism and to gain a free hand for its foreign policy. In advocating unity based on correct principles, Peking sought to fetter Moscow's freedom of action and to reserve the right of recurrent ideological attack.

That the 1960 Moscow declaration had failed to settle the issue became obvious in the course of the following year over the case of Albania. The Soviets were prepared to tolerate (and largely ignore) Chinese disagreement, but not an ideological rebellion within their imperial sphere; the Chinese, on the other hand, could not abandon their first declared factional ally without ruining their prospects in the long-term ideological struggle they envisaged. Since the clash over Albania at the 22nd CPSU Congress, all efforts at reconciliation have broken down because both sides have become increasingly aware that their respective concepts of unity are themselves irreconcilable. By breaking relations with Albania but pursuing a policy of demonstrative rapprochement with Yugoslavia, the Soviets have shown that they will accept cooperation based on imperfect ideological agreement, provided it goes with ideological nonaggression.[17] The Chinese, on the contrary, seek perfect doctrinal unity, to be achieved by unrestrained ideological criticism.

Permanent Schism?

The result is that, as between the two principal antagonists, neither kind of unity can any longer be achieved. The Soviets have taken freedom of action in foreign policy, but so have the Chinese, and effective consultation between them has been reduced to zero, as the behavior of both powers in the Sino-Indian conflict and the Cuban crisis of last fall has clearly shown. The Chinese are using their freedom of criticism, but so are the Soviets and their supporters. Proposals for another world conference and a truce in public polemics are verbally supported by both sides, but qualified by each

[16] *Cf.* Peking *People's Daily*, Dec. 15, 1962, on the concept of the "temporary minority," and the angry reaction of *Pravda*, Jan. 7, 1963.

[17] This is most explicit in the defense of the rapprochement with Yugoslavia by *Pravda*, Feb. 10, 1963, against the attack of the *People's Daily*, Jan. 27, 1963.

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with conditions unacceptable to the other. Everything proceeds as if both Moscow and Peking had resigned themselves for some time past to the inevitability of schism and each was only maneuvering to saddle the other with the responsibility for it.

In trying to envisage the likely effect of the schism on future relations among Communist governments and parties, we may start from the Chinese concept of these relations because it is comparatively well-defined. In essence, it has not changed since the 1957 Moscow conference. In the Chinese view, the Communist parties cannot be run from a single center as a World Party, and they are fully autonomous in their organization; but they must be run on common ideological principles, and this requires recognition of the doctrinal authority of a leading party. Similarly, the Communist governments are sovereign and equal, but they need a common foreign policy which must be laid down, after due consultation, by the government of the leading power. Yet while the Chinese Communists insisted in 1957 that this leading role could only be played by the CPSU and the Soviet government, they now consider that Khrushchev and his associates have proved unworthy of such leadership. In organizing the struggle against Soviet "revisionism," the Chinese have in fact, without so far formally announcing it, assumed the "leading role" themselves—at least for all those willing to adopt their factional platform.

We are thus observing the formation of a new Chinese-led international grouping comprising at least two other Communist governments (those of North Korea and Albania), a number of Asian Communist parties, important party minorities elsewhere in Asia and in Latin America, and preparatory contacts in a large number of other CPs and national revolutionary organizations. On the basis of their ideological statements, the Indonesian and Japanese CPs (the latter after expelling a dissident minority) must definitely be counted as part of this grouping, while the Malayan, Thai, and one of the rival Burmese CP's are known to be traditionally dependent on China, and the Indian CP has a well-defined pro-Chinese minority.[18] The allegiance of the ruling Communist parties of Vietnam and Cuba appears still undecided at the time of writing: the Vietnamese leadership seems desperately anxious to avoid taking sides but under growing pressure to do

[18] For a careful survey of alignments in Asia, see R. A. Scalopino, "Moscow, Peking and the Communist Parties of Asia," *Foreign Affairs* (New York), January 1963. For the latest evidence that the Indonesian CP, despite its efforts to maintain contact with both sides, has ideologically taken the Peking line, see the speech made by Njoto, one of its deputy chairmen, at a party celebration following his recent return from a visit to Eastern Europe, Russia and China, quoted by NCNA, Feb. 10, 1963. The pro-Chinese party in Burma is the illegal BCP.

What is Happening in International Communism?

(Peking's Version)

Something very interesting is happening today on a wide scale in the international Communist movement. What is the interesting phenomenon? The doughty warriors who claim to possess the totality of Marxist-Leninist truth are mortally afraid of the articles written in reply to their attacks by the so-called dogmatists, sectarians, splitters, nationalists, and Trotskyites whom they have so vigorously condemned. They dare not publish these articles in their own newspapers and journals. As cowardly as mice, they are frightened to death. They dare not let the people of their own countries read our articles, and have tried to impose a watertight embargo.

They are even using powerful stations to jam our broadcasts and prevent their people from listening to them. Dear friends and comrades, who claim to possess the whole truth! Since you are quite definite that our articles are wrong, why don't you publish all these erroneous articles and then refute them point by point so as to inculcate hatred among your people against the heresies you call dogmatism, sectarianism, and anti-Marxism-Leninism? Why do you lack the courage to do this? Why such a stringent embargo? You fear the truth. The huge specter you call "dogmatism"—that is, genuine Marxism-Leninism—is haunting the world, and it threatens you. You have no faith in the people, and the people have no faith in you. You are divorced from the masses. That is why you fear the truth and carry your fear to such absurd lengths. . . .

We are not afraid to publish everything of yours in full. We publish all the masterpieces in which you rail at us. Then, in reply, we either refute them point by point or refute their main points. Sometimes we publish your articles without a word in answer, leaving the readers to judge for themselves. Isn't that fair and reasonable? You, modern revisionist masters! Do you dare to do the same? If you are men enough, you will. But having a guilty conscience and an unjust case, being fierce of visage but faint of heart, outwardly as tough as bulls but inwardly as timid as mice, you will not dare. We are sure you will not dare.

—From leading article in Hung Ch'i (Red Flag), Peking, March 4, 1963.

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so,[19] while Fidel Castro's speeches show a definite alignment with the Chinese viewpoint on the problems of Latin American revolution but remain carefully noncommittal on wider issues in view of his extreme dependence on Soviet aid.[20] The situation among the Latin American Communist parties seems generally in flux, with most of the older Communist leaders supporting Moscow, but with the newer "Fidelist" groups looking largely to Peking and beginning to influence the party cadres as well.[21] Similarly, while the Arab Communist parties and the few Communists in tropical Africa are generally Moscow-oriented, the Afro-Asian "solidarity conferences" have shown a steady advance of Chinese influence among the extremist groups of revolutionary nationalists.

We know next to nothing about the organizational form of the ties between Peking and the various pro-Chinese parties and groups; yet this in itself suggests that the Chinese Communists, in harmony with their professed principles, have not generally attempted to intervene directly in the organizational setup of these groups. In the case of ruling parties or of such a strong party as the Indonesian, such attempts would obviously be condemned to failure. In fact, though the Chinese grouping, with its doctrinaire cohesion, is closer to the Comintern tradition than the Communist world movement was in the last years before the schism, it clearly carries within itself the germ of further pluralistic decay: there is no guarantee that Hoxha or Kim Il-sung, let alone Castro or a victorious Aidit, will agree in future with the Chinese version of Communist doctrine just because they do so now.

TURNING NOW TO the relations of the CPSU with its supporting parties and governments, the effect of the schism appears to be that the latter are with increasing clarity grouped in two layers: an inner ring of parties ruling states under Moscow's imperial control, *i.e.*, the member parties of Comecon; and an outer ring comprising the non-ruling pro-Soviet parties, but now also the Yugoslavs and potentially—if they should stay with-

[19] See the statement of the Vietnamese Politburo reported by TASS, Feb. 11, 1963.

[20] See in particular Castro's repeated denial of the applicability of the "peaceful road" to Latin America, both in the "Havana Declaration" and in his speech to the Congress of Women of the Americas on Jan. 16, 1963.

[21] For the latest survey, see Daniel Tretiak, "Sino-Soviet Rivalry in Latin America," *Problems of Communism*, Jan.-Feb. 1963. *Cf.* also the note on "Communist Comment on the India-China Dispute" in *The World Today* (London), December 1962.

in the fold—the Cubans and Vietnamese. Within the inner ring, where recognition of Soviet leadership in foreign policy has always been assured by the imperial power, there is now strong pressure to reduce the autonomy of the member states in the economic field as well, in favor of joint planning under Soviet direction. Far from being able to turn the termination of Moscow's doctrinal monopoly to their advantage, the satellites are finding that the removal of the potential Chinese counterweight from inner-bloc affairs has increased Russia's effective power over them. But in the outer ring, where the facts of imperial power are not directly operative, the weakening of Soviet doctrinal authority and Moscow's turn to a more pragmatic and tolerant concept of unity are likely to promote the development of a looser structure, with greater autonomy and variety than international communism has known at any time since 1920.

The key to this development may be found in the resumption of fraternal relations between the Soviet and Yugoslav Communist parties and in the arguments used by the Soviets to defend the rapprochement against Chinese criticism. The Soviets may somewhat exaggerate (just as Tito somewhat understates) the extent to which the Yugoslavs have actually changed their point of view, but they do not deny that differences of doctrine still exist; their crucial point is that the large measure of practical support given by Yugoslavia to Soviet foreign policy, combined with the cessation of ideological attacks, are sufficient to make the resumption of party relations possible and useful. But this means that fraternal relations among Communist parties need not, in the present Soviet view, be based on identity of doctrine or even on the pretense of such identity—only on agreement on some vital points of doctrine, combined with practical solidarity and absence of polemics. Of course, the Soviets have not abandoned the claim that their own version of Marxism-Leninism, being based on the longest and widest experience, is true and will prevail in the end; but by admitting that different interpretations are historically inevitable even among sincere and authentic revolutionaries, once the latter head independent Communist parties and governments, they seek to deprive this claim of its divisive tendency. Such a point of view is more akin to that taken at the foundation of the Comintern than to the policy adopted by its Second Congress.

For the pro-Soviet Communist party leaders outside the bloc, this attitude offers greatly increased freedom of "revisionist" experimentation, not only in tactics but in the application of the doctrine to their own problems. If only they will continue to support the Soviet Union

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and refrain from criticizing its rulers, emancipation in everything else is now theirs for the asking; except for their attitude to Soviet policies, it now seems entirely a matter of their own ambition and ability how independent they will be. Already, the new policy of the Italian Communists on West European integration,[22] or the attitude of the Indian Communists on national defense, shows the possibilities of the new situation, while the French Communist leadership remains typical of those who have grown so used to moving along well-worn dogmatic grooves that they are frightened rather than exhilarated by the chance to think for themselves.

Yet against the background of schism among the Communist powers and pragmatic tolerance within the Soviet camp, the one remaining fetter must appear all the more irksome: for if the Soviet Union is neither the recognized leader of all Communists nor the fountainhead of the only true doctrine, why should it continue to be treated as the "fatherland of all toilers," immune from criticism and deserving unconditional support? It was the myth of the unique achievement of the Bolsheviks that once made the creation of a Moscow-centered World Party possible; with the myth dissipated, it will be increasingly difficult to argue that the member parties of a loose international alliance should remain loyal to all of Moscow's policies—that, in the telling words of the Chinese, they should "obey every movement of someone's baton." [23] As the parties now backing Moscow in Western Europe and North America, in the Arab world and tropical Africa, and partly still in Asia and Latin America, learn to judge issues in terms of their own drive to power and acquire confidence in their own judgment, the tie to Moscow is bound to wear increasingly thin.

FINALLY, WILL EVEN the basic totalitarian structure of the individual parties, once imposed on them from the outside by Moscow's authority, stay immune from the consequences of polycentric decay? Here we must distinguish between the shortrun effects of the factional struggle between Moscow's and Peking's supporters, and the long-run effects of the search for an independent, national road to power. The factional struggle may normally be expected to lead to an early expulsion of the minority by the majority, whichever side the latter is on; and such a split may seriously impair the strength and outward attraction of some of the Communist parties, but it will leave their totalitarian inner structure intact. Yet the long-run revival of independent political thought may have very different effects, particularly where it takes place in the environment of a modern, democratic society.

Most of the leaders of Communist parties operating in such conditions seem to lack the stature to retain their position without the crutches of Soviet authority, and they are for that very reason reluctant to experiment with new ideas; as the respect for these crutches declines, they will find themselves under increasing criticism, with the influence of their parties reduced by recurrent crises—as we may already observe in the case of the Dutch and Scandinavian parties. But where the leaders are able and ambitious and the search for new policies correspondingly keen, as in Italy, the loosening of the dogmatic straitjacket is bound to raise the question whether the party's tie to Russia and its undemocratic structure are not the two main causes of its isolation from the mainstream of the country's development, which is now flowing in the direction of democratic reform, and hence the main obstacles to its political effectiveness. As Italy's revolutionary potential diminishes, so will the prospects for a totalitarian revolutionary party there; correspondingly the pressures for changing the character of the PCI and opening it widely to democratic currents will increase.

If I may venture a more general forecast at this early stage, I should say that those Communist parties which can only exist as derivative totalitarian parties will gradually wither away with the decline of Soviet authority; that parties rooted in the revolutionary tensions of their own country, but of a past or passing period, may suffer a democratic transformation, possibly culminating in a fusion with neighboring parties; and that only Communist parties in countries with a genuine potential for totalitarian revolution, or in the regions bordering the Communist empires, will survive as effective forces —the former in an increasingly independent, the latter in a continuing dependent position. The potentially independent totalitarian parties of the future are, of course, concentrated in the underdeveloped regions where today Chinese ideological influence is greatest. But the founder members of the Comintern, the Communist parties of industrial Europe that came into being through the transformation, under Bolskevik influence, of small democratic revolutionary groups, may yet end by reverting either to sectarian insignificance or to democratic independence.

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[22] See the comments of *Unità* on the Moscow conference on contemporary capitalism, Sept. 3-4, 1962; the theses presented to the congress of the CPI, *Unità*, Sept. 13; the protest against the circular of WFTU secretary Louis Saillant, *Unità*, Sept. 29; and the speeches made by the Italian representatives at the Leipzig WFTU conference in mid-December.

[23] *People's Daily*, Feb. 27, 1963.

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The Soviet Economy

By Gregory Grossman

AS ONE SEEKS to reconstruct a picture of the Soviet economy in those late winter days of 1953 when the dictator lay dying, the epithets "grim," "oppressive," and "bleak" haunt the mind. True, the repair of the enormous wartime physical damage had been nearly completed. Industrial production had been rising rapidly since the end of the war, and even the output of manufactured consumers' goods was already considerably above the 1940 level.[1] The consumer's lot had also improved markedly from the extremely low levels of the early postwar years.

But grim, oppressive, and bleak the economic picture still was. Although the war had been won, the economy continued mobilized on a quasi-military footing to speed reconstruction, to conduct the cold war, to master atomic weaponry and rocketry, and to support the war in Korea. The notorious labor control laws of 1940 were still on the books, though apparently no longer fully enforced, while a separate and equally severe set of laws and regulations controlled, or at least aimed to control, the mobility and activities of collective-farm peasants. The "cult of personality," that is, Stalin's unbridled and capricious despotism, was felt by everyone and in everything. Millions of persons—the exact number is still unavailable—were leading a semi-human existence in forced labor camps, many of them only recently impressed during Stalin's and Beria's last major wave of arrests.

While the real wages of the urban population had risen substantially above the level of 1940, just before the German attack, they were still considerably below the level prevailing before the Five-Year Plans began. The peasants' real incomes were lower than in 1940, and very much lower than in 1928.[2] Urban housing was a particularly dismal element in this picture, with living space per person, though more ample than in 1940, still one-fifth below what it was in 1926.[3]

It is difficult even to begin to catalogue the economic problems and headaches that Stalin bequeathed to his successors. To start with agriculture (for reasons not only alphabetical) the output of that sector per head of the total population was barely at the 1928 level, while the net output of livestock products per capita was substantially below 1928 [4]—and even in 1928 the Russian diet was one of the poorest in Europe.

[1] According to an index calculated by Norman M. Kaplan and Richard H. Moorsteen (*American Economic Review*, June 1960, p. 296), 1952 production had risen above the 1940 level by 67 percent in total civilian industry, excluding munitions, and by 30 percent in manufactured consumers' goods.

Mr. Grossman, Professor of Economics at the University of California (Berkeley), is an outstanding authority on the Soviet economy. His article is an abridgment of an essay written for a symposium, World Communism: Continuity and Change, *edited by William Petersen, to be published shortly by Prentice-Hall, Inc.*

[2] Abram Bergson, *The Real National Income of Soviet Russia since 1928* (Cambridge; Harvard University Press, 1961), p. 256, and Naum Jasny, *The Soviet 1956 Statistical Handbook: A Commentary* (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1957), p. 41.

[3] See the estimates of Timothy Sosnovy in *Soviet Studies* (Glasgow), July 1959, p. 4, and in the collection of essays entitled *Dimensions of Soviet Economic Power*, Joint Economic Committee, US Congress (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1962), p. 331. The latter volume, hereafter cited as *Dimensions*, contains a wealth of information on the postwar Soviet economy but unfortunately reached the writer too late to be utilized fully in this essay.

[4] For these and other agricultural production data see the contribution of D. Gale Johnson and Arcadius Kahan to *Comparisons of the United States and Soviet Economies*, Joint Economic Committee, US Congress (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1959), Part I (hereafter cited as *Comparisons*), and the contribution of Joseph W. Willett to *Dimensions*, pp. 95 ff.

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The other sectors of the economy also had their share of woes, despite—and at times because of—the rapid growth of industry and related branches. To mention the worst problems: overcentralization and overbureaucratization, especially in the form of hypertrophied industrial ministries; cumbersome and often inept planning, which paid virtually no attention to economic efficiency; technological conservatism at most levels; an elaborate incentive structure, in part ineffective and in part perversely effective; a bad price structure, though with the saving grace that it had relatively little to do with resource allocation; emphasis on quantity of output at the expense of quality; chronic shortages of industrial supplies and equipment; and so on. The list has become well known to students of the Soviet economy.

Economic Growth, 1952-62

With this heritage in mind let us glance at the Soviet economy's overall record of performance during the first post-Stalin decade. In sheer size, it has gone a long way indeed in these ten years. The gross national product, measured in rubles but with Western methods, probably nearly doubled between 1952 and 1962, implying an average annual rate of growth of somewhat under seven percent.[5] This is of course a very creditable performance, though not entirely without parallel among major industrial countries in the non-Soviet world. The output of industry, the favored sector, probably grew at an average annual rate of about nine percent over the ten years.[6]

Agricultural production seems to have expanded by about 60 percent over the same years, nearly all of the increase taking place by 1958.[7] Per capita, the increase in agricultural output amounts to some 35 percent, since the total population has grown by 18.5 percent (about 1.7 percent per annum). The urban component of the population has grown very much faster—by about 45 percent (or some 4 percent per year). The absolute increment in the total population over the decade is in fact accounted for by the increase in the urban population, which passed the rural population in size during 1960.[8]

Consumption per capita has also increased very considerably. Precise and reliable data are lacking, but taking the country as a whole, a per capita increase of 50-60 percent for the decade, or 4-5 percent per year on the average, probably expresses the right order of magnitude. Most of this improvement occurred by 1958. Urban housing has also gotten greater attention from the government, especially since 1958 when the annual rate of construction was sharply stepped up. Nonetheless, the actual achievement in housing construction has generally remained under the planned rates, while the urban population has grown more swiftly than anticipated. Consequently, the improvement in dwelling space per person has been only moderate in relation to the pressing need—probably not quite 25 percent over the decade (after allowing for the statistical underrecording of dwelling space in earlier years).[9]

Great as the expansion of the Soviet economy has been, the emphasis concerning the use of Soviet resources has remained where it was under Stalin: on state power and rapid growth. The current Seven-Year Plan (running through 1965) and the Twenty-Year Program (1960-1980) do not change this emphasis in any significant way.

The Factors Behind Growth

There is no mystery or secret behind the rapid growth of the Soviet economy during the post-Stalin decade (or, for that matter, in earlier years). In explaining the performance we must surely list first the single-minded determination of the regime to maximize economic growth, and its willingess to sacrifice very much, economically and in human terms, to this end. One reflection of this determination is the relatively large share of total resources steadily devoted to growth. Between 1952 and 1962, the gross investment rate has averaged about 30 percent, and lately it has been rising. This is of course a very high proportion: the corresponding US figure has been around 18 percent, although other non-Communist countries (Japan, Norway, Finland) have approached or exceeded the Soviet rate, while many West European countries have maintained percentage rates in the 20's.

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[5] This rough estimate finds support in the calculations of Stanley H. Cohn (*Dimensions*, p. 75), which show an average annual increase in GNP of 6.8 percent for 1950-60; a slightly lower rate can be deduced for the period 1952-62.

[6] *Cf.* the calculations of civilian industrial output by Rush V. Greenslade and Phyllis Wallace (*Dimensions*, p. 120), who estimate an annual rate of 9.4 percent over the nine years 1952-61. Other western estimates (*ibid.*, p. 162) generally come close to theirs.

[7] See the estimates (to 1961) of net agricultural production, weighted by 1958 Soviet prices, offered by Joseph W. Willett in *Dimensions*, p. 98.

[8] See James W. Brackett in *Dimensions*, pp. 487 ff., for a wealth of up-to-date data on Soviet population and for projections to 1981.

[9] *Cf.* Sosnovy, *Dimensions*, p. 331.

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A second factor explaining rapid economic expansion has been the existence of a large pool of underemployed manpower in agriculture which could be tapped for non-agricultural employment. While the population of working age increased only moderately—about 11 percent—between 1952 and 1962 (due to the small size of the group born in the 1940's and reaching working age in the late 1950's and early 1960's), employment in nonagricultural sectors of the economy increased by some 50-55 percent, or by 4 to 4.5 percent per year on the average. In an economy which still has substantial underemployment in large areas of its agriculture, it is of course the rate of growth of nonagricultural employment that bears primarily on the speed of overall economic expansion.[10]

Thirdly, the Soviet Union has benefited throughout the past decade from what the economist calls "advantages of backwardness." The technological level of the Soviet economy in the early 1950's was quite low in relation to the level of knowledge and practice in the advanced western countries, and of course also in relation to subsequent technical progress at home and abroad. The Soviets have seized many of the existing opportunities to adopt western technology, and this no doubt has been a major factor in the rapid growth, especially industrial growth, of the post-Stalin decade. But there were opportunities of another sort to be pursued: the decade was also a period of assimilation (*osvoenie*) of the enormous productive capital and human skill accumulated during the quarter century between the start of the Five-Year Plans and Stalin's death. The feverish and often chaotic construction and training of the early 1930's, the collectivization crisis and its many repercussions, the terror of the later 1930's, preparation for war and the war itself, the grimness of the postwar years and the Korean War, the inadequate and often warped incentives to producers and innovators throughout the period—these and many other factors prevented full use of the productive capital and know-how that had been accumulated and acquired with so much toil and suffering. An appreciable part of the growth after Stalin probably is due to the relative normalization of the political and economic climate and the consequent "shakedown" of productive capacities and skills.

Fourthly, there were several special, in part nonrecurring, factors favorable to growth during the ten years. Examples include: the 100 million acres put under plow in the "virgin lands"; the reduction of defense outlays in relation to the national product and of the armed forces in relation to the civilian labor force, which permitted the relative share of investment to rise substantially without throwing a corresponding burden on consumption; the release of a large proportion of the inmates of forced labor camps and their return to normal civilian employment (even from a narrow economic standpoint, the camps were very wasteful of both human and material resources).

1953-58: Rescue Operation

While the time perspective is still short for reliable judgment, the post-Stalin decade seems to break up fairly well into two periods. The dividing point is not the 20th Party Congress in February 1956, as it is in the realm of economic thought and in the political and cultural fields, but rather the second half of 1958. The first period therefore embraces somewhat over five years (or just five years if it is dated from the launching of the "new course" in the summer of 1953), while the second period encompasses some four and one-half years to the end of 1962 (when these lines are being written). Whether the important reforms introduced by the Central Committee Plenum in November 1962 constitute in some real sense the end of the second period and the start of another phase cannot yet be told.

The first period, 1953-58, can be most succintly characterized as a vast, if not always very profound or radical, rescue operation that resulted in rapid expansion of the Soviet economy along a broad front. This was a time devoted to redressing with haste the most serious inbalances inherited from Stalin, righting some of the worst injustices and inequities in the society, salvaging incentives, eliminating the grossest organizational inefficiencies of the economy, and directing resources to areas where they were most urgently needed.

The reforms in agriculture which began in earnest in September 1953 launched a long series of remedial measures in this sector, the end of which is not yet in sight. At the very first, the emphasis was on various incentive elements—prices, taxes, and delivery obligations; at the same time, controls over the peasants were also tightened, on the assumption that a larger carrot not only serves its own purpose but also makes the bigger stick more effective. But the two measures that received most publicity and attention, especially from Mr. Khrushchev himself, were the plowing up of the semi-arid and arid "virgin lands," begun in 1954, and

[10] With regard to population and the labor force, see the contributions of Brackett and of Weitzman, Feshbach, and Kulchycka in *Dimensions*, pp. 493 ff.

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the expansion of acreage under corn, started in 1955. Both were designed primarily to augment, radically and swiftly, the feed-grain base of livestock husbandry—the latter directly, the former largely by shifting bread-grain production to the new lands and thereby releasing some of the old areas for feed grains, including corn. The magnitude of the virgin lands campaign is vividly indicated by the fact that the land newly brought under the plow there since 1954, about 100 million acres, is equivalent to almost one third the *total* cropland currently harvested in the United States.

These measures, and many others that cannot be discussed here for lack of space, contributed in varying degree to a quick and large increase in agricultural output—about 50 percent overall—during 1953-1958. On the other hand, attempts to free local initiative by decentralizing planning and management in agriculture, especially through a decree published in May 1955, remained almost entirely on paper. "Campaign" methods, constant pressure for large deliveries to the state, inadequate incentives on the farm (especially in animal husbandry), ingrained habits of the high and petty bureaucracy, daily intervention by party officials, and all the other modes of operating carried over from the past, combined to thwart any extension of meaningful autonomy for the individual collective farms. Moreover, towards the end of this first period the authorities began to tighten the squeeze on the collective farmers' private plots. The last are of considerable significance not only for the welfare of the farmers but also as a source of food supply: in 1958, together with certain other small forms of private cultivation, they accounted for one-third of the agricultural output of the USSR, although covering less than four percent of the total sown areas.[11]

One of the most important structural reforms in post-Stalin Soviet agriculture took place toward the very end of the first period, in mid-1958. This was the abolition of machine and tractor stations (MTS), the sale of most of their equipment to collective farms, and the attendant thorough revamping of the farm price structure. The MTS had been virtually the sole source of large-scale machinery for collective farming: moreover they had played a very significant role in ensuring procurements and enforcing political control in the countryside. They were also quite wasteful and inefficient. The reform of mid-1958 eliminated dual authority on the land, did away with much of the above-mentioned waste and inefficiency, and largely abolished the baneful multiple-price system. It happened that the same year witnessed extraordinarily favorable weather conditions. As agricultural production rose sharply, so did the incomes of peasants, and particularly their earnings from working for the collective farms.[12]

IN THE FIELD OF labor controls and welfare measures the first five years after Stalin also saw a number of very significant reforms, aimed mainly at reducing certain inequities and improving work incentives. Decrees were issued immediately after the 20th Party Congress in February 1956 to reduce the length of the work week for the population at large and especially for certain categories of workers, and to eliminate criminal penalties for tardiness, absenteeism, and unauthorized quitting. These and later decrees have shortened the standard work week from 48 hours in 1953 to 41 hours in 1962. Also in 1956, pension rates were augmented and minimum wages and salaries were raised (later to be raised again), thus substantially improving the position of the oldest and most indigent elements in Soviet society. The whole wage structure soon came under careful study, and steps have been taken to rationalize it from the standpoint of both incentives and comparative earnings. Numerous other labor and welfare measures have been introduced since 1956 concerning work rules, grievance procedures, tax reforms, and various social security provisions.[13] Last but not least, one must mention again in this context the release of many of the inmates of forced labor camps and the transformation of some camps into so-called corrective

[11] These figures derive from official data, which however may not be very firm. See J. A. Newth, "Soviet Agriculture: The Private Sector, 1950-1959," *Soviet Studies*, October 1961, pp. 160-71. Note that the enormous discrepancy between output and area in this instance is explained in part by much higher yields in the private sector as compared to the socialist sector, and in part by the former's concentration on livestock products, to an extent utilizing feed obtained from the socialist sector.

[12] Jasny estimates the rise in per capita peasant incomes from all sources between 1952 and 1958 to have been as much as 55 percent, but it must be borne in mind that 1952 incomes were catastrophically low. Naum Jasny, *Essays on the Soviet Economy* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1962), p. 155. *Cf.* Alec Nove, "The Incomes of Soviet Peasants," *The Slavonic and East European Review*, June 1960, pp. 314-33. For discussions of the various post-Stalin measures in agriculture see Lazar Volin, "Reform in Agriculture," *Problems of Communism*, Jan.-Feb. 1959; see also Volin's and Nancy Nimitz's contributions to *Comparisons*, Part I, and this author's article, "Soviet Agriculture since Stalin," *The Annals*, January 1956.

[13] For details and interpretation see Alec Nove, "Toward a 'Communist Welfare State?,'" and discussion thereof, in *Problems of Communism*, Jan.-Feb. 1960; also, the contribution by Edmund Nash to *Dimensions*, pp. 393 ff., which contains a convenient chronology of the measures.

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labor colonies, which are claimed to operate under a milder regimen.

The major reform with regard to industry and construction in the 1953-58 period was the abolition of economic ministries and their replacement by a little over 100 regional economic authorities, the so-called sovnarkhozes, or economic councils.[14] Apart from its political motives and implications, this measure was designed to eliminate ministerial autarchy ("departmentalism"), bring middle-level administrators closer to the enterprises, and rationalize the organization of production and supply on a regional basis. The enterprises themselves, however, gained little additional power or freedom of action, and it is questionable whether the term "decentralization"—so frequently applied to this reform in the West, though never in the USSR—is at all apt.

A new breeze of economic realism, and even rationality, began to be felt in the Soviet Union at about this time. Stalin's death had already made possible some widening of the extremely narrow range of discourse among economists and considerably more candid public discussion of economic problems (*e.g.*, the industrial conference of May 1955). It was again the 20th Party Congress of 1956, however, that gave this trend a mighty push, launching what became in a few years an avalanche of frank, practical discussion and theoretical debate, occasionally accompanied by new departures in economic policy. The whole question of economic calculation and rational choice was re-examined from the bottom up, the Soviet price structure came under close theoretic scrutiny, traditional policies and planning methods were questioned, mathematics was once again admitted to the economist's tool box, and mathematical methods of planning and problem-solving suddenly attracted intense interest. Dogma came under mounting attack, though Marxist doctrine still set definite limits on the search for rational economic solutions.

THE ACTUAL RATIONALIZATION of Soviet economic policies and planning that has ensued from these developments should not be exaggerated. Nevertheless, toward the end of the first period under examination the erstwhile neglect of the chemical industries was reversed (May 1958), the stress on gigantic hydroelectric projects was seriously questioned (August 1958), the development of petroleum and natural gas was given emphatic priority over coal, the dieselization and electrification of railroads was sharply speeded up, and a much heightened sense of urgency was ascribed to automation. Soviet industry seemed to be heading away from the 1920's and 1930's and adopting an aspect more consonant with the 1950's and 1960's.

In sum, as the last of the 1958 harvest reached the government's collection points and the year waned, Mr. Khrushchev and his lieutenants had reasons for satisfaction and even self-congratulation. Under the Premier's personal tutelage, agriculture had increased its total output by half over five years, and the revision of Stalin's agricultural policies seemed to be paying off handsomely (although extremely favorable weather in the new lands in 1956 and 1958 also had much to do with successes). Per capita incomes in both town and village had risen sharply. Industry—buoyed by the success in agriculture and by a continued large inflow of resources (in part unlocked by the 1957 reorganization)—was also expanding its output rapidly. Finally, the regime's new technological and investment policies, coupled with prospects of rapidly growing capital formation, bore promise of further vast gains in the productivity and efficiency of industry and of other economic sectors.

The optimism that prevailed was fully reflected in the Seven-Year Plan for 1959-1965, adopted by the 21st Party Congress in January-February 1959.[15] The Plan was said to inaugurate the period of "the full construction of communist society"—that ideal society of economic abundance and full social harmony envisioned by Marx as the ultimate stage of human history. Supposedly the Plan would boost the Soviet economy most of the way toward the goal of overtaking and surpassing the United States in per capita production and consumption—a point which would finally be reached around 1970, clinching the "historic victory of socialism over capitalism" on our planet.

These grand claims have since been somewhat modified: at the 22nd Party Congress in October 1961—perhaps best remembered for its "de-Albanization"—a new Party Program was adopted which called for the "building of the foundations of communism" over the

[14] Khrushchev's November 1962 proposals announced a reorganization of the sovnarkhozes into larger and fewer units, as will be discussed further in this paper.

[15] Mr. Khrushchev's "Draft Theses" for the Seven-Year Plan were first published in the Soviet press on November 14, 1958. For the English translation of the final text of the "Directives for the SYP" see *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, April 1, 1959. For analyses of the Plan see Oleg Hoeffding, "Substance and Shadow in the Soviet Seven-Year Plan," *Foreign Affairs*, April 1959; Leon Herman, "The Seven-Year Haul," *Problems of Communism*, March-April 1959; and Naum Jasny, "The Soviet Seven-Year Plan: Is It Realistic?," *Bulletin*, Institute for the Study of the USSR (Munich), May 1959.

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next two decades and outlined certain major production targets for 1970 and 1980. The Program, however, carefully avoided stating that communist society would come into existence in the USSR by 1980.[16]

Since 1958: Slowdown and Recentralization

From the latter part of 1958 on, the upward momentum of the Soviet economy began to slacken: some of the "single-shot" benefits (such as those stemming from the industrial reorganization of 1957, or from the mass release of prisoners) began to exhaust themselves; the labor supply became much less favorable for demographic reasons; the new plans and investment policies, as well as various international and scientific commitments, placed additional pressure on resources; and various institutions and operations created by Khrushchev's reforms began to spawn new difficulties and problems. Compared with the first post-Stalin period, the four years from 1959 through 1962 have therefore been marked by reduced rates of growth and a more moderate rise in living standards, remedial measures of a patchwork nature aimed at closing loopholes, steps to safeguard or bolster incentives, and other steps to tighten—and especially to recentralize—the organizational structure.

The retardation is especially noticeable in agriculture, where total output has been marking time, fluctuating with the weather, and at best keeping up with the population increase. The extraordinarily favorable weather conditions of 1958 have not recurred, indeed could hardly be expected to over the short run. Weather apart, the chief reasons for the very limited progress (if any) in agriculture seem to be: (a) continued imposition of overly ambitious plans, which often operate perversely; (b) unwillingness or inability to allot sufficient resources to this sector and its supporting activities (fertilizer production, roads, distribution facilities); (c) continuing ineptness in planning, management, distribution, supply, *etc.*; and (d) a possible sag in incentives. Concerning the last point, it should be noted that peasant incomes apparently dropped significantly after 1957, continuing low at least to 1960, owing to a renewed squeeze on the peasants' private plots and livestock and to the financial burden that fell on the collective farms for tractor and machinery purchases following the dissolution of the MTS.[17]

The rate of growth of industrial production, though still high, declined substantially after 1957.[18] Given this fall-off and the failure of agricultural output to rise significantly after 1958, it is not surprising to discern a substantial reduction in the rate of growth of the national product as a whole and of urban real income.[19] Changes in defense expenditures further complicated the problem of achieving planned goals. In mid-1961, the budgeted outlays on defense were sharply raised, so that by 1962 and 1963 the nominal appropriations for this purpose increased some 50 percent over the level of early 1961. However, it is not certain that in real terms defense outlay rose as much as the budget figures would have one believe.[20]

AS THE SEVEN-YEAR PLAN progressed, it also became increasingly apparent that the various reforms and reorganizations of the preceding five years had not been sufficient to improve fundamentally the "qualitative" aspects of the economy's operations, such as adherence to plans ("plan discipline"), the articulation of supply and demand, the quality of manufactured articles, the speed and effectiveness of construction, the meeting of consumer needs, and, last but definitely not least, the propensity to innovate. In some of these regards, such as industrial innovation, the new institutions seem to have aggravated rather than ameliorated the economy's chronic problems and defects.

On the organizational plane, remedial steps generally have been of two sorts: the elaboration of the administrative hierarchy in the economic sphere, and the recentralization of planning and economic administration. Neither development is surprising: they constitute the natural response of any formal organization which is faced with serious problems of operational effectiveness and which—for reasons good or bad—is not ready for a more fundamental overhaul. In this sense, as well

[16] A liberally annotated English translation of the Program is to be found in Herbert Ritvo, ed., *The New Soviet Society* (New York: The New Leader, 1962). Translation of the preliminary text appears in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, August 9, 16, and 23, 1961. For an extensive discussion of the Program see *Survey* (London), October 1961.

[17] See Arcadius Kahan, "Recent Trends in Soviet Farm Incomes," *Problems of Communism*, Nov.-Dec. 1961, pp. 54-57. The writer has also consulted on this subject with Professor Jerzy F. Karcz.

[18] According to the Greenslade-Wallace index, the average annual increase of civilian industrial output was 10.7 percent in 1952-57 and 7.7 percent in 1957-61 (*Dimensions*, p. 120).

[19] *Cf. Dimensions*, p. 75, with regard to national income, and the calculations by Rachel E. Golden on p. 354 with regard to real disposable wages.

[20] On the magnitude of the Soviet defense effort see the contribution of J. G. Godaire in *Dimensions*, pp. 33 ff.

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THINGS THAT DO NOT CHANGE

II. Waste, Inefficiency, Mismanagement

Taken from the same issues of *Krokodil* as the caricatures on p. 17, these cartoons illustrate another perennial object of Soviet satirical wrath: the abuses easily perpetrated (and frequently inevitable) in an overcentralized and overbureaucratized economic system. In the first (right) the bureaucrat tells two stern-faced proletarians that a meeting on "labor discipline" will be held, "as always," during working hours (the implication, of course, is that the workers are anxious to work a full day uninterruptedly, thus contributing to the "construction of communism"). . . .

Рис. Ю. УЗБЯКОВА

— Завтра состоится производственное совещание по вопросу о трудовой дисциплине.
— В какое время?
— Как всегда, в рабочее.

—*February 20, 1953.*

Рисунок Л. ГЕНЧА.

Главный зоотехник Назаровской МТС Красноярского края П. Кухорь руководит только по телефону. Работники забыли, как он выглядит.

— Вот познакомьтесь: это наш главный зоотехник, а тут можете послушать его голос...

—*May 20, 1955.*

СМОТР ШТАТОВ В ОДНОМ КОЛХОЗЕ

— *А ты кто такой?*
— *Колхозник.*

Рисунок А. ЦВЕТКОВА

—*December 20, 1962.*

. . . The second cartoon (left) satirizes the bureaucrat's penchant for managing by remote control—or "by telephone," as the caption puts it. "Here, get acquainted," says the milkmaid to the members of the kolkhoz: "This is our chief zoo-technician, and you can hear his voice" (here it is the milkmaid who represents the dedicated, pristine proletarian). The third cartoon (lower left) is entitled "Staff Inspection at a Certain Kolkhoz." Almost all of the assembled kolkhoz members have titles such as "Agronomist," "Kolkhoz Chronicler," "Water-Tank Manager," etc., and only one, in answer to the inspector's question, identifies himself as a simple kolkhoz farmer. Note especially the overly distorted, indeed repulsive features of the satirized figures—a standard feature of Soviet cartoon art.—*Ed.*

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as in some others, the recent organizational changes have been essentially conservative.[21]

To mention the most important of these: In June and July of 1960, republic-wide economic councils (sovnarkhozes) were created in the three largest republics (Russian, Ukrainian, and Kazakh) to administer the many smaller sovnarkhozes of 1957 vintage. In November 1962, it was announced that an all-union sovnarkhoz (SNKh SSSR) would be established, apparently on the organizational ruins of the old State Planning Commission (Gosplan), suddenly charged with policy errors and bungling by Mr. Khrushchev at the Central Committee Plenum. Among other related trends, the main all-union supply administrations, attached to Gosplan following the 1957 reorganization, have steadily acquired greater powers. At the same time, by all signs, the (lower) sovnarkhozes have steadily lost power to the various republican and all-union bodies. The sovnarkhozes themselves are being reduced, at this writing, to somewhat less than half their previous number by a process of amalgamation, following a resolution of the November 1962 Plenum. (In the RSFSR the reduction is particularly sharp—from 67 to 24 sovnarkhozes.) The same Plenum also decreed the vertical cleavage of the party structure into two parallel hierarchies, one concerned primarily with industry and related branches, the other with agriculture.

In agriculture, the major organizational innovations during the period since 1958—that is, following the abolition of the MTS—have been: (a) the establishment in early 1961 of a separate organization to supply agriculture with equipment, spare parts, and various essential materials (Selkhoztekhnika); and (b) the creation of a full-fledged hierarchy of territorial production and procurement administrations to which both collective and state farms are subordinate, paralleled by a structure of territorial councils and (at higher levels) agricultural boards. The latter measure is notable, *inter alia*, for setting up a definite administrative machinery responsible for agricultural production, and for virtually abolishing the distinction between state and collective farms in this regard.

On the planning side the changes have been equally substantial. The product-line ("branch") State Boards,[22] established primarily in the defense industries at the time of the 1957 reorganization, have been gradually increased in number until they now cover construction and nearly all branches of industry. They are responsible for planning and implementing policy on technical progress and investment in their respective branches. But planning must be coordinated territorially as well within individual industries. Hence, in May 1961 the country was divided into 17 so-called large economic regions, each on the average comprising six sovnarkhozes, and each with a "coordinating and planning council." These, however, never had much of an active existence and were apparently abolished (though this is not entirely clear) when the sovnarkhozes were consolidated at the end of 1962. At that time also (November 1962), the USSR State Scientific-Economic Council, concerned with long-term planning, was transformed into (or renamed?) the USSR Gosplan. (On March 13, 1963, it was announced that a USSR Supreme National Economic Council was being created within the Council of Ministers to supervise and coordinate the activities of Gosplan and the product-line state boards. The erection of a logical but highly complex and cumbersome structure for planning and management of the Soviet economy seems thus to have been completed—at least for a while.—Ed.)

The cumulative effect of these reorganizations of the past four years, as well as of various other changes, has been to further centralize planning, management, and administration. Agriculture and investment are two good examples. In the final analysis this "creeping" recentralization has come about primarily because of two underlying factors: the chronic overcommitment of resources (*i.e.*, the haste of Soviet economic development, in historical terms), and the divergence between the goals, values, and interests of the regime and those of individuals and groups within Soviet society. The conception, widespread in the West, that the Soviet economy today is in some general sense less centralized than at the end of Stalin's regime, is of very dubious worth; indeed, the opposite could probably be convincingly argued. Certainly, with regard to one of the most crucial criteria of decentralization—the enhancement of the autonomy of the individual enterprise—the changes in the past decade have been minute. The Soviet enterprise is still closely and continuously directed and controlled from above. In fact, this virtual lack of autonomy at the enterprise level—with its attendant problems of irritating and often incompetent "petty tutelage" from above, frequent changes in plans, continuing and even growing supply difficulties, and, more recently, the multiplication of superordinate authorities,

[21] They are discussed at some length in Alec Nove, "The Industrial Planning System: Reforms in Prospect," *Soviet Studies*, July 1962, pp. 1-15, Herbert S. Levine's essay in *Dimensions*, pp. 47-65, and my article, "The Structure and Organization of the Soviet Economy," *Slavic Review*, June 1962, pp. 203-22.

[22] Often and less exactly rendered into English as "State Committees."

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each with its directives and audits—has prompted increasingly frequent and vocal complaints, sometimes bordering on cries of desperation, on the part of managers and some economists.[23]

A related problem that has been of special concern to the Soviet leaders in recent years is the sluggishness of efforts at innovation, despite constant and heavy pressure from above—a phenomenon that derives from a powerful combination of "conservatism" in management, which often stands to lose financially by upsetting production routines, and the cumbersomeness of the bureaucratic apparatus.[24] This particularly complicated and thorny matter is intimately connected with the various problems of institutional and organizational structuring, planning and performance criteria ("success indicators"), and the price pattern.

Ten Years Later

Nearly double in size (in terms of the national product), far more advanced technologically, and somewhat reformed organizationally, the Soviet economy today has left the grim and bleak days of the winter of 1953 far behind. But its most pressing problems still bear a striking resemblance to those of a decade ago. They are four, in sum:

(a) The constant pressure on the economy's resources created by the regime's continued drive for its "world-historic" goals, by the internal problems of the "socialist camp," by the cold war and the scientific and technical race with the West, and by the ever-rising economic aspirations of a fairly rapidly growing population.

(b) The very slow increase (if any) in agricultural production since 1958, severly retarding overall economic growth as well as the rise in living standards.

(c) In other sectors, the welter of problems consisting of poor planning, widespread and large-scale waste of resources, all-too-frequent production of the wrong things at the wrong time, resistance to innovation, and so forth. Construction is faring particularly badly in these respects, with the volume of so-called uncompleted construction (due to inefficient planning and management) rising every year.[25]

(d) The Soviet man's imperfect tractability in "remolding" himself to accord with "communist morality." Even if he is more abiding of moral and juridical laws than his prerevolutionary grandfather, as Soviet ideologists would have us believe, there are today many more laws to break at every turn. There is no doubt a good deal of dedication and idealism in the populace at large, especially among the young; but cynicism toward communist ideals also prevails, and a callous disregard of regulations is encouraged both by the possibility of handsome material rewards and by the inefficiencies and disequilibrium of the economy. If the Soviet press is to be believed, economic crimes and transgressions of all sorts and degrees—from petty pilferage of state property, through systematic deception of superiors, to large-scale "speculation" and bribery—are widespread and may be on the increase. Time will tell whether the new series of severe penalties enacted in the past two years, including capital punishment, will turn the tide.

With all its ills and problems, the Soviet economy could undoubtedly continue for a good time under present conditions. Certainly neither paralysis nor explosion is to be expected, and no serious student of the Soviet economy predicts such catastrophe. But this is not the issue, of course. The significant facts are that the limits of patching over the essentially Stalinist structure of the economy are being approached; that this situation is increasingly recognized by many persons in various positions and walks of life; and that a great deal of rethinking in all areas, from abstract political economy down to practical everyday operations, is underway. "Anyone who is at all familiar with planning and economic reality [in the USSR] can see that it is presently undergoing an important if not a crucial stage —a time of profound thinking, of re-examination of habitual concepts, of the appearance of new problems which only yesterday raised no thoughts, and of the seeming disappearance of other problems which only yesterday looked very important." Thus *Ekonomicheskaia gazeta* commented editorially in October 1962.[26] It is difficult to believe that Mr. Khrushchev's tinkering with the economic-administrative structure and his reshuffling of planning bodies a month later offers a fundamental

[23] The Soviet press has been increasingly candid on these matters in recent years. An especially valuable source of such information, including sensible analyses and proposals for remedial action, is the weekly *Ekonomicheskaia gazeta* (Economic Journal), organ of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party.

[24] Some of these problems are discussed more fully in the writer's "Soviet Growth: Routine, Inertia, and Pressure," *American Economic Review,* May 1960, pp. 62-72.

[25] It may be worth dispelling here the myth that "at least" the Soviet economy fully utilizes its productive capacity. In point of fact, this is not so. While no general statistics on the subject are available, the Soviet press frequently reports idle capacity, including whole factories, major underutilization of nominally employed assets, and a large and growing backlog of equipment awaiting installation or repair, sometimes for many years.

[26] October 13, 1962, p. 6.

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and durable solution. On the other hand, the simultaneous splitting of the party into parallel industrial and agricultural pyramids is a radical step that has more of a ring of desperation than a tone of conviction to it.

In brief, the Soviet economy today faces an enormous organizational and institutional problem, the problem of finding a workable degree of centralization (or decentralization) under new and changing conditions. Unlike the difficulties in agriculture, which at least bear reasonable hope of alleviation as the economy grows richer and can afford to pour in more resources to rescue that sector, the organizational problem promises to grow worse by dint of the economy's very successes. The sheer bulk of the planning job, as it is now carried on in the Soviet Union, can be mathematically likened to the square of the number of commodities plus the square of the number of economic units. As both products and producing units multiply with the economy's growth, the task of planning swells much faster. The top-heavy Soviet economic structure is costly not just in the resources it engages, but eminently more so in its inimical effects on adaptation to demand and to changing technology, and on efficiency and morale.

One possible way out is to preserve or even enhance the degree of centralization, but to render its operation more supple and swift with the aid of mathematical economics and electronic computers. An ideologically and politically palatable course, especially after the purging of the worst dogmas from Soviet economics, this approach is now attracting great attention on the part of Soviet economists, mathematicians, and planners. Another possible course, with politically and ideologically opposite implications, is a thorough decentralization, which in its extreme form would amount to some sort of a socialist market economy. However, the bars to full-scale decentralization are formidable both from an ideological and from a practical point of view. Given the present severe pressure on the economy's capacities, and the consequent need to mobilize resources and enforce priorities, it seems safe to predict that the regime will exhaust the possibilities of the first approach before experimenting to any meaningful degree with the second.

The Cultural Scene

By Ronald Hingley

WHERE DID SOVIET CULTURE stand when Stalin died? It is tempting to answer that it did not "stand" at all, but lay prostrate.

The stifling of culture was part of the general pattern of persecution which pursued the Soviet citizen into every corner of his life. It is hardly necessary to remind anyone ten years later that the Soviet Union entered the year 1953 as a terrorist bureaucracy in an advanced state of moral and intellectual paralysis. Nor is it necessary here to review in detail the campaign of intimidation by secret police, concentration camp, threat, demotion, execution, torture, interrogation and extorted confession. And there is no need for another blow-by-blow account of the terrorization of culture through the "Zhdanov decrees" of the Central Committee of the CPSU (1946-48), the "anti-cosmopolitan" drive, the "doctors' plot" and numerous minor absurdities involving major injustices.

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Culture at a Standstill

At the time of Stalin's death, then, the Soviet Union was in a condition of acute cultural demoralization. Not merely had genuine cultural activities been largely suppressed and supplanted by an official pseudo-culture, but by now even the official pseudo-culture was beginning

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to disappear. For instance, a decline in the production of feature films, which had begun in 1947, reached the point where, in 1952, only five feature films were made altogether. The overall number of theaters in the country decreased from about a thousand in 1941 to about five hundred in 1953 (the decline hit non-Russian theaters particularly hard, Jewish theaters having been closed down entirely). In the visual arts Alexander Gerasimov and his like were turning out devotional portraits of Politburo members and dedicated milkmaids, while graven images of Stalin and idealized factory hands were rolling off the production belts in the sculpture factories. Composers, among whom Shostakovich, Khachaturian and Prokofiev had received rough handling, were confined to writing hummable tunes, and prose literature saw the heyday of "Stalin Prize novels" in which young lovers argued heatedly by the light of the moon about problems of industrial production.

These were frustrating times for the culture-hungry Russian. Unable to concentrate on his volume of Babaevski,[1] because it might be thought disloyal if he turned down the volume of his radio (which was just embarking on a two-hour report on the current All-Union Conference of Pig Breeders), he might go out into the streets of Moscow one summer evening in search of entertainment, only to find that the local cinema was featuring Stalin on the technique of street-fighting in *The Battle of Stalingrad*. It was easy enough to get into the nearest theater, which was almost empty, but that meant spending three hours watching American scientists discuss the best way of infecting Korean babies with deadly bacteria. There seemed to be no escape from Stalinist pseudo-culture. Should our culture-seeker descend into the bowels of the earth? Even there it glared at him from the ornate tiling and glittering chandeliers of the Metro. Did he lift up his eyes unto the heavens? Even then they were as likely as not to alight on the squat bulk and towering pinnacles of the new university under construction on the Lenin Hills. Most of these things were carrion liable to turn the stomach of the least squeamish culture vulture. Perhaps the only alternative would be to spend the evening playing chess, provided one was careful to avoid openings and variations of a cosmopolitan character associated with Capablanca, Lasker, Ruy Lopez or any other imperialist agent, and was always careful to call the "Alekhine Defense" by its proper name, "The Moscow Defense." [2]

[1] S. P. Babaevski (b. 1909), is the author of a number of Stalin Prize novels, including *The Cavalier of the Golden Star* (1947).

Was the Stalinst onslaught on culture really quite as all-pervasive as this? Fortunately no, for otherwise Russians would not have emerged from the dark years as effectively as they have, with souls certainly bludgeoned, but on the whole remarkably unbowed. It is true that they were denied access to modern foreign culture, on pain of being arrested as "cosmopolitans," while they were also prevented from developing their own, on pain of being arrested as "formalists". This was bad enough, but it might have been altogether disastrous if they had also been entirely cut off from the cultural heritage of the past. Our imaginary Russian culture-seeker of 1952 did not necessarily have to read Babaevski—he could read Chekhov or Dickens instead. In the theater he could choose to watch Ostrovsky [3] or Shakespeare rather than contemporary Soviet plays depicting American race hatred or sturdy Stakhanovites. The samples of representational art of the nineteenth century on show in Russian galleries were not beneath contempt, and the bicycle factory at the bottom of the sheet might well be a notable example of Russian ecclesiastical architecture. With many reservations our culture-seeker did have access to the productions of artists, writers and composers who were dead or foreign, or better still both. In particular, most of the Russian classics were at his disposal, though he would have difficulty getting a copy of any of Dostoevski's great novels—apart from *Crime And Punishment*, valued by the authorities for the light which it shed on bad housing conditions in prerevolutionary Leningrad. Thus an important link, both with the past and with the culture of other countries, was kept alive even in the worst times.

Russians kept their souls alive in other ways, too. Risky as it was, writers wrote "for the drawer," while painters even in those days occasionally dabbled discreetly in non-representational art. And by 1952 authority itself was showing signs of impatience with official culture. In April 1952 a *Pravda* editorial attacked the current theory that plays depicting Soviet life should not attempt to show conflict (since no disharmony could exist in the just society). Later in the year, Malenkov urged writers not to close their eyes to the defects of Soviet society, and made his celebrated call for "more Gogols and Shchedrins" to revive the art of Russian satire.[4] Naturally several of the writers who

[2] See "Chess and Politics," by D. T. Richards, *Survey* (London), No. 46, January 1963, pp. 112-124.

[3] A. N. Ostrovsky (1823-86), the well-known Russian playwright.

[4] At the 19th Congress of the CPSU (October 1952), Malenkov spoke at length on literature and the need for satire.

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followed this lead were soon in trouble for doing so.[5] But these incidents do suggest that perhaps Stalin himself was dissatisfied with the cultural wilderness which he had created.

Such apparent relaxations had no real importance, and when Stalin died he left Soviet culture crippled in three vital ways—by the ban on experiment in form, by the severance of foreign cultural contacts, and (perhaps most crippling of all) by the compulsory official optimism which all works of art had to reflect, and which made it impossible for the Soviet artist, in whatever field, to reflect the actual life of the men and women around him. The remainder of this enquiry will consider what means and to what extent Soviet citizens have managed to reclaim the wilderness.

Freedom *vs.* Repression

If there is one—admittedly oversimplified—way in which the past decade may be characterized, it is as a period of oscillation between the forces of freedom and the forces of repression. It is not necessary within the confines of this article to depict these zigzags in chronological order, especially as adequate surveys are already available. As the reader will remember, a "little thaw" set in in late 1953, associated particularly with Ehrenburg's novel *The Thaw* (Part One), published the following year. This was followed by a freeze-up, no doubt mild by Stalin's standards. Then came the more dramatic "thaw" of 1956, which followed Khrushchev's "secret speech" at the 20th Congress of the CPSU in February of that year. This was marked on the literary front by Dudintsev's criticism of the Soviet establishment in *Not By Bread Alone* and by the two almanacs entitled *Literary Moscow*, of which the second contained some especially outspoken items. Then, in 1957, came a further period of repression connected with the drive against revisionism. Since then we have had a relatively settled period, certainly one without oscillations on the scale of 1956. But though the ups and downs have become less spectacular, they have become more frequent—so much so that they are now almost a daily occurrence and clearly the time has long passed when each individual plea for more freedom or more repression could conceivably be thought to reflect a decision made in the party Presidium or Secretariat.

What we now have, therefore, is neither an open struggle nor total dictation from above, but something in between. It may be described as a semi-open struggle, carried on in a code language with which Sovietologists in the West are quite familiar. For example, if a painter, composer or writer calls for more "contemporaneity" (*sovremennost*), we recognize him as an advocate of repression. If he calls for more "artistry" (*khudozhestvennost*), we know he is asking for more freedom. There is more to it than that, of course, especially as some symbols are ambiguous—for example, someone who calls for more "truth" (*pravda*) may be on either side of the fence. In any case Russian intellectuals have been "seeking truth" for more than a century without this ever having been more than a reflex action of the speech organs unaccompanied by any mental process.

The result of all this has been a polarizing process whereby many leading spokesmen and practitioners of the arts have seemed to fix themselves firmly in the camp of freedom or repression. In the literary field, for example, Tvardovsky and Paustovsky are clearly champions of freedom, while Surkov and Kochetov are champions of oppression. T. Khrennikov, First Secretary of the Composer's Union, is obviously a reactionary, and so is V. Serov, newly appointed President of the Academy of Art. Anyone in doubt about the latter would not have needed to read the article in *Pravda* by which he celebrated his appointment.[6] The title alone—"The Artist Is Inspired by the Deeds and Life of the People"—is a complete giveaway to those who know the code.

In real life, of course, whether in the Soviet Union or anywhere else, people are not so simple as this terminology would suggest, and no doubt there are few "Hards" without a touch of softness in their make-up, just as there may be few "Softs" dedicated wholeheartedly to dismantling the system. The struggle between the two groups must be going on all the time in individual consciences as well as on the pages of *Pravda*. Nor can everyone be dismissed as a simple liberal or reactionary on the basis of his public performance. For example, the political performance of Dmitry Shostakovich is neither "hard" nor "soft", but infinitely ductile. This is not intended as a sneer, for Shostakovich deserves enormous respect as the greatest creative artist the Soviet Union has ever brought forth, and he is surely right to reserve his considerable mental toughness for the composition of music.

Then again we have the case of Ilya Ehrenburg, so long the standard-bearer in the march towards greater freedom, the advocate of formal experiment in the arts and the breaker of innumerable taboos on the long, long

[5] To mention but two of the many authors who got into trouble: Leonid Zorin for his play *The Guests*, and Anatoly Marieng for his play *The Hereditary Prince*.

[6] *Pravda*, December 9, 1962.

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A Matter of Whose Taste?

A good deal of harm was done to Soviet art by the personality cult of Stalin, when the taste of one man, a taste of doubtful quality, was presented as the standard. Had it not been for that, who knows what unwritten operas of Shostakovich himself and of other composers would now be the pride of Soviet music! Perhaps it would not have been necessary for a whole generation of Soviet composers to storm the open gates—gates that had long ago been flung open by Shostakovich.

—Rodion Shchedrin in Pravda, February 10, 1963, p. 4.

Whenever I listen to Glinka, tears of joy come to my eyes. . . . I like David Oistrakh's violin performances. I also very much like . . . the collective of violinists of the Bolshoi Theater. . . . I was born in a Russian village and was brought up on Russian and Ukrainian folk music, melodies, and folksongs. I like some selections performed by the jazz orchestra conducted by Leonid Utesov. . . . It gives me great pleasure to listen to the songs of Solovev-Sedov and the compositions of the composer Komanovski. . . . I also like Ukrainian songs a great deal. I like the song "Rushichok" composed by the composer P. Maiborod with words by Andrey Malyshko. You hear this song and want to hear it again. . . . Who does not know the songs about Budenny's army! Many good songs were written by the brothers Pokras. I very much like their song about Moscow—written, I must admit, on our instruction when I was secretary of the Moscow party committee. . . . Of course, I do not claim that my perception of music should become some kind of a norm for all. However, we cannot indulge a person who claims that a cacophony of sounds is real music, while music beloved to our people is neglected by some persons as outdated. . . .

To put it briefly, we stand for music which is melodious, meaningful, which touches the heart of the people, which engenders strong feelings; we are against any kind of cacophony. . . . Our policy in art, the policy of irreconcilability with abstractionism, formalism, and all other bourgeois distortions, is a Leninist policy which we have carried out unflinchingly, are carrying out, and will carry out. (*Applause.*)

—From Khrushchev's speech of March 8, 1963; Pravda, March 10, p. 3.

road towards "destalinization." About Ehrenburg an important question arises: to what extent is he an officially licensed standard-bearer, in fact subservient to authority and for this reason permitted to say things which are forbidden to others? Can it be that Ehrenburg, who is continually making public appearances abroad, is let off the leash from time to time in order to suggest to gullible followers that leashes are no longer in use at home? Or is he really trying to bring about changes in the direction of greater freedom, and making the compromises inevitable if his voice is to be heard at all?

A similar dilemma is posed by younger men who try to walk the tightrope between official conformism and the provocation of cultural scandals. One may instance the case of Yevtushenko, who at the moment seems to be trying to combine the roles of aging *enfant terrible* and pillar of Khrushchevism. Cultural activity since Stalin's death has thus advanced in an atmosphere of great deviousness, surrounded by all sorts of absurd conventions. But it certainly *has* advanced, even though many Russians must be wishing that it had gone a great deal further. We may now turn to the three areas in which Stalinist oppression weighed most heavily on Soviet culture and attempt to assess the degree of progress made. To recapitulate, the three were: first, the ban on contacts with foreign countries, second, the insistence that works of art must reflect official optimism, and, third, the prohibition on formal experiment.

Melting of the Curtain?

Of the three areas, the one that has altered most strikingly in the last ten years is that of contact with foreigners. The Soviet theater was among the first to reflect this change, one early landmark being the visit to Moscow of the Comédie Francaise in April 1954. Like most Western cultural expeditions to Russia, the French group was met with wild enthusiasm by audiences which had been out of touch with foreign culture for too long and wanted to make up for lost time. Soon native Soviet plays denouncing wicked American businessmen began to give way to translated foreign plays—not all of them very distinguished, one might add, including as they did Frederic Knott's *Dial M For Murder* and Agatha Christie's *Witness For The Prosecution*. The field of art, too, was affected by the new spirit, and many exhibitions of foreign painting began to be shown, some of them including examples of non-representational art and "abstracts". The latter have been denounced in the press, but no one seems to have been prevented from

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looking at them. In the exhibition of British painting at the Hermitage Museum in Leningrad in 1960 this author was able to verify what had always been said—that the abstracts were the most popular item. Again, at the moment of writing Moscow is enjoying an exhibition of paintings by the French artist Fernand Léger, which include some abstract pictures, and the papers are full of the usual stories about Russians queuing up in twenty degrees of frost to get in.

Léger is no longer alive (good), and was not a Russian (good), but painted abstract pictures (bad). One presumes Soviet officials must get used to operating these criteria, though they sometimes show signs of disorientation. This has been reflected in the policy of locking undesirable pictures away from the public. During the first period of the thaw, both post-Impressionist foreign painters and recent Russian non-representational painters were brought out for display. Then the Russian paintings were withdrawn, while the foreign ones were left on show—an illustration of the principle that, for purposes of cultural penetration, it is better to be foreign than Russian, just as it is better to be dead than alive.

The same preferential treatment has been shown to foreign writers. One may or may not admire such English works as Kingsley Amis' *Lucky Jim* and John Wain's *Hurry On Down*. But certainly no Russian Kingsley Amis or John Wain could have got his work printed at the time when these novels were brought out in Russian. (With the recent appearance of works by Aksionov this policy, too, might well have been modified.)[7]

Western cultural imports have included performances by artists as far apart as Benny Goodman and Stravinsky (the latter, strictly speaking, a re-import). They have included light, medium and heavyweight material. But they have two things in common—one good (the enormous interest shown by Russians in all cultural imports), and one bad (the fact that they have all been, as it were, imports under government license). Now the Soviet press has begun complaining of insufficient selectiveness by the importers. Why, asked the novelist Victor Nekrasov in a recent article, did we have to take the films *Oklahoma* and *The Count of Monte Cristo* rather than, say, *The Bridge on the River Kwai, Citizen Kane, La Dolce Vita* or the Polish *Ashes and Diamonds*?[8] And why, may one ask, should the Russians be given Hemingway, but not Faulkner and Camus?

As this last question brings out, cultural contact with the West is bedeviled by official "cultural agreements," and takes place under supervision which would be inept even if it were not Soviet, simply because it is official. Fruitful cultural influences, such as that of Russian literature on the West in the early years of the century, were not wrangled about by committees of civil servants. They just happened, and were none the worse for that.

Though cultural contacts have improved since Stalin's death, they are certainly not free. Nor have they gained from official Soviet insistence on regarding each "cultural exchange" as a prestige battle in which they are determined to come out on top. Post-Stalin cultural exchange has led to a situation rich in absurdity, not the least absurd thing about it being the way in which Western cultural officials have begun to pick up some of the little mannerisms of their Soviet opposite numbers.

From Optimism to Realism

Of even more value to the Soviet creative artist than increased foreign cultural contacts has been the retreat from compulsory official optimism—the second of the three headings under which the dismantling (or partial dismantling) of Stalinism is considered here.

Once again the retreat from Stalinism has been incomplete, and has been carefully supervised from above.

There was a time when hardly anything—not even a technical article—could appear in print without an accompanying litany of praise to Stalin. Nowadays, though adulation of Khrushchev regularly oversteps the bounds of good taste, it is not compulsory. A negative control still operates whereby Khrushchev may not be criticized adversely, although various writers both to the left and right of Khrushchev's own position have in fact done so in an extremely devious way, and he has even been discreetly pilloried on the stage. Thus the arts have indeed been purged to some extent of the "cult of personality," though more doses of the same laxative would not come amiss.

The retreat from official optimism has also made it possible for a less idealized picture of Soviet living conditions to be presented in paintings and novels, on screen, stage and so on. I well remember the shock with which, shortly after Stalin's death, I first noticed a cartoon in *Krokodil* showing two Russian housewives cooking their dinner over a communal stove. The fact that millions of housewives then shared communal kitchens (as for that matter they still do) was known

[7] See Vasily Aksionov, "Dva rasskaza," *Novyi mir*, No. 7, 1962. and "Ticket to the Stars" (Zviozdnyi bilet), *Yunost*, No. 6, 1961.

[8] Viktor Nekrasov, "Po obe storony okeana" (On both sides of the ocean), *Novyi mir*, Nos. 11 and 12, 1962.

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to all of *Krokodil's* readers. But to have admitted this would have been contrary to the canons of Socialist Realism, as operated under Stalin, since these dictated that portrayals of contemporary everyday life must not reflect reality at all.

Nowadays comparative frankness is permitted in describing living conditions, but it is usual to set the franker "revelations" at some unspecified time in the past—if only a few years previously—with the unspoken implication that of course things are different at the time of writing.

When controls were at their laxest, in 1956, some Soviet writers were slow to realize that art need not necessarily be about politics at all. They were so relieved at not having to praise everything about the Soviet system that they began to criticize everything instead, creating, in works such as Dudintsev's novel *Not By Bread Alone,* a sort of Socialist Realism turned upside down. This, the authorities made it clear, was not to be permitted. However, barely three years later, Khrushchev, in his speech to the Third Congress of the Writers' Union (February 1959), intimated that "neutral" literature (*i.e.*, work dealing with private situations and lacking overt political implications) was not taboo, provided no one made too much of a song and dance about it. And a similar relaxation has been allowed in the other arts as well.

Soviet writers have been slow to exploit this new opportunity—slower, perhaps, than film-makers. They have now been freed for several years from the most odious compulsion of Socialist Realism—the need to make constant affirmations of political loyalty. But though they have made use of the new concessions to describe private situations, they have retained what is also a characteristic of Socialist Realist writing—a slack, dull, contemplative approach directed towards the past (in the sense that large sections of their work consist of lengthy and unutterably dull flash-backs). Stories such as Viktor Nekrasov's *Kira Georgievna*[9] have aroused attention at home and abroad without anyone apparently noticing what poor stuff they are. Kazakov and Tendriakov have likewise been somewhat overrated in the West, but one writer who may well outstrip his rivals (to judge from his short stories rather than his novels) is Aksionov. S. Antonov, too, has learned to pack a little punch in his work.[10]

Probably poetry now stands on a higher artistic level than prose, and certainly poets are in the forefront of the campaign to secure more freedom of expression. One thinks here of Tvardovsky, Yevtushenko and of the latest headline-maker, N. Voznesenski. But prose has made the most notable recent contribution of all the arts with the publication of Alexander Solzhenitzyn's *One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich.*[11] This may yet come to be regarded as the literary masterpiece of the first forty-five years of Soviet rule. It is free from concessions to official nonsense such as almost all Soviet writers, however "liberal," have made in one way or another.

No Holds Barred?

In the sphere of artistic experiment (the third of our headings) there has also been a retreat from Stalinism. But this has not got very far, since the party continues to repress "modernism" in the arts with a zeal which seems largely irrational. Official dislike of creative experiment has been defied on many occasions—as early

[9] *Novyi mir*, No. 6, 1961; English version, translated by N. Vickery, published by Pantheon, New York, 1962.

[10] Sergey Antonov, Soviet short story writer, contributor of five short stories to *Literaturnaia Moskva*, Moscow, 1956.

[11] Translated by Ronald Hingley and Max Hayward, New York, Praeger, 1963, and by Ralph Parker, New York, Dutton, 1963.

***KROKODIL* on Abstract Art**

Caption left: Chef-d'oeuvre and its connoisseurs.
Caption below: Accepted unanimously, with one obstaining.

—From Krokodil (Moscow), Dec. 20, 1962.

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as 1954, for example, when "modernist" productions of Maiakovski's *Bedbug* and *Bathhouse* were staged in Moscow. Courageous painters are continually holding unofficial exhibitions of "abstract" art (of Russian "abstracts" as opposed to those contained in the permitted foreign exhibitions), and these regularly attract huge crowds until they are pounced on by authority. Aksionov's use of up-to-date slang and Solzhenitsyn's development of the *skaz*[12] by blending concentration camp argot and peasant language with standard Russian, are examples, modest but successful, of formal innovation in literature, as are some of the devices employed in Voznesensky's verse. (An unsuccessful example was Dudintsev's story *A New Year's Tale*.[13]) Then again, one hears of composers using the twelve-tone scale, and even of public performances of dodecatonal music.[14] The fact is that in private such things thrive—samples of "modern" poetry (*i.e.*, poetry resembling that written in Russia and the West about fifty years ago) are copied and passed from hand to hand, while non-representational painters find patrons among highly-paid atomic physicists.[15]

All the same, the party seems resolved to hold such wickedness in check. As has been amply demonstrated, the mere thought of an "abstract" painting is enough to make Mr. Khrushchev lose his temper. At the beginning of December 1962, he was lured (by ingenious "Hards"?) to an unofficial "abstract" exhibition in Moscow, and claimed in an angry tirade that what he saw might have been painted by the tail of a donkey. The sequence has been one of the routine Soviet witch-hunts against creative experiment, which is still continuing at the time of writing.[16]

Meanwhile one has the impression that only official repression prevents the entire nation from embarking on an orgy of action-painting, doing the "twist," and writing surrealist verse. Of course the wilder kinds of artistic experiment are not necessarily very valuable in themselves. It is the feeling that he may not experiment if he wants to which is so hampering to the Soviet artist. And here he is not very well placed at the moment.

In conclusion, the arts have moved a long way in Russia since Stalin's death. One can no longer be really surprised at anything in the way of "revelations," and artists have now grown more accustomed to making use of what little latitude they are given to develop new techniques. Thus it already seems likely that the output of the 1960's will be on a higher level than that of the previous three decades. But there is still no sign that the party intends to abandon its claim to know what is best for everybody. If that should ever happen, the Russians, with more than thirty years of frustrated self-expression behind them, might well start a cultural renaissance which would leave the rest of us far, far behind.

POSTSCRIPT

Since the preceding pages were written, Mr. Khrushchev has delivered a long pronouncement on cultural policy to representatives of Soviet literature and the arts on March 8, 1963. His speech seems designed to end the era of limited official tolerance in cultural matters (to which reference was made above) and to inaugurate a period of harsher control.

Mr. Khrushchev's remarks made it clear that literature is now the main target of attack, although during the preceding few months painting and music had seemed to be more in the line of fire. For the first time since 1959, he threw the weight of the party towards the side of the diehards in the diehard-liberal struggle in the literary world.

In addition to continuing his abuse of modernism in the arts, Khrushchev insisted that writers should reflect official optimism to a greater extent, which suggests that it will now be more difficult to get "neutral" fiction, devoted to private situations, into print. He abused various "liberal" writers for commenting in an un-Soviet manner on recent visits to the West; and he also attacked Ehrenburg, who is now in virtual disgrace despite his many past services to the cause of Khrushchevism.

This, of course, might be only another torrent of words. Nevertheless, the campaign against non-conformism, which by now has embraced not only literature, but all other areas of creative endeavor, seems to be gaining in volume and vehemence—a development which does not augur well for the future of Soviet culture.

[12] *Skaz*—narrative conducted in the style and with the mannerisms of an imaginary colloquial speaker.

[13] *Novyi mir*, No. 1, 1960.

[14] See Fred K. Prieberg, "The Sound of New Music," *Survey* (London), No. 46, January 1963, pp. 14-102.

[15] See V. Slepian, "The Young vs. the Old," *Problems of Communism*, May-June 1962.

[16] See A. Brumberg, "Tempest in a Gallery," *New Republic* (Washington, D. C.), Feb. 16, 1963, pp. 17-20.

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Resurrection—and Perdition

By Leopold Labedz

ACCORDING TO A Moscow wit, the new Soviet Constitution, which is "to raise socialist democracy to a still higher level,"[1] will add the right of posthumous rehabilitation to the long list of rights already guaranteed by the Stalin Constitution.

Rehabilitations have indeed been an important feature of the post-Stalin scene. Although the specific reasons for the decision to rehabilitate particular victims of the purges have been obscure in many cases, the general pattern of the rehabilitations throws a revealing light on the character and limitations of the change that has taken place in Soviet society in the decade since Stalin's death.

Stalin's victims encompassed many categories, but only some of these can be dealt with here.[2] Of the Communist notables who were purged by Stalin, few have survived. Consequently, the candidates for rehabilitation in this category have been almost entirely confined to persons whose reputations only could be restored.

One may recall that rehabilitation was not an entirely unknown phenomenon even in Stalin's time. Professor Ramzin, who was accused of sabotage in the trial of the so-called Industrial Party in 1930, was later rehabilitated and, as head of the Institute of Thermodynamics in the early 1940's, received a Stalin Prize for his scientific achievement. Similarly, A. N. Tupolev, the famous Soviet aircraft designer, was imprisoned in 1938, released in 1943, and later designated an Academician and Stalin Prize winner. Among the military, (the future) Marshal Rokossovsky and some other commanders (Gorbatov, Meretskov, Podlas) were jailed, but later won rehabilitation and fought in the war.

But these rehabilitations concerned professionals and were the result of the tyrant's grace and favor, granted only when the need for the ex-victims' services was realized. Unlike the post-Stalinist rehabilitations, they had no immediate political significance. The most striking thing about the rehabilitation process in the last decade has been its selectivity; and it is this element which furnishes the clue to its political significance and to the intricate connection between past and present that is involved.

This selectivity also reflects the moral character of the process. "Rehabilitation" is defined in the *Concise Oxford Dictionary* as a restoration to privileges, reputation, or proper condition. When the French government brought Dreyfus back from Devil's Island and publicly rehabilitated him, there was no ambiguity or concealment about it. But Stalin's victims do not get this kind of open rehabilitation. Soviet rehabilitations are furtive and carried out, so to say, by installments; the un-persons are let out of the "memory hole" in a most unobtrusive way. The whole process can properly be called rehabilitation by stealth.

Some rehabilitations were first brought to light by name-dropping in texts, others by portraits put on display at exhibitions and museums. There were gradations of rehabilitation, for reputations were restored in different degrees, according to the current party criteria. Some persons were rehabilitated, but their work was not, or only parts of it. In short, the whole process has been essentially a political operation in which the redress of past wrong done an individual and the rectification of unjust accusations against him have not been the decisive criteria. On the contrary, such moral criteria have been basically subordinated to purposes of political manipulation and continue to be

[1] Khrushchev in *Pravda*, April 26, 1962.

[2] A more comprehensive study is in preparation by the author.

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so. This explains why so many victims remain unrehabilitated despite the fact that their "guilt," in the light of the general official admissions about Stalinist justice, can no longer be maintained.

Those Who Survived

The first persons to undergo formal rehabilitation in the USSR were the doctors arrested in 1952 on charges of sabotage, espionage, and terrorist acts. The "Doctors' Plot" was repudiated in the Soviet press on April 4, 1953, and the accused were "completely exonerated" by a communiqué of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Two of the doctors originally arrested were missing from the list of those released, presumably because they had perished as a result of what the communiqué euphemistically called "the use of impermissible means of investigation" to obtain their confessions.

Shortly afterwards came the first rehabilitation of a prominent party member, an old Bolshevik about whom the Soviet press had maintained a 13-year silence. On May 6, 1953, *Pravda* published a decree awarding Grigori Ivanovich Petrovsky the "Order of the Red Banner of Labor." The award was ostensibly granted in connection with his 75th birth anniversary, but this was obviously only a pretext since, curiously enough, his 75th birthday had actually occurred on February 4, while Stalin was still alive. Petrovsky had been President of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic for almost twenty years, and a candidate member of the Ukrainian party Politbureau for thirteen years. In 1938 he lost all his posts but was not publicly accused of any crime. It is not clear whether he was imprisoned, but if so, it was only for a while, because shortly thereafter he moved to Moscow, where he became a minor official in the Museum of the Revolution. Why he alone, of all the members of the Ukrainian Politbureau at that time, survived the purge remains a mystery. The motives for his rehabilitation are no less mysterious, but they seem to have been connected with the struggle for power after Stalin's death, in which the Ukrainian *place d'armes* figured prominently.[3] Before his death on January 10, 1957, Petrovsky published some reminiscences in the press. He was given a state funeral; the urn containing his ashes was carried by Voroshilov, Suslov, Furtseva, and Kirichenko, and he was interred in the Kremlin wall. And on February 4, 1963, the real date of his 85th birth anniversary, *Pravda* published a commemorative article about him.

[3] *Cf.* R. Conquest, *Power and Policy in the USSR,* London, 1961, pp. 211-12.

Another interesting case history of a person who lived to enjoy his own rehabilitation is that of A. Y. Kapler, the most successful Soviet film writer under Stalin. He wrote the scenarios for the series of films on the Revolution and Civil War, including "Lenin in October" and "Lenin in 1918," which filled the same role in the cinema as the *Short Course* on the history of the CPSU did in book form: *i.e.*, they depicted the "heroic" period of Soviet history as Stalin had revised it, retroactively displacing most of the original leaders of the Revolution. For his work Kapler was rewarded with the Order of Lenin. During the war he became a war correspondent, but in 1943, allegedly on account of his correspondence with Stalin's daughter, Svetlana, he was arrested and sent to a labor camp in Kotlas.[4] In 1955 he was released and resumed his career, again becoming prominent in the Soviet film world. He wrote the scenarios for several new films and sat on the jury for awarding Lenin film prizes.[5]

In November 1957, the magazine *Soviet Literature* published a new version by Kapler of his old scenario for "Lenin in 1918." A note in brackets underneath the title explained laconically: "Revised, 1956." Whereas in the original version Stalin had overshadowed, or even replaced, all the other Bolshevik leaders except Lenin, he was now conspicuous by his absence.

But this was not the end of Kapler's Pirandellesque double involvement. At the beginning of 1962, he wrote an article in *Literaturnaia gazeta* describing how a boy friend of his daughter had been framed by the Sochi chief of police, maltreated, and finally certified as insane. Kapler's personal appeal to Khrushchev on behalf of the young man had been in vain because of the intervention of the police official's influential friends. Presumably only the high status of the rehabilitated writer made it possible in the end to expose the culprits who, in Kapler's opinion, were trying "to reestablish the regime that the party has wrathfully condemned once and for all."

Separating the Sheep from the Goats

The first of the executed old Bolsheviks to be rehabilitated was M. S. Kedrov, an old member of the Cheka, whose exoneration was made public in the December 17, 1953, announcement of Beria's trial and execution.

[4] *Cf.* A. Ekart, *Vanished Without Trace,* London, 1954, pp. 214-15.

[5] *Cf.*, for instance, *Iskustvo Kino*, No. 2, 1961, & No. 4, 1962, and *Literaturnaia gazeta*, Feb. 27, 1961, & March 22, 1962.

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Khrushchev said in his "secret speech" of February 1956 that Kedrov had been "found innocent by the Military Collegium. But despite this, he was shot on Beria's order."

The trial of Georgian police chiefs Rukhadze and Rapava, in September 1955, provided the occasion for rehabilitating some of the Georgian Bolsheviks who perished under Stalin, including M. D. Orakelashvili, onetime Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Transcaucasion Soviet Republic and secretary of the Georgian party Central Committee between 1921 and 1937. The circumstances of Orakelashvili's death are still somewhat ambiguous. According to *Pravda* (December 20, 1937), he was shot together with A. S. Yenukidze on December 16, 1937, after a trial in camera; according to the *Large Soviet Encyclopedia* (Vol. 51, 1958), he died in 1940.

Yenukidze, on the other hand, was mentioned in a sinister context in Khrushchev's secret speech as a signatory of the "directive" which "became the basis for mass acts of abuse against socialist legality." Khrushchev did not mention the fact that Yenukidze—who had been secretary of the Executive Committee of the Congress of Soviets since 1918—fell from grace in 1935, when he was accused by Yezhov of being "politically degenerate." It was Khrushchev himself who in June 1935 was charged with explaining Yenukidze's expulsion from the party to the Moscow party membership. Abel Yenukidze had till then been considered a close friend of Stalin (hence Trotsky's later reference to Cain-Stalin), but in 1935 he was accused of employing Trotskyists and former aristocrats. Khrushchev charged him at the time with "treason to the revolution" and with being "a kind uncle" to the enemies of the party.[6]

Perhaps Khrushchev's two radically different accusations against Yenukidze—charging him in 1935 with liberalism and in 1956 with having helped in the preparation of Stalinist terror—were not quite unconnected and might account for the fact that Yenukidze's posthumous disgrace lasted four years longer than that of his codefendant in the 1937 trial, Orakelashvili. Yenukidze was at last rehabilitated in 1959. This fact, however, was only disclosed much later in an article written about him by the grandson of his friend, the old Bolshevik Shaumyan, and published in *Pravda* on May 19, 1962, the 85th anniversary of Yenukidze's birth. In contrast to Khrushchev's 1956 remarks concerning him, the *Pravda* article called Yenukidze "one of the first victims of Stalin's personality cult," attributed his fall to Stalin's need to inflate his own role in the Bolshevik history of Transcaucasia, but ascribed the deed itself to "the notorious falsifier of party history, provocateur, and adventurist, Beria." As the historian Boris Nicolaevsky has pointed out, however, the fall of Yenukidze took place before Beria's historical falsifications appeared in print.[7] Beria was then only a provincial party secretary in Georgia, and his role in the affair could at most have been only secondary. The full story of Yenukidze's undoing still remains to be told, but it very likely was connected with Stalin's preparation of the *Yezhovshchina*, for which the Kirov murder was the signal.[8]

THE COMPLICITY OF present Soviet leaders in particular cases of persecution most probably accounts for the fact that certain rehabilitations have come earlier than others. But political considerations rather than personal responsibility have been the paramount factor. In the early stages of the post-Stalin struggle, the chiefs of police got all the blame, and the demarcation line of responsibility was firmly drawn between the party and the political police. The case of N. A. Voznesensky, who had been chairman of the Gosplan and Deputy Premier until March 1949, conveys this aspect of the rehabilitation process in a nutshell: although both party leaders and NKVD men were disclosed to have had a hand in eliminating him, only the latter were punished.

Giuseppe Boffa, Moscow correspondent of the Italian Communist newspaper *l'Unitá*, learned of Voznesensky's rehabilitation already in the spring of 1955,[9] but it was not until January 1956 that the latter's name first reappeared in a Soviet publication.[10] A month later, in his secret speech, Khrushchev disclosed some details of the "Leningrad affair," of which Voznesensky had been a victim, together with Kuznetsov, Rodionov, Popkov, and others. (Their names had not been referred to in *Pravda's* report of the Abakumov trial, published December 24, 1954, when the "Leningrad case" had first been revealed.) Khrushchev laid the blame on Stalin (who "personally supervised the 'Leningrad Case' "), Beria (who provided Stalin with "certain slanderous materials"), and Abakumov (who "fabricated this affair"). Abakumov was shot, but it seems clear that other Soviet leaders—Malenkov in particular, and possibly Kozlov—were also mixed up in the "case."[11]

[6] *Pravda,* June 8 & 13, 1935.

[7] *Sotsialisticheski vestnik*, May-June 1962.

[8] *Cf.* L. Pistrak, *The Great Tactician*, New York, 1961, pp. 140-41.

[9] *La grande svolta*, Rome, 1959, p. 25.

[10] *Voprosy istorii*, No. 1, 1956.

[11] *Cf.* R. Conquest, *op. cit.,* in particular pp. 95-111.

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It was only after the defeat of the "anti-party group" in 1957 that Malenkov also was accused by Shvernik of direct complicity in the Leningrad affair[12]—a charge repeated shortly thereafter by Khrushchev, who declared that Malenkov had been one of the chief organizers.[13] According to Boffa, Malenkov admitted his "moral co-responsibility" in the case, but the same author indicates a more direct kind of responsibility by claiming that one of the executed victims, A. A. Kuznetsov, was arrested in Malenkov's office.[14]

It may be recalled that Frol Kozlov, at present a member of the CPSU Presidium and First Deputy Premier of the Council of Ministers, was sent to Leningrad as party organizer in 1949 and became a secretary of the Leningrad *Obkom* in 1952. The First Secretary of the *Obkom* at the time was V. M. Andrianov, presumably a protégé of Malenkov. He was relieved from this post in September 1953 and replaced by Kozlov,[15] who in the meantime had been demoted to the position of third secretary. In the struggle with Malenkov, control of the Leningrad party apparatus was obviously of great importance to Khrushchev, and that fact may explain the rise of Kozlov.

It is also worth noting that in the later chorus of voices referring to the "Leningrad Case" Kozlov's was conspicuously absent. Judging from his biography, he must have been quite familiar with the affair; yet he never made any allusion to it nor any attempt to incriminate Malenkov. This was in striking contrast to the attitude of his successor as First Secretary of the Leningrad *Obkom*, I. V. Spiridonov, who both before and during the 21st CPSU Congress pressed for stern measures against those who had "inflicted a great loss on the cadres of the Leningrad party organization."[16] Spiridonov's vindictiveness may have reflected the rancor of the Leningrad Communists resulting from the purges which had hit them in 1949 and 1952. Or it may have been part of a design for which further measures against the "anti-party group" were to serve as a springboard. Whatever the case, such measures did not materialize either during or after the 22nd Congress, notwithstanding the extension of the charges against Malenkov and others at the Congress and Kozlov's declaration that the culprits "must be made to answer for their anti-party and criminal action." It again was Shvernik who referred to the "Leningrad case." Six months later Spiridonov was relieved as First Secretary of the Leningrad party organization.[17]

CLEARLY, WHAT IS at stake in the battle of rehabilitations is not so much the resurrection of the dead as the survival of the living—at least the political survival. This explains why no trial like that of Abakumov followed all these charges and admissions. Too many party people who built their careers under Stalin were personally implicated in the purges to make it easy to embark upon a risky course of punitive legal action while settling political accounts among themselves—even if the necessary scapegoats could be found.

This is not to suggest that such a possibility is inconceivable, but only to say that so far prudence has prevailed. It is out of prudence that rehabilitations have been presented in such a way that no questions of personal responsibility were raised. In the first place, they have usually been disclosed in a most inconspicuous manner. Moreover, in the early phase, those non-surviving purge victims who, after rehabilitation, were accorded a place in Soviet encyclopedias had one vital detail missing from their biographies: namely that their lives had been cut short by execution, or by death in labor camps or prisons. There was only oblique reference to this touchy subject in a two-volume collection, *Reminiscences on Lenin* (published in 1956-57), in which the biographical notes on twelve of the contributors ended with the phrase: "Became a victim of enemy slander in . . . [date follows]; later rehabilitated."

The slight progress of rehabilitation in the six years since then can be measured by following the case of one of the contributors to this collection, O. A. Pyatnitsky, once secretary of the Comintern. Although the later-published editions of both the large and small Soviet encyclopedias include an entry on Pyatnitsky, neither mentions how he died or even that he was arrested. Not until January 31, 1962, in an article about him on the occasion of his 80th birth anniversary, did *Izvestia* clarify Pyatnitsky's death by stating that he "fell a victim of unfounded accusations in 1939."

[12] *Pravda,* June 7, 1957.

[13] *Ibid.,* July 6, 1957.

[14] G. Boffa, *op. cit.,* p. 29. I. M. Turko wrote in *Leningradskaia pravda* (July 8, 1957) that he was called *in February 1949* to Malenkov's office "where every effort was made to make me sign an obvious falsification." The *Leningrad Encyclopedia* (p. 566) and the *Large Soviet Encyclopedia* (p. 168), both published in 1958, reveal that Kuznetsov was a Secretary of the Central Committee until *February 1949.*

[15] Since then, while others have been rehabilitated, Andrianov's name has been purged from the *Leningrad Encyclopedia,* the *Large Soviet Encyclopedia,* and other places—a procedure as firmly adhered to with reference to those fallen from grace in the post-Stalin era as it was in the period of the "cult of personality."

[16] *Partiinaia zhizn,* No. 2, 1959.

[17] *Pravda,* May 4, 1962.

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It took some years for the formula "victim of enemy slander" to be altered to "victim of unjust repression." Still, even as late as 1958, the only kind of allusion yet made to the fate of the rehabilitated Voznesensky was the vague statement in the *Large Soviet Encyclopedia* (Vol. 51, p. 60) that he stayed in his post "until the end of his life." Nor does the index to Vol. 50 of this work give the dates of death of "enemies of the people" like Bukharin, Zinoviev, Yezhov, and Beria.

All these tergiversations raise the question: What is to be considered a rehabilitation? Not all the victims of past purges have been exonerated; among those who have been, not all were exonerated in the same way; and finally, not all those exonerated were actual victims of Stalin's purges. Some, like the rehabilitated Lunacharsky or Pokrovsky, died beforehand and were either put into the "memory hole" or vilified only later on. There also were some actual victims, like Ordzhonikidze, who were never openly vilified, but instead were "adopted" and therefore needed no rehabilitation.

The rehabilitation process has two aspects: political and legal. Politically, posthumous rehabilitation is a symbolic operation in which persons whose records previously had been systematically blackened, or about whom there had been complete silence, are "restored in print." It may be wholehearted, or qualified by the indication that the person did indeed commit political mistakes but was unjustly treated inasmuch as his mistakes were not crimes.

Legally, rehabilitation involves the quashing of judicial sentences and sometimes the award of some form of compensation.[18] Such procedures started not long after Stalin's death. In his 1956 "secret" speech, Khrushchev disclosed that since 1954 the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court had rehabilitated 7,679 persons, many of them posthumously. Legal and political rehabilitation, however, are separable: that is to say, the latter does not necessarily follow the former. And even when it does, there may be a considerable interval between.

Rehabilitation *Manqué*

If Khrushchev's revelations at the 20th Congress posed the question of the public rehabilitation of the victims of the "personality cult," they *ipso facto* broached the problem of what to do about the leaders of the opposition who perished under Stalin, including those sentenced in the Moscow Trials. Even more than Stalin's dethronement itself, this could have created a delicate political problem affecting the legitimacy of his heirs. All the late dictator's successors had belonged to his faction in the 1920's, and most of the politically prominent people of the Stalinist generation were the beneficiaries of his crimes. Although perhaps not all had been direct accomplices in these crimes, they at least had risen to positions of political power and influence over the dead bodies of the liquidated "enemies of the people."

It is not surprising, therefore, that the mechanism of retrospective justice was put into operation selectively. The Stalinists liquidated in the 1930's were rehabilitated, while the opponents of Stalin generally were not. In the former category were such men as Kossior, Postyshev, Chubar, Eikhe and Rudzutak, all old Bolsheviks and members of Stalin's Politbureau. Among those connected in any way with the opposition to Stalin, only Antonov-Ovseenko (who repented and became ambassador to Republican Spain before his final fall) has been rehabilitated; the other prominent old Bolsheviks who were involved in the oppositional struggle against Stalin and were liquidated in the Great Purge have not been.

Strictly speaking, some of the defendants in the Moscow Trials, that epitome of Stalinist justice, should not be candidates for *posthumous* rehabilitation. Sokolnikov and Radek were only sentenced to ten years' imprisonment, and Rakovski to twenty years; and there never was any announcement of their deaths in prison, or of their release in conformity with the norms of "socialist legality." The principal accused in the trials—Trotsky (condemned *in absentia*), Kamenev, Zinoviev, Pyatakov, Bukharin, and Rykov—were charged, among other crimes, with preparing to remove not only Kossior and Postyshev, now rehabilitated, but also Molotov and Kaganovich, now in disgrace. It is obviously no use trying to anticipate history: the large and small Soviet encyclopedias now both contain biographies of Kossior and Postyshev, but the former entries on Molotov and Kaganovich have been eliminated.

Even Trotsky, Kamenev, Zinoviev, and other old oppositionists are no longer represented as foreign agents, although references still abound to their "anti-party and anti-Soviet activity." The suppression of their role in Soviet history has become less conspicuous, and the historical falsification of their actions is now more discreet. Such falsifications are obviously more difficult to construct now than before, and as a result fantastic

[18] On September 8, 1955, the USSR Council of Ministers issued a decree "Concerning the length of employment, provision of employment and pension rights of citizens who had been improperly convicted under the criminal code and who have since been rehabilitated."

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somersaults have been performed in Soviet historiography.[19]

Gradually, some hitherto suppressed documentary materials have been allowed to come to light, and even though these have often been emasculated, the necessity has arisen to reconcile the new-old facts with Stalinist falsifications which were still being preserved. In 1957, when John Reed's *Ten Days That Shook the World* was republished in the USSR after 27 years of suppression, a new preface to the edition explained away Trotsky's role in the revolution as resulting from "the inexorable logic of historical events (which) sometimes forced the representatives of the capitulating line to talk and act against their own convictions."[20] Again, in the newly republished memoirs of some of the old Bolsheviks, references to the unrehabilitated leaders have sometimes been deleted, or passages of the original texts have even been rewritten so as to make these leaders appear in an unsympathetic light.[21]

RECENTLY A MORE sympathetic treatment of such figures has occasionally been permitted. Thus, for example, in a novel by E. Kazakevich, Zinoviev appears as a complicated personality who "felt towards Lenin a tender affection, almost a feminine love, at the same time disinterested and calculating."[22] On the other hand, an earlier attempt by E. N. Burdzhalov (in *Voprosy istorii,* April 1956) to present a more truthful account of the position of Kamenev *and* Stalin before Lenin's "April Theses" ended in Burdzhalov's dismissal and a shake-up of the editorial board of *Voprosy istorii.*

The official version of the role of the unrehabilitated personalities in the events leading to the Bolshevik seizure of power has changed since 1956, but only slightly. Both the first and second editions of the new CPSU history, for instance, point out that Kamenev took a "semi-Menshevik position"; that Rykov supported him and argued that "there are no objective conditions in Russia for a socialist revolution"; and that the policy of Trotsky was "adventurist and disastrous for the revolution."[23] There are some differences between these two editions of the party history, but these mainly concern the role of Stalin and not those of the disgraced leaders. The second edition is incomparably more critical of Stalin and misses no chance to find him at fault. On the other hand, while both editions describe the unrehabilitated Bolsheviks in less demonic terms than were employed in the Stalinist *Short Course,* they both —despite minor changes in the second edition—preserve in all essentials the previous falsifications concerning the oppositionists.

Thus, although the second edition in one place drops a sentence from the first edition to the effect that Kamenev's position in 1917 "was a continuation of his previous opportunistic line," it repeats elsewhere that his (and Zinoviev's) "betrayal was a direct consequence of their opportunistic vacillations." Similarly, Trotsky's role in the revolution and the Civil War is still systematically suppressed or distorted: the November insurrection was not directed by him; the Red Army was created without him; and on every occasion he pursued a pernicious policy.

As a sort of poetic justice, the blackening of Trotsky is coupled in the second edition of the party history with a similar though not as elaborate effort to blacken Stalin. The latter is now represented as sharing Kamenev's political position before April 1917, opposing Lenin on the issue of the exclusion of Kamenev and Zinoviev before the Bolshevik seizure of power, and "vacillating" during the Brest-Litovsk negotiations. Even where the narrative refers to the struggle with the opposition, for which Stalin had been praised to the hilt in the first edition, his name is now discreetly dropped in most places (as are those of Molotov and Kaganovich) and replaced by the anonymous term "party workers."

The present line on the rehabilitation of the oppositionists is defined in a Central Committee resolution made public by TASS on February 1, 1963, criticizing the work of the journal *Voprosy istorii KPSS* (Problems of History of the CPSU). This resolution is reminiscent of the one issued by the Central Committee five years ago regarding the magazine *Voprosy istorii* after the Burdzhalov affair. The 1963 resolution states:

The journal should fight for the liquidation of the harmful consequences of the cult of Stalin in party history and for the complete overcoming of subjectivism, dog-

[19] *Cf.* the author's articles: " 'The Ministry of Truth' without 'Big Brother'," *The World Today,* July 1954, pp. 300-09, and "L'histoire du P. C. de l'USSR," *Le Contrat Social,* Jan. 1960, pp. 33-38. Also Alexander Dallin, "Recent Soviet Historiography," in *Russia under Khrushchev,* Edit. by Abraham Brumberg, New York, F. A. Praeger, 1962, pp. 470-88, and Merle Fainsod, "Soviet Russian Historians," in *Encounter,* March 1962.

[20] Describing the production of the film, "October Days," based on Reed's book, A. Vlasov and A. Mlodik reveal that "when the work emerged from the preparatory period, difficulties began to arise at almost every step." (*Neva,* No. 1, 1959, p. 205.)

[21] *Cf.* S. V. Utechin, "New Publications on Party History," and J. Meijer, "The Civil War in Russia: Sources," in *Soviet Survey,* No. 20, 1957, pp. 5-11 and No. 30, 1959 pp. 71-6.

[22] *Oktiabr,* No. 4, 1961, pp. 8-63.

[23] *Istoriia Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskovo Soiuza,* Moscow, 1959; 2nd edition, 1962.

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matism and the mistaken historical methods connected with them. The journal is also duty-bound to oppose resolutely and implacably any attempts to undermine the foundations of Marxist-Leninist theory under the guise of the struggle against the personality cult, and all attempts to rehabilitate the anti-Marxist opinions and trends which were routed by the party.

In the light of this declaration, it is not surprising that neither the first nor second edition of the new party history says a word about the Moscow Trials despite the logical implications of the revelations made at the 20th and the 22nd Congresses and of all the rehabilitations which have been authorized so far. In the second edition, the prelude to these trials, the murder of Kirov, is no longer connected by implication with the activity of the opposition, as it was in the first edition,[24] but the new edition makes no attempt at further clarification, merely quoting Khrushchev's remark in his "secret speech" of seven years ago that the circumstances of the murder "are still being investigated." [25]

IN THE MEANWHILE, one particular rehabilitation, more than any other, has implicitly put in doubt the legal foundation of the Moscow Trials. This was the rehabilitation of the former First Secretary of the Uzbek Communist Party, Akmal Ikramov, one of the accused in the Bukharin-Rykov trial. The *Small Soviet Encyclopedia* gives the date of his death as March 13, 1938, the last day of the trial. Like all the other defendants, Ikramov confessed to all the crimes of which he was accused. In his concluding speech for the prosecution, Vishinsky charged Bukharin with having established contact with the British intelligence service through Ikramov, who testified to that effect during the trial.[26]

Ikramov's rehabilitation was announced by Nuritdin Mukhitdinov, then a member of the party Presidium, in a speech at Tashkent in September 1957.[27] Obviously this invalidated the whole case; yet no rehabilitations of the others accused in the Moscow Trials have followed. Only in a private conversation has Mikoyan come close to admitting that the trials were frame-ups. Asked by Mr. Louis Fischer whether he really believed that Bukharin had been a wrecker and a spy, Mikoyan answered: "No, I don't." [28]

[24] *Istoriia . . .*, p. 463.

[25] *Istoriia . . .*, 2nd edition, p. 486.

[26] *Report of Court Proceedings in the Case of the Anti-Soviet "Bloc of Rightists and Trotskyites,"* Moscow, 1938, pp. 339-56, 625, 754-58.

[27] *Pravda vostoka,* December 28, 1957.

[28] *Russia Revisited,* London, 1957, p. 64.

Not many do, and even though Bukharin and Co. remain unrehabilitated in the Soviet Union, neutral references to them had appeared in the writings of Polish and Italian Communists even before the 22nd CPSU Congress.[29] The Congress, it will be recalled, adopted a proposal by Khrushchev to erect in Moscow a memorial "to commemorate notable party and state officials who became victims of unjustified repressions during the period of personality cult." [30] But despite the moving display of dialectical spiritualism by Madame D. A. Lazurkina during the Congress proceedings,[31] nothing more has been heard of this proposal, and it will perhaps share the fate of the pantheon that was to have been erected after the 20th Congress.

Following the 22nd Congress, Trotsky's widow, the late Natalia Sedova-Trotsky, appealed to the CPSU Central Committee for a revision of the Moscow Trials and the rehabilitation of her husband, but her plea remained unanswered. On the other hand, the Yugoslav newspaper *Polityka* (October 16, 1962) reported—from "usually reliable sources" in Moscow—the judicial rehabilitation of Bukharin and other members of the Right Opposition, including Rykov and Tomsky. The same story was later reported by Western news agencies and by *The Times* (London), but there has been no official confirmation of it. Whatever the truth may be, it is unlikely that any legal rehabilitation of the Right Oppositionists will soon be followed by their political rehabilitation.

As for Trotsky and the Left Oppositionists, the chances of such action remain even more remote. Paradoxically, the reasons for this may now be no less of an external than an internal nature. In the Sino-Soviet dispute, both sides strenuously try to prove the doctrinal legitimacy of their respective positions: Soviet charges of "ultraleftism," "adventurism," and "Trotskyism" hurled against Mao are indignantly rejected by the

[29] Oskar Lange, *Ekonomia polityczna,* Warsaw, 1959, Vol. I, pp. 78 and 259; Aldo Zanardo in *Studi Gramsciani,* Editori Riuniti, Rome, 1958; Jadwiga Siekierska, *Kartki z przeszlosci* (Pages from the Past), Warsaw, 1960, pp. 89, 90, 116, 169; Günter Heidorn, *Monopole-Presse-Krieg,* (East) Berlin, 1960, p. 342.

[30] *Izvestia,* October 30, 1961.

[31] Speaking in support of a resolution to remove Stalin's remains from the Red Square mausoleum, Madame Lazurkina said that "Ilich" (Lenin) had appeared to her the night before and told her "it is unpleasant for me to lie side by side with Stalin, who brought so much harm to the party." (*Pravda,* October 31, 1961.) A party member since 1902, Madame Lazurkina had worked with Lenin, suffered many years of imprisonment and exile under Stalin after 1937, and finally gained rehabilitation in 1956.

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Chinese, who counter by accusing Khrushchev of rightist deviation. In the present state of the conflict, so long as there is no final split, Khrushchev (who himself ousted Malenkov as Premier on charges of Bukharinism) is not likely to deprive himself of a doctrinal weapon by rehabilitating Trotsky or to provide Mao with such a weapon by politically rehabilitating Bukharin.

In the present state of polycentric disarray in the Communist world, however, the lines of distinction between the "rehabilitated" and "unrehabilitated" tend to become blurred anyway, and the confusion has been compounded by the peculiar ambivalence of Soviet official "rehabilitations." It is not surprising, then, that the Italian Communists, who must find it difficult to follow faithfully all the nuances of these rehabilitations, have gone beyond them. After the 22nd Congress, *Nuova Generazione,* the organ of the Italian Communist youth league, began clamoring for the rehabilitation of the old Bolsheviks, and the main party organ *l'Unità* has even gone so far as to publish Trotsky's photograph and advertisements of his books, and to state that the "revelations of the 20th and 22nd Congresses have dismantled, bit by bit, the whole construction" of the Moscow Trials.[32]

The truth of the matter is that rehabilitations have little to do with logical consistency; they are dictated by the political needs of the Soviet leadership. Whenever destalinization has threatened to get out of hand to the point of threatening the legitimacy of his rule and undermining political controls, Khrushchev has hastened to emphasize that Stalin was after all a Marxist, that he was right in his struggle against the Opposition and deserves credit for it in spite of his mistakes and abuses of power. Khrushchev made this point in 1956, and he made it again just recently in his censorious speech to Soviet writers and artists (*Pravda*, March 10, 1963):

The party's struggle against the Opposition was led by Stalin. . . . Stalin's authority rose particularly high in the period of the struggle . . . against such anti-Leninist trends and oppositional groups in the party as the Trotskyists, Zinovievists, right opportunists, and bourgeois nationalists. . . . We still believe that Stalin was devoted to communism, that he was a Marxist; this cannot and should not be denied. . . . At Stalin's funeral many people including myself, had tears in their eyes. These were sincere tears.

Military Rehabilitations

The first indication of the rehabilitation of Stalin's army victims came in the January and February 1956 numbers of *Voprosy istorii*, which honorably mentioned Marshals A. I. Yegorov and V. K. Blyukher, and some other military figures. Subsequently other army commanders were rehabilitated, the most interesting case being that of Marshal Tukhachevsky and his fellow victims.

Tukhachevsky's name first reappeared (in parentheses) in an article by L. M. Spirin in *Voprosy istorii* (No. 6, 1956, p. 18). Shortly afterwards an article in *Kommunist* (No. 12, 1956, p. 70) charged him with "bad organization" of the 1920 offensive against Warsaw. This clearly suggested that his rehabilitation was encountering difficulties, probably because it not only involved the Army's prestige but also implied a revision of one of the celebrated Moscow Trials, opening up questions of personal complicity in the trial proceedings.[33] Whatever the reasons, the rehabilitation did not proceed along a straight course.

Tukhachevsky was first positively praised in *Komsomolskaia pravda* (August 23, 1957). Of all his military exploits the journal chose to extol him for his "heroic deeds accomplished for the glory of the Soviet motherland, the Soviet people, and the party of Lenin" in suppressing the 1921 workers' uprising in Kronstadt. At about the same time the *Large Soviet Encyclopedia* came out with a reference to him (Vol. 50, p. 260) as a "great military leader," and somewhat later *Voprosy istorii* (No. 4, 1958, p. 34) characterized him as a "gifted military commander." The process culminated with the inclusion of a biographical note on Tukhachevsky in Vol. 51 (p. 209) of the same encyclopedia. But while it fulsomely praised him, the note said nothing about the circumstances of his death in 1937, when he was executed for allegedly plotting the dismemberment of the USSR in favor of Germany and Japan. The only public reference to these circumstances was a statement by Alexei Surkov, then secretary of the Soviet Writers' Union, in an interview given to the Yugoslav newspaper *Mladost* (October 2, 1957), that "Marshal Tukhachevsky was killed because of the intrigues of the Gestapo."

Some of Tukhachevsky's codefendants also were rehabilitated. R. P. Eideman reappeared in Vol. 47 of the *Large Soviet Encyclopedia.* V. K. Putna was resurrected in *Sovetskaia Litva* (February 22, 1958), which hailed him as a "distinguished son of the Lithuanian

[32] Giuseppe Boffa in *l'Unità*, January 30, 1962.

[33] It is not certain whether a trial was actually held or the military court simply signed the verdict. In his speech to the 18th Party Congress in 1939, Voroshilov referred to "vile traitors like the Tukhachevskys, Yegorovs and Orlovs." And Khrushchev described Yakir as "riffraff (who) wanted to let in the German fascists" (*Bilshovik Ukrainy,* No. 6, 1938). Both quoted by Lazar Pistrak, *op. cit.*, pp. 151-52.

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people." Marshal Bagramian, writing in *Kommunist* (No. 2, 1958, p. 37), restored to the roll of honor the names of two more defendants in the Tukhachevsky trial, I. P. Uborevich and I. E. Yakir.

However, the rehabilitations of Tukhachevsky and his colleagues proved insecure. A later article by Bagramian marking the 40th anniversary of the Red Army omitted any mention of Tukhachevsky. The omission, moreover, was probably not fortuitous as the new party history, which appeared afterwards, also left out Tukhachevsky's name altogether. It was Voroshilov whose name was mentioned in connection with the suppression of the Kronstadt revolt; and the names of Uborevich and Yakir also were missing from the list of military heroes of the Civil War (p. 280). Thus Tukhachevsky and his fellow defendants were again "dehabilitated."

BUT THEN THE GHOSTS returned once more. Vol. IV of *The History of the Civil War*, published at the end of 1959 by the Institute of Marxism-Leninism, described Yakir as a "famous military commander" and listed Tukhachevsky among the "military specialists, generals and officers of the old (Tsarist) army (who) showed their devotion to the fatherland and to the people on the battlefields of the Civil War." This was a somewhat backhanded compliment to Tukhachevsky since it pointed to his wrong "social origin." Then, in 1961, on the 40th anniversary of Kronstadt, Marshal Voroshilov himself published an article recalling the events of the uprising and acknowledging Tukhachevsky's role in them. He also glorified Putna as a "splendid military leader."[34]

But it was the 22nd Congress that imparted real impetus to further action concerning both the "rehabilitated" and "re-rehabilitated" army commanders. During the Congress, Polyansky attacked Voroshilov, accusing him of complicity in the 1937 military purge. He charged that Voroshilov, who had been Defense Commissar at the time, was afraid that his complicity in the purge would be discovered and for this reason had taken sides with the "anti-party group" in 1957.

Shelepin and Khrushchev also were vociferous in lamenting the fate of Stalin's military victims. In his concluding speech to the Congress, Khrushchev said:

When we . . . received a report that neither Tukhachevsky nor Yakir nor Uborevich had been guilty of any crime against the party and the state, we asked Molotov, Kaganovich, and Voroshilov:
"Are you for rehabilitating them?"
"Yes, we are for it," they answered.
"But it was you who executed these people," we told them indignantly.
"When were you acting according to your conscience, then or now?"[35]

Khrushchev professed particular indignation at the execution of Yakir—whom he had called "riffraff" in 1938, but now described as a "Bolshevik of crystal purity"—and mentioned a meeting with Yakir's son in 1961. He also took up the Tukhachevsky case; but instead of drawing upon the Soviet archives, he referred to an "interesting story" which had "flashed through the foreign press" about the Gestapo having provided Stalin with false documents on Tukhachevsky.[36] The former course would have indicated a real concern for the rehabilitation of the wronged army officers and not just an intent to manipulate the case politically.

The 22nd Congress was followed by a spate of articles in the Soviet press about the rehabilitated military leaders.[37] All these articles followed the by now standard theme about "slander" and "unjustified repression." It was admitted that Gamarnik shot himself because he "could not suffer the tragic end of many loyal sons of our party, nor tolerate the mass repressions produced by the personality cult" (*Krasnaia zvezda*, April 13, 1962). And the new edition of the party history this time included the names of Tukhachevsky, Yakir, and Uborevich (pp. 293, 539). While there still have been no direct references whatever to the trial of Tukhachevsky, *Pravda*, on his recent 70th birth anniversary (February 16, 1963), published an article in which it admitted that he was shot. It also exonerated him on the score of his previously-emphasized defective "social origin" by pointing out that he was the son of a peasant woman and a poor landlord from a neighboring village. Shortly before this, Tukhachevsky's daughter and three sisters attended a special memorial gathering in his honor at the Frunze Military Academy in Moscow (reported in *Trybuna Ludu* [Warsaw], February 1, 1963). And it may be noted that both Tukhachevsky

[34] *Oktiabr*, No. 3, 1961, pp. 142-56.

[35] *Pravda*, October 29, 1961.

[36] Gomulka elaborated this story in greater detail at the Ninth Plenum of the Polish party Central Committee (*Trybuna ludu*, Nov. 22, 1961).

[37] *E.g.*, *Krasnaia zvezda* published articles on Alksnis (Jan. 27, 1962), Kutyakov (March 4), Tukhachevsky (March 24), Kork (April 5), Gamarnik (April 13), Eideman (May 10), and Prinakov (May 16); *Izvestia*, on Tukhachevsky (Dec. 27, 1961), Yakir (Feb. 6, 1962), and Blyukher (May 11, 1962); *Ogonyok*, on Uborevich (No. 52, 1961, p. 26). Also published in 1962 were: a pamphlet on Blyucher by V. Dushenkin, *Ot soldata do marshala;* a book about the rehabilitated military leaders, *Polkovodtsy grazhanskoi voiny;* and a book containing their memoirs.

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From Explanations to Prevarications

. . . (or) Wrestling with an Uneasy Conscience

From Khrushchev's "Secret Speech" at the 20th CPSU Congress, February 25, 1956:

Some comrades may ask us: Where were the members of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee? Why did they not assert themselves against the cult of the individual in time? And why is this being done only now?

First of all we have to consider the fact that the members of the Political Bureau viewed these matters in a different way at different times. Initially, many of them backed Stalin actively because Stalin was one of the strongest Marxists and his logic, his strength and his will greatly influenced the cadres and party work.

It is known that Stalin, after Lenin's death, especially during the first years, actively fought for Leninism against the enemies of Leninist theory and against those who deviated. . . . This fight was indispensable. Later, however, Stalin, abusing his power more and more, began to fight eminent party and government leaders and to use terroristic methods against honest Soviet people. . . . *Attempts to oppose groundless suspicions and charges resulted in the opponent falling victim of the repression. . . .*

In the situation which then prevailed I often talked with Nikolai Alexandrovich Bulganin; once when we two were traveling in a car, he said, "It has happened sometimes that a man goes to Stalin on his invitation as a friend. And when he sits with Stalin, he does not know where he will be sent next, home or to jail."

It is clear that such conditions put every member of the Political Bureau in a very difficult situation. . . . Possessing unlimited power, Stalin indulged in great willfulness and choked a person morally and physically. *A situation was created where one could not express one's own will.*

From the CPSU Central Committee Resolution, June 30, 1956:

One might ask why, then, did these people [i.e., the "Leninist core of the Central Committee"] not take an open stand against Stalin and remove him from leadership? This could not be done under the circumstances which had developed. *The facts show clearly that Stalin was guilty of many lawless deeds, committed particularly in the later period of his life.* However, at the same time, we should not forget that the Soviet people knew Stalin as a person who always acted in the defense of the USSR. . . . *Any action against him under these conditions would not have been understood by the people.* It is no way a question of lack of personal courage. It is obvious that if anyone in this situation had acted against Stalin he would not have received support from the people. . . .

One should also bear in mind that *many facts about wrong actions of Stalin,* especially in the sphere of the violation of Soviet law, *became known only during recent times*—after the death of Stalin, mainly in connection with the exposure of the Beria gang and the establishment of party control over the organs of state security.

From Khrushchev's speech at the 22nd CPSU Congress, October 27, 1961:

You can imagine how difficult it was to solve these questions [of Stalinist repressions] when the Presidium of *the Central Committee included people who had themselves been guilty of abuses of power.* . . . They stubbornly resisted all measures aimed at exposing the cult of the individual.

From Khrushchev's speech on March 8, 1963:

The question is often raised now as to why the violations of legality and the abuse of power were not revealed and stopped during Stalin's life, and whether it was not possible to do it at that time. . . . It is asked whether the leading party cadres did not know about the arrests of people at that time. Yes, they did. But *did they know that completely innocent people were being arrested? No, they did not know that.* They trusted Stalin and they did not even admit the thought that repressions could be applied to honest people devoted to our cause. . . .

When Stalin was being buried, many people, including myself, had tears in their eyes. They were sincere tears. Although we knew about some of Stalin's personal shortcomings, we trusted him. . . .

We learned of Stalin's abuse of power and the instances of arbitrariness which he committed only after his death and the exposure of Beria, that rabid enemy of the party and the people, spy and vile provocateur.

(All Italics added)

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and Marshal Blyucher are being accorded philatelistic rehabilitation through the issuance of postage stamps bearing their pictures.

Ghosts from the Ukraine

Rehabilitations have been no less selective and tortuous in other spheres. The case of Mykola Skrypnyk is particularly interesting among the rehabilitations of leaders previously condemned for "nationalist deviation." It provides a good illustration of the extreme sensitivity of this question in the Soviet multi-national state. And in this as in other spheres, rehabilitations cannot but have symbolic political significance because of their bearing upon national aspirations and the expectations engendered by them.

In the Ukraine the connection between the purges and the national problem was perhaps more striking than anywhere else. The flower of the Ukrainian intelligentsia perished in the 1930's as a result of the drive against "bourgeois nationalism."[38] The rehabilitation of the victims began timidly in 1956, but then it proceeded apace. However, the rehabilitation of Skrypnyk, who became a symbol of "nationalist deviation," encountered particular difficulties and has been implemented only reluctantly.

The first steps were taken after the 20th Congress. An article in *Voprosy istorii* (No. 3, 1956) declared:

As far as we can see there is not even a trace of nationalist deviationism in what M. O. Skrypnyk said. The chance erroneous remarks concerning the national problem which Skrypnyk made several years later cannot be the basis for slandering an old functionary of the Bolshevik Party and the Ukrainian government.

But the struggle for Skrypnyk's rehabilitation was curbed in 1958, with a renewed stress on his "serious nationalist errors." For example, in an article hailing the 40th anniversary of the Ukrainian Communist Party, *Radyanska Ukraina* (June 4, 1958) reverted to a familiar tune in stating that "in the early 1930's the Communist Party of the Ukraine exposed and condemned the nationalist errors of Skrypnyk." Whereas for a time there had been references to Skrypnyk as a historian of the Communist movement and a victim of the "personality cult," now again no positive references to him could appear.[39]

However, his rehabilitation was only suspended. The history of the Ukrainian party, published in 1961, mentioned him as a former member of the Politbureau,[40] although it maintained a careful silence about his role and eventual suicide. Then, after the 22nd Congress, his rehabilitation again gained momentum. On January 25, 1962, the 90th anniversary of his birth, *Pravda* and *Izvestia*, as well as *Radyanska Ukraina*, published laudatory articles hailing him as one of Lenin's old companions. "Stalin linked Skrypnik with the so-called national deviationists and exaggerated his mistakes," declared *Pravda*. And *Izvestia* explained to the public that "deeply insulted by the unjust accusations against him, Skrypnyk committed suicide in a moment of mental weakness."[41]

But it is not only Skrypnyk who rides again after the 22nd Congress. There has since been a new series of "birthday rehabilitations" as a result of which P. P. Postyshev, Skrypnik's persecutor, who tried "to sear with a red hot iron" the manifestations of "Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism," is galloping along with the adherent of the "Ukrainian road to socialism." On his 75th birth anniversary, *Pravda* (September 18, 1962) recalled Postyshev's merits, and a special gathering was held at the Museum of the Revolution to commemorate his memory.[42] Referring to Khrushchev's (still unpublished) 20th Congress speech, *Pravda* wrote that Postyshev had "boldly and directly opposed the groundless repressions employed against honest people and the crude violations of Soviet legality," and that as a result he had, like so many others, "perished tragically during the period of the personality cult of Stalin."

Postyshev was evidently one of the "Leninist core" of old Stalinists, referred to by Khrushchev, who *did* dare to oppose Stalin's bid for total power.[43] Khrushchev's own role in those years can be established only if that supreme historical witness, Alexander Poskrebyshchev, Stalin's own personal secretary, who was long ago presumed dead but is now reported to be writing

[38] *Cf.* Yuryj Lavrynenko, *Rozstriliane vidrozhdeniia*, Biblioteka "Kultury," Paris, 1959, and G.S.N. Luckyj, *Literary Politics in the Soviet Ukraine, 1917-1934*, New York, 1956.

[39] On the rehabilitation of Skrypnyk, *cf.* Panas Fedenko, "Mykola Skrypnik: His National Policy, Conviction, and Rehabilitation," in *Ukrainian Review*, Munich, No. 5, 1957.

[40] *Ocherki Istorii Komunisticheskoi Partii Ukrainy*, Kiev, 1961, p. 389.

[41] *Pravda's* original report of Skrypnyk's death (July 8, 1933) stated that he "committed a series of political errors, and upon realizing this he could not find the courage to overcome them in a Bolshevik manner and thus resorted to the act of suicide." Quoted in Hryhory Kostiuk, *Stalinist Rule in the Ukraine: A Study in the Decade of Mass Terror (1929-39)*, New York, 1960, p. 64.

[42] *Voprosy istorii KPSS*, No. 6, 1962, pp. 228-29.

[43] *Cf.* Leonard Schapiro, *The Communist Party of the Soviet Union*, New York, 1959, pp. 413-14; also, Kostiuk, *op. cit.*, pp. 114-22. The latter also gives some details on Khrushchev's Ukrainian career after Postyshev's fall.

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his memoirs in Moscow,[44] should be permitted to tell the truth instead of merely providing a whitewashing "self-rehabilitation" for Khrushchev.

Method in the Madness

It has been said that Communists do not believe in the after-life but do believe in posthumous rehabilitation. The Hungarian revolution dampened that belief for a while, but as can be seen, it certainly did not extinguish it. Only recently, the Bulgarian Communists gave a supreme demonstration of the faith by conferring the title of "Hero of Socialist Labor" on Kostov.

The Soviet Union has on occasion even contrived to extract "surplus value" from the labor of rehabilitated heroes. *Pravda's* article on the 90th birth anniversary of Chicherin serves as a case in a point. It appeared on December 5, 1962, at the height of the acrimonious Sino-Soviet debate, when Khrushchev was being accused by Mao of having perpetrated "another Munich" in Cuba. The article recalled at length the history of the Brest-Litovsk negotiations, "treacherously wrecked by Trotsky," and emphasized the praiseworthy action of Chicherin in reaching a compromise which "was dictated by the necessity of life" and "permitted our country to preserve the gains of the revolution and gather strength for further struggle against the enemies of the Soviet power." A week later, the same "birthday rehabilitation" argument was used almost literally by Khrushchev in his major post-Cuban foreign policy speech.[45]

Rehabilitations thus have their uses, but so have "dehabilitations." The 20th anniversary of the battle of Stalingrad provided a fresh occasion for "dispelling the myth about the allegedly decisive role of Stalin in planning and leading the operations in the region of Volgograd"[46] and for stressing instead Khrushchev's role as architect of the Stalingrad victory.[47] Likewise, both Bulganin and Kirichenko, whose efforts during the war had been praised in the first edition of the new party history (p. 526), disappeared from the honor roll in the second edition (p. 544), after their demotion.

If the history of Soviet rehabilitations has not always shown complete consistency, the Stalinist logic has certainly been consistently applied to "dehabilitations." Ever since subscribers to the *Large Soviet Encyclopedia* were instructed to replace the article on Beria by one on the Bering Straits (using "scissors or a razor blade"), all the political figures who fell by the wayside have been systematically eliminated from official works.

In both cases there is method in the folly, and it can perhaps be understood only in the context of what, for lack of a better term, may be called "political anthropology"—that is, by concentrating on the function of symbols in a political system. Like the confessions in the Moscow Trials, Soviet rehabilitations are political instruments and can be regarded as genuine only in the world of *Alice in Wonderland*. But it is of course better to have to deal with rehabilitations, even if they are selective and ritual, rather than with false confessions.

The complicity of Stalin's collaborators and their need to protect their legitimacy underlie the erratic character of the rehabilitation process. After Stalin, new functional myths have been synthetically created for the political purposes of the day, and they are faithfully reflected in Khrushchevian historiography.

Rehabilitations in the USSR do not restore what is essential in the Western notion of rehabilitation: the right to draw conclusions from the moral wrong done the victim by the state. They are a pragmatic affair in which truth is a matter of convenience and innocence or guilt a utilitarian consideration. At the same time, as some names find their way into print, others disappear. Admittedly the proportion changes, but it is still a question of some persons being "rehabilitated" while others are demoted.

This ambivalent tendency is now contained within certain limits, but if the accused principals in the Moscow Trials are ever to be rehabilitated, it may safely be predicted that the operation will be carried out in the same peculiar *chiaroscuro* manner in which some of Stalin's victims, who are still disapproved of by the present leadership, have been accorded a grudging, qualified rehabilitation. Should such a decision be taken, it will certainly be implemented in such a way as to emasculate the moral or political implications of the act. It is also important to note that rehabilitation has not been extended to non-Communist victims of Stalin.

Yet even within their narrow framework, rehabilitations do create difficult problems for Soviet historiography and set in motion a chain-reaction of more and more complex falsifications.

One way to clear up this intricate maze would be to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

This, however, as Eliza Doolittle would have said, is not likely.

[44] Jacques Tatu, in *Le Monde*, December 28, 1962.

[45] *Pravda*, December 13, 1962, p. 3.

[46] *Ibid.*, January 27, 1963. The revision of Stalin's role in the war began long before. *Cf.* article by D. M. Kukin in *Voprosy istorii*, No. 10, 1961.

[47] Praising Khrushchev in a long article in *Pravda* (Jan. 30, 1963), Marshal Chuikov managed not to use the name of the town at all, but he referred to "Stalingrad" in an interview which he gave to the Italian newspaper *l'Unità* (Feb. 3, 1963).

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Russia and China: Perennial Conflict

By Mark Mancall

THE LONG AND increasingly sharp Sino-Soviet dispute represents the West's latest failure to communicate with China through a constructive understanding of her political, social, and economic institutions. Through 19th-century American missionaries or 20th-century liberals or Marxists, the West has had a tremendous impact on China, contributing to the rapid deterioration of her traditional values and the breakdown of her traditional institutions. The West failed, however, to construct or transplant new values and institutions that might provide an efficient bridge to modernity (a task that we are attempting in many areas today). Invariably China, acting under the imperatives of her own autonomously evolved society, has developed institutions and attitudes that have at best dismayed and at worst endangered the West.

The Soviet experience in China gives us the opportunity to examine in a few specific instances the failure of the West to perceive the fundamental imperatives of China's modern history. Stalin (and Khrushchev, too) confronted the problem of all Westerners in their contacts with China: how to perceive, and manipulate, a socio-cultural system significantly different from their own and in a process of change outside their control.

Stalin's dilemma can be illustrated by three examples: (1) his insistence, in the years 1924-27, on an urban-based, proletariat-led revolution in China, which almost led to the destruction of the Chinese Communist Party; (2) his support of Chiang Kai-shek and the United Front policy, which led him to misjudge seriously the actual and potential power of the Chinese Communists during and after World War II; (3) his apparent assumption, after 1949, that he could reestablish Russia's preeminence of power and influence in her traditional Far Eastern sphere of interest, Manchuria and the Liaotung peninsula.

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Stalin and the Chinese Revolution

In 1924-27 Stalin encouraged the Chinese Communists, in coalition with the Kuomintang, to conduct a revolution based on the Chinese proletariat and aimed at the seizure of China's urban centers, particularly those along the coast (Canton and Shanghai) and in the Yangtze valley. By the end of 1927 Stalin's efforts had ended in failure. Chiang Kai-shek ordered the massacre of Shanghai's largely Communist-organized workers in April of that year and turned against the Communist—Left-Kuomintang coalition government at Wuhan. Finally, the Wuhan government disintegrated. The Communists then established a rural soviet enclave in the Kiangsi border region, while the party Central Committee went into hiding in Shanghai. By 1933 even the Central Committee had to join Mao Tse-tung in the Kiangsi border region, and the Chinese revolution's contact with its urban base was lost.

Two factors contributed to Stalin's policy formulations in this period: Marxism-Leninism and Russian historical experience. The Chinese revolution—any revolution—had to be based on the urban proletariat led by the vanguard Communist Party in alliance with, but not dependent upon, the peasantry. This was made abundantly clear when Pavel Mif, one of the Comintern's early China experts, urged that the Chinese peasants be allowed to form soviets, but failed to insist that urban workers lead them. Stalin accused Mif of "underrating the role and significance of the working class." It was entirely inadmissible to form soviets in the countryside without any urban base in the industrial

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centers. While an agrarian revolution would be required to complete the revolutionary process, only trained proletarian cadres could lead the agrarian revolution. Because the Communists were too few to "permeate this ocean of peasantry," they would have to rely on the Kuomintang (Wuhan) to reach the peasants.[1]

This issue of urban proletarian primacy was at the core of the 1927 debate on whether to continue the Communist alliance with the Kuomintang at Wuhan. The Comintern declared that Wuhan, "being the government of the Left-Wing Kuomintang, is not yet the dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry, but is on the road to it and will inevitably, in the course of the victorious *class struggle of the proletariat, . . .* develop in the direction of such dictatorship." [2]

The issue of an urban-based revolutionary strategy evoked bitter dispute in China in 1927. The Indian Communist M. N. Roy, then on a mission to China, insisted that the revolution depended upon the development of peasant uprisings, and he advised the Wuhan government not to continue its military campaigns to gain control of urban centers, but instead to drive for the countryside in South China. Borodin, the chief Soviet adviser to the KMT, on the other hand, did not believe that the Left-Kuomintang could promote an agrarian revolution.[3] Through the Chinese Communist leader Ch'en Tu-hsiu, he proposed at the Fifth CCP Congress in 1927 the "Northwestern theory," according to which "the revolution was to retire to the northwest provinces where the influence of imperialism was weaker and where the revolution could easily concentrate its forces for a later attack on the imperialist strongholds." [4] Mif interpreted this as implying that at that time the revolution could not succeed "in Canton nor in Shanghai nor in Tientsin nor in Hankow nor in any of those regions where industry was most developed, because there imperialism and the Chinese bourgeoisie held the stronger positions." [5] The Congress, obviously bowing to a Comintern directive conveyed through Mif, rejected Borodin's "defeatism." Borodin's position would, after all, have denied the validity of the concept of a proletarian revolution in China.

Stalin's commitment to an urban-based revolution, and to the Wuhan government as its vehicle, was so firm that he opposed peasant rebellion lest it betray his plans. The KMT army was officered by the landed gentry, who not unnaturally feared the loss of their land, and Stalin sided with them against the ground swell of peasant revolt. As a result, the Chinese Communists agreed, for instance, to exempt KMT officers' land from confiscation—since this included the land of their extended families, it took in a great deal of territory. Mao himself, in a cooperatively opportunistic move, became the chairman of the All-China Peasants' League, whose express purpose was the protection of the property of army officers' families.

Influence of Russian Experience

Stalin's Marxist-Leninist predilection for a proletarian urban-based revolution in China was reinforced by the experience of Russia's October Revolution. The Bolsheviks came to power in Russia through the sudden seizure of state power at the bureaucratic center, and in the most advanced region, of the country—*i.e.*, in the urban metropolises of Petrograd and Moscow. Having seized state power, they were able to organize a new bureaucracy (for instance, the Workers' and Peasants' Inspectorate in 1919) and a regular army (the Red Army), which then spread the revolution, admittedly on a wave of peasant revolt, from centers of organized power to the countryside.

The Bolshevik accession to power came on the heels of an almost total breakdown of control inside the country. There was no basis, however, for the formation of local military and bureaucratic power to rival the advancing Bolshevik armies or to hinder the reestablishment of central bureaucratic control. (This, of course, was not true of some of the non-Russian nationality areas.) The importance of Petrograd as the key to revolutionary success was recognized by the White forces as well—witness their concentration on the recapture of Petrograd in order to seize state power themselves. This made them incapable of cooperating with nationality movements which might have given them a territorial base for opposing and even preventing the expansion of Red power.

While Petrograd's key position in the revolutionary seizure of power rested primarily on that city's role as the bureaucratic center and the traditional seat of legitimate power, it was supported by another factor: Petrograd was the center of the most highly developed region of the Russian empire. Theodore von Laue has pointed to the existence of a "cultural slope" which had its highest point in the northwestern section of the Tsarist empire (the Baltic provinces) and thence sloped

[1] Conrad Brandt, *Stalin's Failure in China* (Cambridge, 1958), p. 105.

[2] *International Press Correspondence* (July 16, 1927), p. 740, italics mine.

[3] Brandt, 122.

[4] *Ibid.*, 123.

[5] *Ibid.*

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down toward the east and southeast.[6] "The cities," he writes, "stood out as minor peaks on this slope" from the point of view of literacy. He also finds, on the basis of the 1897 census, that the phenomenon of a slope repeated itself in other areas as well, for example, in the mortality and birth rates. Despite regional variations, "the general nature of the slope was undeniable." Furthermore, Petrograd and Moscow were the centers of the highest penetration of Western influence and of the consequent breakdown of traditional cultural values —in short, the centers of highest social and psychological dislocation. The significant thing about the Russian revolution in this regard is that Bolshevik power developed first in the higher reaches of the slope and then spread downwards.

Stalin's insistence that the Chinese revolution concentrate on the seizure of the cities of the Yangtze valley, such as the Wuhan complex (Hankow, Hanyang, Wuchang), Nanking, and Shanghai, and later his insistence on the capture of Peking, must have been predicated on an amalgam of Marxist-Leninist theory and the practice of the Bolshevik revolution. But he completely misunderstood the role of Chinese cities and the dynamics of Chinese politics and society. On the surface, Chinese urban phenomena may have resembled those of Russia. Wuhan and Shanghai, for instance, were the great centers of industrial and commercial complexes, where Western cultural penetration was more pronounced than in the countryside. A small but growing proletariat had arisen in the factories of these cities; cultural dislocation there was intense. Peking had been the imperial center and still retained something of its traditional aura of legitimacy—indeed, it was in order to participate in this legitimacy that various warlords made successive attempts to capture Peking.

The Realities of Chinese Power

But despite these superficial analogies with Russia, the realities of Chinese society—which Stalin failed to perceive—were quite different. Centralized state power had ceased to exist in China by 1916 or 1917; indeed, a good case could be made for its growing ineffectuality as early as the middle of the 19th century. Power had devolved into the hands of warlords with local economic and political bases. In other words, a regional organization of power had superseded a centralized bureaucracy.

This regional power had deep roots in the Chinese scene. The last decades of the Manchu Empire had seen the granting of more and more power to local viceroys at Canton and elsewhere. Even more significant, perhaps, was the fact that in China traditional bureaucratic power did not extend down to the village level as it did in Russia. The lowest official in the old bureaucratic structure was the *hsien* (county) magistrate. The local gentry intervened between the magistrate and the peasants, mediating between the bureaucracy and the population at large in the interests of both. In other words, real local power in China lay not with the bureaucracy but with a highly articulated local group whose power derived from both social and economic sources. This group consisted of the educated and landowning class in the local communities. The Chinese proverb "Heaven is high and the Emperor far away" reflects this traditional lack of direct communication between the masses and the state bureaucracy. Because of this separation, the seizure of urban centers in China would not necessarily have allowed the Communists, as it did in Russia, to build an administrative structure on the ruins of the traditional bureaucracy.

The eclipse of the effective role of the gentry, particularly after the abolition in 1905 of the Confucian examination system (which had been the means for legitimizing gentry power) made Chinese society even more polarized than the Russian. A void was created between the tattered remnants of the bureaucracy and the peasants, with no formal conduit between the countryside and the government or urban centers. This was reflected, for instance, in the fact that although heavy local taxation continued after the 1911 collapse of imperial rule, the proceeds from it were not transmitted up the bureaucratic ladder but were kept locally for the support of the new agrarian power of the warlords and their military units.

The Japanese found during their war in China that the seizure of urban centers did not guarantee control of the countryside. Mao understood this point years before and consequently began building the foundations of Communist control in a section of society that lay beneath or outside the traditional bureaucratic structure and had lost its former link with the central government —the gentry. Stalin, on the other hand, insisted that the Chinese Communists seek to control the cities. But while in Russia the cities may have been the key to power, in China they were not. Chiang Kai-shek made the same error.

[6] Theodore H. von Laue, "Imperial Russia at the Turn of the Century: The Cultural Slope and the Revolution from Without," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 3.4:353-367 (July, 1961). See also Mary C. Wright, "Revolution from Without? (A Commentary on 'Imperial Russia at the Turn of the Century: The Cultural Slope and the Revolution from Without')," *Ibid.*, 4.2:247-252 (January, 1962).

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The phenomenon of the "cultural slope" observed by von Laue in prerevolutionary Russia can also be observed in China. The Yangtze valley is agriculturally the richest, industrially the most advanced, and intellectually the most prominent region of the country. This was as true of traditional as it is of 20th-century China. (The Manchu government had to develop a system of provincial quotas for entrance into the bureaucracy lest official posts be monopolized by men from the lower-Yangtze and southern provinces.) But the seizure of the Yangtze cities would not have given the Chinese Communists (who certainly wanted them as much as Stalin did) access to the advantages of the region. Agrarian taxes could not be collected without local control. The urban industrial centers were largely in the foreign concessions, which were defended by Western gunboats. The cultural superiority of the region was based on traditional values, not on modern or Westernized accretions. The greatest modern Chinese university, for instance, was in Peking, and not in the Yangtze valley.

Stalin, then, misapplied Western concepts of power to China. Power in China was not an urban phenomenon. Quite the contrary, urban conglomerations rested on the countryside—on the peasant-supported gentry or, later, the provincial warlords. Shanghai, which most closely approximated a Western city, was the exception to urban dependence upon the countryside. It depended more on foreign trade through the foreign concessions, which were not integrated into the local scene administratively—or even economically, except in their dependence on Chinese labor. Shanghai, in fact, had little contact with the hinterland at moments of social disruption.

Chiang Kai-shek demonstrated that in China cities were not necessary to political survival when, during the Japanese war, he retired to the Szechwan countryside and survived. He had United States aid, it is true, but even more important to him were the vastness of the country, poor communications, and nationalist alliances with the real sources of local power, the warlords. He survived without access to the Yangtze region, as did Mao in the same period.

Stalin and China, 1930-45

Between 1944 and 1948, Stalin or his representatives made various statements about China that displayed a striking inner consistency: they all indicated that, at least as late as 1945, Stalin was unaware of, did not understand, or was uninterested in what had happened in China from about 1930 through the end of World War II. In late 1944, for instance, Molotov told General Patrick Hurley, the US representative in China toward the end of the war, that the so-called Chinese Communists were "impoverished men and women seeking an outlet for their dissatisfaction." [7] In 1948 Stalin himself told Georgi Dimitrov and Edvard Kardelj that after the war, in 1945, he had advised the Chinese Communists that "the development of an uprising in China had no prospect," and that they should seek a *modus vivendi* with Chiang Kai-shek, join his government, and dissolve their armies.[8] Right up until the middle of 1949, when the Communists were on the verge of final victory, Moscow continued to recognize the Chiang government. Early in that year, the Soviet ambassador had been the only foreign envoy to the Kuomintang regime to comply with Chiang's request that the diplomatic community move to Canton, the new Nationalist capital. He did not leave China for Moscow until May 1949.

Unless one accepts the rather simplistic "conspiratorial" theory of Sino-Soviet relations, Stalin's apparent ignorance of the growth of Chinese Communist power between 1936 and 1945 is startling. Mao estimated that in 1934 some nine million people were under the control of the Chinese Soviet Republic central government in the border regions of south-central China. Harassed, however, by Chiang's five anti-Communist campaigns, the Communists were forced to leave the Soviet regions in October 1934 and make the celebrated "Long March" to Northwest China. Some 20,000 survived to complete the journey. Under the stimulus of the Japanese invasion launched in 1937, the Communists were able, from their new capital at Yenan, to organize effectively vast rural areas and to carry on an anti-Japanese campaign (as well as guard against KMT threats of attack after the New Fourth Army incident of January 1941). By the war's end, the Communists had securely organized some 100 million Chinese in their base areas in North China, making themselves, in population, the fifth or sixth largest power in the world.

In the face of this unparalleled expansion of Chinese Communist power after the mid-1930's, Stalin not only recognized but, in fact, actively encouraged Chiang's anti-Communist regime. The Fourth Plenum of the CCP Central Committee in January 1931 was probably the next to last occasion on which the Comintern intervened actively in the affairs of the Chinese party. Thereafter, Stalin's attention shifted away from the Chinese

[7] Robert C. North, *Moscow and Chinese Communists* (Stanford, 1953), p. 208.

[8] *Ibid.*, p. 222.

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revolution. At home, Stalin concentrated more and more on building "socialism in one country" through successive five-year plans. Abroad, the Japanese seizure of Manchuria in late 1931 and Hitler's subsequent rise to power in Germany posed direct threats to Soviet security. It was thus in Stalin's interest to normalize relations with the internationally recognized Nationalist regime at Nanking. Cooperation with Chiang, particularly in the Manchurian areas, would weaken the Japanese threat to Siberia.

Moscow reestablished normal diplomatic relations with Nanking (which had been broken in 1927) in 1932. This is not to say that Moscow-Nanking relations improved overnight. In order to conciliate Japan, the USSR—over Nanking's protests—sold the Russian-owned Chinese Eastern Railway, in northern Manchuria, to Tokyo, which needed it for planned Japanese expansion on the mainland. Nanking also opposed Moscow's defense protocol with Mongolia in 1936 and openly feared Soviet penetration of Sinkiang.

STALIN'S POLICY towards Chiang Kai-shek was remarkably consistent from the mid-1930's right down to the end of World War II. When Chang Hsueh-liang, the strongly nationalistic general of the Manchurian armies, arrested Chiang at Sian in December 1936 because the latter refused to fight the Japanese, Stalin intervened to prevent a public trial of the Generalissimo and his probable execution. "Free Chiang at once or we will break all connections with you," he is reported to have wired the Chinese Communists.[9] This was perhaps the only time Stalin intervened in Chinese Communist affairs after 1931.

Stalin's intervention on Chiang's behalf led to an immediate improvement in relations. In August 1937 Nanking and Moscow signed a treaty of non-aggression which in effect committed the Soviet government not to support independent (*i.e.*, Communist) military or political forces in China. In November of the same year, US Ambassador Davies reported from Moscow that the USSR had extended a credit of Ch$100 million to Nanking for military supplies, and that Soviet planes and instructors had been delivered to Chiang, in addition to other materiel. In 1938-39, according to Chinese Nationalist figures, the Soviet Union granted Nanking three loans amounting to US$250 million. All these Soviet measures were aimed, of course, at Japan.

The normalization of Moscow-Nanking relations was accompanied by the formation of an uneasy "united front" relationship between Yenan and Nanking, particularly after the Sian Incident of December 1936. Although, as David Dallin remarks, "the United Front —even as a maneuver, a temporary zig-zag—was in conflict with the basic attitudes of many Chinese Communists," [10] and even though it broke down in 1941, Stalin must have believed in its postwar continuation strongly enough to sign, on August 14, 1945, a pact of "friendship and alliance" with Nanking, based on concessions in East Asia made to Russia by the Western Allies in the Yalta agreements. The treaty was stoutly defended by the Soviet press, but it was destined to prove inconsequential. A postwar Communist-KMT coalition regime would have been necessary for the treaty to remain operative—and Stalin, at least as late as the end of the Pacific war, was advising the Communists to make such a coalition. Subsequent events, of course, proved his evaluation of the situation incorrect, as he himself admitted. Within four years, the Chinese Communists had come to national, and international, power.

Roots of Stalin's Error

Stalin's rapprochement with Chiang Kai-shek during the mid-1930's, as I have indicated earlier, can easily be explained in terms of Soviet national interests in the Far East. Chiang in 1937 vastly outweighed the remnants of the "Long March" as a national symbol and therefore was necessary to Stalin as a nationalist rallying point inside China, against Japan. What is still puzzling, however, is Stalin's attitude towards Yenan at the end of the war. It is to be doubted that he either consciously "sacrificed" the Chinese Communists on the altar of Soviet security at the time, or conspiratorially supported them by allaying Chiang's fears. On the contrary, he appears simply to have been unconcerned with them, and his unconcern may well have derived in part from bad intelligence.

But even "bad intelligence" seems an insufficient explanation of Stalin's indifference. He surely could not have been wholly unaware of the remarkable growth of Chinese Communist power—clearly based on the

[9] Edgar Snow, *Random Notes on Red China (1936-1945)* (Cambridge, 1957), p. 2. All evidence points to the conclusion that the Chinese Communists entered the Sian scene only after Chiang's arrest. Chang Hsueh-liang's motivation in arresting the Generalissimo was purely nationalistic frustration at Chiang's failure to commit himself completely to the anti-Japanese struggle—a commitment the Communists also sought.

[10] David J. Dallin, *Soviet Russia and the Far East* (New Haven, 1948), p. 137. See also James C. Thomson, Jr., "Communist Policy and the United Front in China," *Papers on China,* 11:99-148 (East Asian Research Center, Harvard University, 1957).

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peasantry—that was achieved through the stimulus of Japanese aggression. (US intelligence, Generals Hurley and Marshall, and others were not.) Whether or not he had an envoy at Yenan, Stalin did have representatives in Chungking, as did the Chinese Communists, and the CCP also had its representatives in Moscow. Furthermore, Edgar Snow and others had widely publicized the Communists. Any reasonable analysis of the information available to the Soviets would have confirmed Yenan's power, even if not its orthodoxy.

It is more likely that the cause of Stalin's postwar misjudgment was the same as that of his misjudgment of the 1920's. Chinese Communist power was founded on an alliance with the peasantry and was not dependent upon any urban base. This alliance was carefully constructed on the basis of two policies. The first was a moderate land reform aimed not at the destruction of the landlord and rich-peasant classes, but at a reduction of their power. The second policy was to incorporate these groups into the alliance through the "three-thirds" system: party members were limited to one-third the membership of any administrative organ, the other two-thirds going to the landlords, rich peasants, and well-known non-Communists. While discipline may have given the Communists actual control, at least the appearance of importance and participation was granted the non-Communist elements. The motive force behind the alliance was, of course, nationalism, which was intensified by the Japanese invasion. But Stalin, who had dealt with his own peasants through the exercise of state power from a comparatively advanced urban industrialized base, may have missed the point.

Stalin's concern with the state as the vehicle for extending the Communist revolution was grounded in two aspects of Soviet revolutionary experience during the period between the two world wars. On the one hand, inside the Soviet Union the revolution had been spread to areas such as Central Asia by means of state power. On the other hand, the revolutions in Hungary and Germany after World War I failed, first, because the Hungarian and German proletariats were either not sufficiently committed to the revolution or too weak to overcome bourgeois power; second, because Soviet arms could not support them. In the light of these practical lessons, what was Stalin to think about the postwar prospects for the revolution in China?

CHIANG KAI-SHEK, riding the crest of anti-Japanese nationalism, had not only survived the war but emerged internationally as China's symbol. He had the support of the United States. Moreover, with Chiang's return to China's urban centers—under Japanese control during the war—guaranteed by the Pacific victory, Stalin apparently saw as little hope for a Chinese Communist takeover of national power as he had in the early 1930's. After all, he had not yet had the experience of exporting communism on the backs of Soviet soldiers (except in the special case of Mongolia), and China was too large for the Soviet army to absorb under any conditions. Consequently, the Chinese Communists, who in Stalin's eyes may not have been Communists at all, had only one alternative in his estimation: to enter a coalition with Chiang and to surrender the chief basis of their power, their independent peasant armies. Stalin urged this course on the Chinese Communist representatives in Moscow in 1945 and acted upon the same assumption in his treaty with Chiang that same year.

Stalin may also have seriously believed that Soviet interests would be better served after the war by the continuation of the Chiang regime. Chiang was, after all, a known quantity. He had agreed under the 1945 treaty to satisfy Stalin's basic desires in Manchuria and the Liaotung peninsula. And Chiang himself, in *China's Destiny*,[11] insisted that all his country's trials and tribulations stemmed from Western imperialist penetration. Chiang was, admittedly, anti-Communist; but may not Stalin have counted on the Chinese leader's anti-Westernism as a basis for the Communist-Kuomintang coalition he envisioned?

In the end, of course, Chiang proved more anti-Communist than anti-imperialist, and the coalition scheme foundered as much on the Generalissimo's obstinacy as on Mao's unwillingness to surrender the very basis of his own power. But how could Stalin have foreseen this in 1945? The United States, after all, was pursuing a similar policy of encouraging a Kuomintang-Communist coalition. Both Moscow and Washington misread the postwar Chinese scene.

Sino-Soviet Relations after 1949

When Mao victoriously proclaimed the establishment of the Chinese People's Republic on October 1, 1949, he presented Stalin with a new set of problems unprecedented in the Soviet leader's experience. Throughout Eastern Europe, with the exception of Yugoslavia, communism had been imposed by the Soviet Red Army. The Chinese Communists, on the other hand, had come to power with their own army, their own territory, their

[11] Chiang Kai-shek, *China's Destiny* (New York, 1947), with notes and commentary by Philip Jaffe. This book was first published in China in 1943.

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Old Claims—New Champions

Inasmuch as some persons have mentioned Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macao, we are obliged to discuss a little of the history of imperialist aggression against China. In the hundred years or so prior to the victory of the Chinese revolution, the imperialist and colonial powers—the United States, Britain, France, Tsarist Russia, Germany, Japan, Italy, Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands, Spain, and Portugal—carried out unbridled aggression against China. They compelled the governments of old China to sign a large number of unequal treaties—the treaty of Nanking of 1842, the treaty of Aigun of 1858, the treaty of Tientsin of 1858, the treaty of Peking of 1860, the treaty of Ili of 1881, the protocol of Lisbon of 1887, the convention of 1898 for the extension of [the lease on] Hong Kong, the treaty of 1901, and so on. By virtue of these unequal treaties, they annexed Chinese territory in the north, south, east, and west, and held leased territories on the seaboard and in the hinterland of China. Some seized Taiwan and the Penghu Islands; some occupied Hong Kong and forcibly leased Kowloon; some put Macao under perpetual occupation, and so on and so forth.

At the time the People's Republic of China was inaugurated, our government declared that it would examine the treaties concluded by previous Chinese governments with foreign governments, treaties that had been left over by history, and would recognize, abrogate, revise, or renegotiate them according to their respective contents. In this respect, our policy toward the socialist countries is fundamentally different from our policy toward the imperialist countries. When we deal with various imperialist countries, we take differing circumstances into consideration and make distinctions in our policy. As a matter of fact, many of these treaties concluded in the past have either lost their validity or been abrogated, or have been replaced by new ones.

With regard to outstanding issues which are a legacy from the past, we have always held that when conditions are ripe these issues should be settled peacefully through negotiations, and that pending a settlement the status quo should be maintained. Within this category are the questions of Hong Kong, Kowloon, and Macao, as well as of all those boundaries which have not been formally delimited by the parties concerned in each case. . . . Our position as described above accords not only with the interests of the Chinese people, but also with the interests of the people of the socialist camp and of the whole world.

—From an editorial in Jen-min jih-pao (People's Daily), Peking, March 8, 1963.

own administrative responsibility and apparatus, on a wave of popular support and nationalism. As Edgar Snow pointed out with prescience as early as 1948, "because of that, it seemed likely that the Chinese would become the first foreign Communists openly to place their national interests on a level with those of Russia."[12]

On a deeper level of historical significance, Stalin fell heir to the problem that had bedeviled the West for over a century: how to develop, with China, institutions through which the now united and autonomous Chinese culture area could participate in the world community. The institutions and ideologies of Christianity, Liberalism, and economic imperialism had all been rejected by the Chinese themselves in the course of their revolutionary upheavel. Now it was Stalin's, and communism's, turn to face the old enigma in China.

Between 1950 and 1953, Stalin sought a solution by constructing a complex web of economic, political, military, and cultural relationships with the Chinese Communist regime. These relationships included Soviet material and financial aid to Peking, a political and military defense alliance, military assistance during the Korean war, the posting of Soviet technicians to China, and the training of Chinese students and specialists in the Soviet Union. But the weakness of the house that Stalin built was demonstrated by the fact that it started to crumble almost as soon as Stalin himself disappeared from the scene. It crumbled in China, in fact, faster than it did in Eastern Europe, where Khrushchev appears to have had a fair degree of success in transmuting the Stalinist monolith into a viable international entity through such institutions as Comecon and fairly frequent Communist summit meetings. In China, Khrushchev's effort failed, as the current Sino-Soviet dispute attests.

The monotonous repetition of Stalin's errors in China is apparent again in the implicit assumptions underlying the post-1949 relationship he constructed with Peking. Implicitly, Stalin must have assumed that Mao, like Chiang before him, would agree to the restoration of Russia's pre-1904 position in Manchuria and the Liaotung Peninsula. This supposition may have been reinforced by the thought that Mao was a Communist and, within the framework of the new Sino-Soviet alliance, would clearly distinguish Soviet fraternal cooperation from Western imperialism. Consequently, Stalin insisted that the 1950 treaty of alliance include, in modified form, the provisions for a Soviet position in Manchuria that had been written into the 1945 treaty with Chiang.

[12] Quoted in Edgar Snow, *The Other Side of the River: Red China Today* (New York, 1962), p. 4.

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Stalin, in effect, laid the groundwork for the eventual Sino-Soviet dispute by failing to come to terms with Chinese nationalism and with the implications of the uniqueness inherent in the very history of Mao's rise to power. The Chinese Communist leadership had not spent the war in the Soviet Union, or even in Soviet jails; and Mao was not a Tito. Stalin's assumptions were seemingly supported by Mao's tractability and acquiescence: intense Soviet persuasion may have been necessary in the negotiations leading up to the treaty of February 1950, but Mao did not bolt, probably because he could not.

WHILE IT MAY BE too facile to say that Chinese communism is the fulfillment of Chinese nationalism, it is true that Mao, as head of the Chinese state, is heir to a political and cultural tradition that was present at Yenan but not operative because he was not yet responsible for China's continuity and integrity. After 1949, however, Mao *was* responsible for China proper, and he was certainly as anti-imperialist as Chiang. The $2 billion in industrial value that the Soviet Union, in the fashion of traditional imperialists, took out of Manchuria after World War II in the guise of "war booty" was not compensated, in Peking's eyes, by less than that amount in Soviet aid and loans to China after 1949. The 1950 treaty provisions for joint Sino-Soviet companies to exploit the resources of China's frontier regions may have been necessary, just as Sino-Western enterprises were necessary in an earlier period for China's beginning modernization. But they did not have to sit any better with Mao than American or British "capitalist exploitation" had with the Kuomintang.

To a Chinese, the presence of Soviet troops on Chinese soil (in Manchuria and Liaotung) and of Soviet technicians with extraterritorial privileges resembled in fact, if not in theory, the "semi-colonialism" to which China had earlier been subjected by various Western powers. Some of the criticisms voiced in China during the "Hundred Flowers" movement in 1957 were aimed at the Soviet Union on precisely these grounds. Stalin's lack of subtlety in China, his failure to recognize China's national sensitivity, undermined the entire Sino-Soviet relationship after his death. Mao's commitment to China's integrity—anyone reading Mao must be impressed with his interest in China's historical tradition—conflicted with his need for the Soviet alliance. While Stalin was alive, the conflict was held in abeyance. With his death, which left Mao as the most outstanding and powerful Communist ruler, the restraining influence of Stalin's image disappeared. This is not to say that greater political finesse or subtlety on Stalin's part would have placed the alliance on a firmer foundation. It is only to suggest that the tension of the Sino-Soviet dispute reflects a tension within Chinese communism itself, between China's tradition modernized through communism and a Moscow-centered international order.

Mao and the Chinese Heritage

Sino-Soviet relations between 1917 and 1963 illustrate the general breakdown in communications that has characterized relations between China and the West for over a century. Indeed, if we broadly interpret communications to include an accurate knowledge and perception of the Chinese scene and constructive interaction with it, it is reasonable to ask whether such communications ever existed at all. Analytical sinology has been a late-blooming field everywhere—certainly in both the USSR and the United States. If anything, the Soviets have been hampered in their analysis of China by the rigidity of their ideological commitments. Stalin certainly was so restricted. The United States also has been.

The riddle at this moment in history is not Stalin's failure, but rather the completeness of the breakdown of the Stalinist relationship with China and Khrushchev's inability to construct a new Sino-Soviet alliance. Why, for instance, did Mao, who from personal experience was painfully aware of Stalin's ineptitude in assessing the Chinese scene, acquiesce in the latter's primacy between 1949 and 1953 and then strike so violently for bloc leadership after 1956? Political, military, and economic necessity may be a sufficient answer in both cases. A struggle for power may explain the violence of the Sino-Soviet dispute in the last year or so. But compromises have always been possible within these areas, even in such power struggles, especially at moments of great internal stress such as China has recently been experiencing. What accounts for Mao's present intransigence when he has shown himself capable of imaginative compromise in the past? For the sake of speculation, I would suggest that a further intellectual dimension is necessary for a satisfactory explanation.

Certain traditional Chinese political assumptions may have disposed Mao to accept Stalin's approach to political organization. China, or by extension the Soviet bloc—in the words of an American scholar—"is a political and cultural universe. It cannot be divided." In this universe "there is only one Son of Heaven. He and his dynasty (or party) are the repository of final power." The Son of Heaven is also the repository and

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embodiment of ultimate truth (be it Confucian or Marxist), by virtue of which he rules.[13] Mao's necessary acquiescence in Stalin's primacy after 1949, despite his own personal inclinations, may well have been buttressed by these intellectual dispositions. Historically, China had been under the sway or influence of "barbarians" more than once, but their sway was never permanent. Between 1949 and 1953, Mao could accept Stalin's primacy because Stalin's was an identifiable political role within the context of both Chinese tradition and Chinese communism, as is Mao's today.

The accession of new groups to power in China has usually resulted in a reaffirmation of the Chinese "political style," however modified by immediate circumstances. Mao can no more escape China, with its problems and traditions, than Stalin could have escaped Russia. With Stalin's death, the subsequent political instability in the Soviet Union, and Khrushchev's policy innovations, Mao felt that the mantle of orthodoxy and truth had passed to him. Intellectually, Mao is caught up in a three-way tension between traditional dispositions, the imperatives of modern nationalism, and the Marxist ideological necessity that China be part of the mainstream of world history, which is governed by laws that are universal. For Mao, the only resolution of this tension lies in the conviction and insistence that his ideological formulations are orthodox and universally valid. In one dimension, he is fighting for his international political life, for his belief that he now rightly occupies the ideological (and power) position formerly held by Stalin. But in another dimension, Peking's fundamental acceptance of Khrushchev's ideological leadership under current circumstances would require, intellectually, much more than Mao's abandonment of his own ideological position. It would require the abandonment and denial of the most fundamental political principle in the Chinese tradition: the centrality of China and the unique power of China's ruler. Were this to happen, it might prove to be as basic as any change we have witnessed so far in China.

[13] For a discussion of traditional Chinese political assumptions and style, see John K. Fairbank, *Communist China and Taiwan in United States Foreign Policy* (The Brien McMahon Lectures, University of Connecticut, November 21, 1960.)

The Post-Stalin Era in Eastern Europe

By Robert Bass

ANY ATTEMPT TO ASSESS the history of the East European People's Democracies since the death of Stalin poses substantial difficulties and offers several pitfalls. The difficulties stem from the variety and complexity of the events which have crowded the last decade. Among the pitfalls, the most serious is the temptation to generalize about an East European *bloc* as though it were still an indivisible entity with a single will and purpose. If such a concept had substantial validity while Stalin lived, it is obvious today that national histories so diverse as those of Poland and Albania, or Hungary and Czechoslovakia, must be treated with much greater discrimination.

Another tendency, perhaps, is to forget that Communist East Europe has lived without Stalin somewhat longer than it was compelled to live with him. The effect of the forceful imposition of Stalinist policies and institutions between 1947 and 1952 was certainly pervasive, but the impact was also of limited duration. The dictator's death caused diverse reactions in Eastern Europe, but the shock was less severe than in the Soviet Union itself, where Stalinism had held sway for more than three decades.

In a brief summary, there is also the temptation either to exaggerate or to understate the importance and meaning of developing trends: in this case, to overrate

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the extent to which the East European scene has changed or alternatively to deprecate the significance of many apparent transformations. In analyzing changes, it would be hard to overstress the impact of the Soviet rapprochement with Tito in 1955 or of the destalinization campaign launched in February 1956; while these developments resulted in catastrophe for Hungary, they also brought about vital shifts in the posture of Eastern Europe, not the least remarkable of which was Gomulka's return to power in Poland in October 1956. Substantial growth in Eastern Europe's industrial potential also serves as an indicator of change, though serious economic difficulties remain and the European Common Market threatens to pose further problems. Finally, the style of Hoxha's defection and the manifest reality of polycentric tendencies within Eastern Europe itself, when compared with the circumstances and the climate surrounding Yugoslavia's expulsion from the Cominform in 1948, suggest that there really has been a marked transformation in the East European sector of the Communist world.

On the other side of the coin, one must point to the measured orthodoxy of the Czechoslovak leadership, the tragic suppression of the Hungarian revolution, and the clear indications that even the number and variety of changes have been insubstantial when measured by the yardstick of popular hopes and aspirations. In the extreme case of East Germany, it is impossible to believe that the dilemmas of the government or the feelings of the people have changed significantly since the uprising of June 1953.

Despite problems of analysis, certain basic observations can be made concerning the post-Stalin decade.[1] A review of major events may show in particular the increasingly different roles assumed by the East European members of the Soviet alliance, as they have groped their way toward the solution of their particular problems and toward a measure of individual diversity.

The Aftermath of Stalin's Death

Let us first take a look backward to the "New Course" period, from the summer of 1953 to the early months of 1955. The workers' riots in Pilsen, Ostrava and other Czechoslovak cities between May 30 and June 4, 1953, the East German uprising of June 16 and 17, and the extraordinary maiden speech of Premier Imre Nagy to the Hungarian National Assembly on July 4 are familiar landmarks. All appeared to symbolize the end of the Stalin era and to portend substantial changes to come. The action of the Czech workers was a clear repudiation of the Stalinist policy of restricting consumption to barely tolerable levels. It was equally a demonstration against the trade unions, which had been made into docile instruments of party policy totally unrepresentative of the interests of their members. The German uprising was a mass protest against the abrogation of personal freedom; against the systematic use of terror and coercion as a means of obtaining public compliance; and against the calculated effort fostered by Stalin to obliterate national feelings and traditions. Nagy's speech was an eloquent if oblique criticism of the arbitrary and illegal practices which had helped to establish Communist regimes in Eastern Europe. It was also a pointed account of the damage done to the East European economies, not only by direct Soviet postwar exploitation but by the forcible imposition of industrial and agricultural programs which were beyond the strength of the people to meet, which were unsuited to national requirements, and which were calculated mainly to bolster the Soviet Union's damaged industrial capacity.

The Soviet military response to the German workers' bid for freedom provided compelling evidence that no immediate disintegration of the Stalinist system had taken place. Yet it was obvious that the all-pervasive atmosphere of fear which Stalin had so effectively generated throughout Eastern Europe was on the wane. Taking their cue from the new collective leadership in Moscow, the East European leaders soon came forward one after another to announce departures from earlier policies. While there were differences in emphasis and timing, the new programs had many common features: a halt to forced collectivization, assistance to farmers, concern for the manufacture of more consumers' goods, price reductions, a slow-down in the expansion of heavy industry, and promises to respect "socialist legality."

[1] A summary and impressionistic survey of this kind is difficult to document in detail, so in most cases specific source references will be omitted. As general sources the author relied on: (1) The press of Czechoslovakia, Poland, East Germany, Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria. (2) The periodicals *Problems of Communism* (Washington, D. C.), *East Europe* (formerly *News From Behind the Iron Curtain*, New York), and *Survey* (London). (3) Among full length studies—Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, *The Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict*, Cambridge (Mass.), 1960; Paul Zinner, ed., *National Communism and Popular Revolt in Eastern Europe*, New York, 1956; Melvin Laski, ed., *A White Book: The Hungarian Revolution*, New York, 1957; Frank Gibney, *The Frozen Revolution: A Study in Communist Decay*, New York, 1959; Flora Lewis, *A Case History of Hope: The Story of Poland's Peaceful Revolution*, New York, 1958; Imre Nagy, *On Communism: In Defense of the New Course*, New York, 1957; Robert Bass and Elizabeth Marbury, eds., *The Soviet-Yugoslav Controversy, 1948-1958: A Documentary Record*, New York, 1959.

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In the circumstances, it was not surprising that outside observers focused on the quantity rather than the degree of the changes resulting from these apparent policy reversals. As events unfolded, especially during 1954, it was suspected that the "New Course" had become a rolling snowball which the Communist authorities were powerless to halt. The problems of control and discipline following the end of Stalinist terror were seen as virtually insurmountable for most of the East European regimes. The loss of Communist party initiative which was evident in Hungary and Czechoslovakia was taken as symptomatic of a general malaise precipitated by widespread popular antagonism and the authorities' inability or unwillingness to alleviate hardships. By extension, it was supposed that the Communist parties and governments were being compelled to yield to a mounting wave of popular pressure.

In retrospect, this appears as something of an oversimplification. Undeniably, there was evidence of popular hostility which had previously lacked all means of expression; yet the profound crisis which erupted in Eastern Europe in 1956 was probably less a result of effective pressure from the masses than of a disintegrative process within the ruling Communist parties themselves. This, in turn, was a direct consequence of the complex effort launched by Khrushchev in early 1955 to reconstruct and revitalize the world Communist movement, which required, *inter alia*, that all the East European leaders face up to the deeply disturbing issue of Tito's defection and the resulting phenomenon of "national communism." Even in the extreme case of Hungary, it was the effect of this confrontation on the Communist elite which opened the floodgates to popular revolt, for the party had become so deeply divided as to be incapable of effective self-preservation.

Encouraging as the economic policies of the first post-Stalin years appeared, few real concessions were actually involved. Autarchic development was decried; some vitality was injected into the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA); and greater material incentives were offered to farming populations Yet, notwithstanding official propaganda to the contrary, little was or indeed could be done to make the East European economies even moderately responsive to consumer demand. Some resources were diverted to stimulate the light industries, internal trade and services, and some state reserves were freed for consumer purchase, but only limited steps were taken to halt the continued expansion of the heavy industrial base. Planners sought to achieve more balanced growth and to discover the key to greater labor productivity by very slow and measured increases in living standards.

From the Communist viewpoint, this program probably appeared to work rather well, since no moves toward genuine liberalization had really been intended. Though the power of the police was applied with far greater discretion than in the past, it remained substantially undiminished. In sum, with the exception of Hungary, there was little spontaneity or improvisation demonstrated by the satellite regimes during this period; their policies were simply an application of the decisions reached in Moscow by the new collective leadership.

Thaw and Revolution

The period of instability thus began not immediately after Stalin's death, but fully two years later. Paradoxically, it was ushered in by Shepilov's famous *Pravda* article of January 24, 1955, which announced a "general line" reaffirming the priority of heavy industry and condemned "vulgarizers of Marxism" who held any other view. The phrase was inadvertently prophetic. Under Stalin, vulgarization had been impossible by definition, but now it was obliquely admitted—however limited the initial context—that deviation from orthodoxy could become a reality within the ranks of a ruling Communist party. This truth was soon borne out with fateful consequences in Eastern Europe.

Publication of the Shepilov theses was followed by a wide range of major events: Malenkov's resignation on February 8th; the publication of the March resolution of the Hungarian Central Committee, presaging the dismissal of Imre Nagy on April 18th; the signing of the Warsaw Pact and Austrian State treaties in May; Khrushchev's visit to Yugoslavia in June; and the Geneva summit meeting the next month. Different as they were in kind, each of these developments was a reflection of Khrushchev's victory in the USSR and the introduction of a new set of guidelines for the future development of the Communist world.

The essentials of Khrushchev's program are as easy to catalogue as they proved difficult to implement in the Peoples' Democracies. Unlike Malenkov, Khrushchev was preoccupied with increasing the economic strength of the Communist states nearly as much as Stalin had been. He believed in the basic importance of heavy industry and insisted on the resumption of collectivization in Eastern Europe. He felt that some measure of international detente was needed in order to allow the Communist states to achieve their goals. He did not want a return to the terroristic methods of Stalin, but rather sought to effect a revitalization of relationships

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between the ruling Communist parties which would result in a new sense of enthusiasm and dedication.

Theoretically, this program was sound enough; in practice, it resulted in near-disaster in Eastern Europe. The 1955 "Spirit of Geneva" simply could not be explained in the Peoples Democracies as a reason for redoubling productive efforts, especially since earlier promises of an imminent increase in living standards had largely failed to materialize. At the same time, the psychological effect of the Russian military withdrawal from Austria raised hope for the first time of greater political freedom behind the Iron Curtain. Most dangerous of all, the rapprochement with Tito created almost insurmountable problems for the satellite leaderships, giving an official boost to the specter of national and differing roads to socialism, and thereby inviting ferment within the ranks of every East European Communist party.

During the autumn of 1955, slow and obviously reluctant steps were taken to restore official ties between Yugoslavia and the East European states. Yet there was evidence of increasing tension everywhere, especially in Poland and Hungary. The revelations of Josef Swiatlo, a defected Polish security police officer, had received wide publicity in Poland in the fall of 1954,[2] forcing the Communist leadership into an explicit examination and condemnation of secret police methods in early 1955. Subsequent months saw a rapid increase in press criticism of the regime, especially in the newspapers *Po prostu* and *Sztandar mlodych*. Adam Wazyk's "Poem for Adults" appeared in August. By October the theoretical journal *Nowe drogi* noted "ideological chaos" and the existence of "nihilistic tendencies" within the Polish party.

In Hungary there was similar unrest over Rakosi's resumption of power in the spring of 1955 and his wholly unrealistic demand for a return to the pre-1953 "spirit of sacrifice." In November 1955 the Hungarian Writers' Union rejected the March resolution of the Central Committee, demonstrating that the party was deeply divided and that Imre Nagy still enjoyed a substantial following.

Against this background, the 20th Party Congress was convened in the Soviet Union. While it is beyond the scope of this survey to analyze the imperatives that led to Khrushchev's secret speech denouncing Stalin, clearly little consideration was given to the vulnerabilities of the East European regimes. Khrushchev and company seem to have assumed that the new stress on "peaceful coexistence" had had no significant impact within the Communist world, and that Yugoslavia, while retaining its distinctive institutional features, was returning to the larger fold. The eventuality that other countries of the bloc would take seriously and attempt to implement the newly accepted doctrine of "different roads to socialism" was apparently not given the attention it deserved.

The Fateful Year

It is impossible to recite, much less to analyze, the kaleidoscopic sequence of events between February and November 1956. What can be said is that no East European government or party was adequately prepared to deal with the destalinization campaign. There could be no doubt about the meaning of the Congress proceedings: the search for "separate roads to socialism" had been endorsed; the need to rehabilitate Stalin's victims in Eastern Europe could hardly be avoided; the revelations of Stalin's methods raised grave questions about the role of surviving Communist leaders in every East European country and intensified the demand for reform both inside and outside the Communist party organization. Since no warning had been given and no preparations made, all official attempts to "explain" what inferences could and could not be drawn from the Congress remained unconvincing improvisations doomed to failure. By the beginning of April 1956, the storm was well underway throughout Eastern Europe.

The writers of Hungary and Czechoslovakia were in the vanguard of the ferment. Rakosi was publicly charged with personal responsibility for the murder of Laszlo Rajk in 1949, at the peak of the anti-Tito hysteria. The Czechoslovak Party was accused of systematic intimidation and persecution of the intelligentsia. In Bulgaria the national Communist Traicho Kostov was rehabilitated, while Premier Vulko Chervenkov, the man most directly responsible for his trial and execution in 1949, was demoted. The rehabilitation of General Komar and release from jail of Wladyslaw Gomulka and General Spychalski was announced in Poland during April 1956. The Cominform, so blatantly identified with Tito's vilification after 1948, was dissolved on April 17. In Czechoslovakia, meetings sponsored by the Youth League to discuss—within careful limits—the more extreme aspects of Stalinism got entirely out of hand, producing sharp criticism of the regime and scarcely veiled demands for change.

On June 28, the Polish regime faced an even more eloquent show of protest, the workers' uprising in the city of Poznan. Foreign visitors to the Poznan trade fair saw demonstrators with placards demanding "Freedom

[2] Swiatlo's text was published in English in *News from Behind the Iron Curtain* (New York), March 1955, pp. 3-36.

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and Bread," "Down with False Communism" and "Out with the Russians."

Almost simultaneously in Budapest (on the night of June 27), an enormous audience attended a meeting of the Petöfi Club in Budapest, which had become a focal point of public debate and criticism. There was open talk of an anti-Stalinist (and therefore anti-Rakosi) group within the Hungarian Communist Party. Police methods were denounced, a member of the Central Committee was shouted down, and demands to hear Imre Nagy were voiced. Three weeks later, on July 18, Rakosi was removed from power and replaced by Erno Gerö. That this substitution had little effect on popular feeling was apparent at the belated state funeral accorded to Laszlo Rajk on October 6, attended by some 200,000 citizens as a symbolic demonstration of no confidence in the Hungarian leadership.

These and many similar events had generated a momentum of their own which could not be halted and which threatened the disintegration of the East European Communist bloc. By August and September of 1956, it was already uncertain whether the Polish or Hungarian parties were any longer in control of the situation. The escalation of resentment among industrial workers, intellectuals, the younger generation and the millions of Roman Catholics in both countries made it appear doubtful that a Communist monopoly of power could be preserved. The issue was no longer whether the Communist hierarchy could or would effect reform, but whether it would be swept away altogether.

The degree of chaos was less marked in East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and Rumania, although the Communist structure in the last of these countries also hung in the balance. The East German regime went through the motions of rehabilitating the Communists who had been purged in 1953, but it was a perfunctory affair: there seemed to be a tacit realization that any show of intra-party dissension would threaten the survival of the German Communist state. The Czechoslovak regime, on the other hand, continued to defend the 1952 executions of former Party Secretary Slansky and Foreign Minister Clementis, insisting they had been fundamentally guilty even if the issue of Titoism ought not to have been introduced at their trials. The consequent absence of any symbol of opposition, living or dead, helped the leaders to maintain control; they also utilized to the fullest the ambivalent relations between Czechs and Slovaks and the spurious but emotionally effective specter of erstwhile Czechoslovak relations with Nazi Germany.

This preservation of a degree of order in some of the Peoples' Democracies could hardly, however, have been a ground for self-congratulation to Khrushchev and his associates. In early October it became known that belated secret discussions between Khrushchev and Tito had broken down because the Marshal refused to collaborate in a joint endeavor to halt further Hungarian demands for democratization.[3] By late October it was clear that the future of the entire international Communist structure would be largely determined by events in Poland and Hungary.

THAT THE IMPENDING disintegration of the East European bloc did not materialize is now, of course, a fact of history. The Soviet armed intervention which commenced without warning on November 4, 1956, brought the Hungarian revolution to a tragic and violent end and led to a long military occupation. In Poland, bloodshed was narrowly avoided because of the outcome of the dramatic session of the Eighth Plenum of the Polish Party, from October 19 to 21, which re-elected Gomulka First Secretary and successfully resisted peremptory demands by a Soviet delegation including Khrushchev, Molotov, Mikoyan, Kaganovich and Marshal Konev, the Commander of the forces of the Warsaw Pact.

The reasons for the difference in outcome are clear. In Hungary, the Communist Party had quite simply disintegrated. Rakosi's ouster came too late and Gerö's succession could not meet the requirements of the situation. The program of the short-lived Imre Nagy revolutionary government included the restoration of the multiparty system, evacuation of Soviet forces, Hungarian withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact and a tragic last-minute appeal for aid and protection from the United Nations. In Poland, on the other hand, the fact of key importance seems to have been the conduct of First Secretary Ochab in the period between the Poznan uprising and the October Plenum. He could not prevent a division within the leadership between the neo-Stalinist Natolin group and those on the other extreme who advocated a wholly independent Polish course. He was, however, able to preserve a central core within the party which dealt sanely with the consequences of Poznan, maintained order and finally promoted Gomulka's candidacy to Ochab's post, which the latter relinquished promptly and voluntarily. Gomulka, in turn, was able to unite the national Communists and the center, and—

[3] On October 5, 1956, *Borba* (Belgrade) reported that there remained "differences of views on contemporary world development and, above all, differences of an ideological character" between the two leaders. After the meeting, the Yugoslav press continued to urge "democratization" in Eastern Europe.

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as a national symbol of unquestioned stature—to win the acceptance of Polish workers and of the military forces under General Komar.

The Policies of Reconstruction

Given the shattering impact of the events of 1956, the pace at which Moscow and the satellite regimes managed to refortify control over the East European orbit is rather remarkable. By the start of the 1960's relative stability had been restored throughout the bloc. Many different elements contributed to make this process of "reconstruction" possible. The profound sense of hopelessness that descended on Hungary after the suppression of the revolution actually worked to Kadar's advantage in his task of reinstituting order. The tragic case of Hungary also had its impact on the parties and peoples of the rest of the bloc: it had demonstrated the limits of the possible, dispelled the illusion of "liberation" and thus encouraged acceptance of the status quo.

In Poland, the exceptional intellectual freedom that had marked 1956 was put under rein by mid-1957. Gomulka, having gained time to revitalize the party, assumed a firm stance against both the revisionists and the neo-Stalinists in the spring of 1957. Restless students, frustrated intellectuals, party activists and the broad masses became increasingly aware that the opportunity for a further change in leadership had disappeared and that there was no alternative to accepting Gomulka's course, a view which the Catholic Church under Cardinal Wyszynski did nothing to discourage. Thus, while the remaining Stalinists were purged in June 1957, the reformers were left quite as powerless.

Press censorship was reintroduced in September and *Po prostu* was closed down in October, moves which occasioned much bitterness but no effective opposition. The intellectuals' clubs which had mushroomed in the post-October atmosphere of freedom were prevented from consolidating, and distinct limits were placed on the development of Workers' Councils. On the other hand, the Polish Sejm (National Assembly) remained a livelier institution than any other in Eastern Europe and there was also new life in Polish organs of local government. Force was not employed against restless and potentially rebellious spirits, even while the capacity for using it was being reconstituted.

In Hungary, the prescription was obviously different. The whole of 1957 was a chronicle of arrests and repressions, accompanied by puerile propaganda that insulted the intelligence of a sullen population and a hostile world by insisting the revolution had been the work of fascists and counterrevolutionaries. Yet despite vicious retaliation—including the execution of thousands of workers, the vindictive prosecution of such literary figures as Dery, Hay and Tardos, and the reimposition of harsh controls over the workers and youth—Hungary did not experience a simple reversion to Stalinism. Policy under Kadar was designed to obliterate everything associated with the revolt; the aim, however, was not to revive rightists and neo-Stalinist forces, but, if possible, to reconstruct a party center—precisely the force that had been missing throughout 1956. In practice, this process had to be started from scratch, first under the protection of the Red Army and later, when it seemed feasible and safe, on a more independent footing; to an extent, the effort has met with success.

Problems of Ideology

In the bloc as a whole, the main problem from the Soviet point of view was to re-establish ideological unity. The Soviet aim was two-fold: first, to reassert firmly the pre-eminent position of the Soviet Union among "socialist" states, so as never again to invite a repudiation of its leadership; second, to effect a bloc-wide rejection of "revisionism," which had been a major factor in the disintegration of authority in 1956 (given the Soviet failure to bring Yugoslavia back into the camp).

Except for some temporary resistance on the part of Gomulka, the Soviet leadership had no real difficulty in getting these propositions accepted. In the spring of 1957 initial agreements were reached with several of the ruling parties, affirming the need for unity in the face of the hostile West and the fundamental importance of maintaining Communist state power. By mid-summer, the more orthodox People's Democracies were again giving loud endorsement to the leading role of the Soviet Union, while Hungarian spokesmen somewhat more cautiously paid homage to the Soviet Union as the "head" of all socialist states. Only Gomulka remained reluctant until he was faced with overwhelming pressure to associate himself with the "Statement of the Twelve Ruling Communist Parties" issued in Moscow in November 1957. This document unequivocally identified the Soviet Union as the "first and mightiest" member of the socialist camp; it also singled out revisionism as a greater danger to the world Communist movement than Stalinist dogmatism in the circumstances then prevailing.

Understandably, the Yugoslavs opposed both of these views, accelerating the already rapid deterioration of Belgrade's relations with other bloc countries. The

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Draft Program of the League of Yugoslav Communists was published in March 1958. Since it rejected the concept of a world divided into two hostile camps, denied Soviet leadership of the Communist movement and reaffirmed Yugoslavia's own road to socialism, it left no alternative even to Khrushchev but to proceed with a new rupture in state and party relations.

In 1959 the concept of Soviet primacy was further strengthened and given a new ideological rationale—in the form of a theory that the USSR was now the only socialist state which had advanced sufficiently to lay the foundations of a Communist society, whereas other states remained at various earlier stages of development. This thesis was first propounded by Khrushchev at the 21st Soviet Party Congress in early 1959; it has since been elaborated at the June 1960 meeting of Communist Parties in Bucharest, the meeting of the 81 Communist and Workers' Parties in Moscow during November and December 1960; and again at the 22nd Soviet Congress in October 1961. So far as it specifically concerns the East European Communist states, this rationale of Soviet leadership has certain advantages: it does not require anything approaching total conformity; in fact, it suggests that the Peoples' Democracies face dissimilar problems which may well be handled in a variety of ways. Significantly, however, it also disposes of the troublesome issue of "differing roads to socialism" by implicitly denying the concept altogether, stressing instead the notion that there may be procedural and other technical variants possible for those who actually travel the same road, but at different times and rates of speed.

Economics and Trade

The post-1956 reconstruction also had an important economic dimension. Soviet assistance to Hungary was probably substantial during 1957, and the re-examination of Soviet economic relations with Poland and other states was far from superficial. Although arguments to the contrary have been advanced, it is questionable that deliberate Soviet exploitation of the bloc has continued or that it has offset Soviet economic concessions and aid.[4] On the other hand, the Soviet "guiding hand" was evident in the 1958 decisions of all the East European states to reassert the priority of heavy industry and to resume planning for power rather than welfare. The drive toward the full collectivization of agriculture was also resumed. Bulgaria, Hungary and Czechoslovakia forged ahead with more determination than was ever shown in the pre-1956 era to achieve virtually total collectivization by 1961. East Germany has been almost as zealous. Only Poland has remained reluctant to apply severe pressures on its farming population, with the apparent result that its food production record has remained conspicuously better than that of all other East European countries.

Manifestly, the People's Democracies are still far from a solution of their economic problems. Comecon, though increasingly active, has not yet achieved anything like full area-wide cooperation and specialization. No state has been persuaded to discontinue particular sectors of its own industry. Although Poland, East Germany and Czechoslovakia have embarked on a number of joint development projects, very little has been done so far to provide needed capital to Bulgaria and Rumania. Gross malfunctions in the planning of effective and equitable distribution has remained a major problem in all bloc countries. Doctrinaire agricultural policies and the opposition of farmers have actually served to depress living standards, and failure to forestall fuel and power shortages has created repeated bottlenecks in industry.

Despite all these shortcomings, it is significant that the 1956 crisis did not have a long-term paralyzing effect on East European economic growth. No country, with the possible exception of East Germany, is faced today with really insurmountable difficulties. Industrial capacity has been increasing steadily. Living standards, while poor compared to those of Western Europe, have been maintained at tolerable and gradually rising levels.

A significant result of this ability to maintain the pattern of growth has been the expansion of economic relations between the Peoples Democracies and the non-European world. In part, of course, such ties predated the Stalin era and the events of 1956; yet by 1958 trade turnover between Eastern Europe, the Middle East and Asia was double that of 1954 and greater than the turnover between the USSR and these areas. The same trend has continued in more recent years.

This expansion of trade should not be seen entirely as a command performance motivated or even dictated by the Soviet desire to promote political and ideological infiltration. It also reflects a candid recognition in Eastern Europe that manufacturing capacity now exceeds raw material supplies and a keen awareness of the need for customers who can and will accept manufactured exports not so easily marketed in Western Europe or North America. Specific transactions between Eastern Europe, Asia, Africa and Latin America afford little evidence of any general adherence to dogmatic prescrip-

[4] See Franklyn D. Holzman, "Soviet Foreign Trade Pricing and the Question of Discrimination: A 'Customs Union' Approach," *Review of Economics and Statistics* (Cambridge, Mass.), May 1962.

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tions. On the contrary, East European traders give a good deal of practical consideration to their own self-interest and therefore respond to a wide range of opportunities, whether or not they happen to match ideological preconceptions about the developmental needs of their trading partners.[5]

The scope of these transactions has remained relatively small, and generally they reflect not economic strength but on the contrary shortages of foreign exchange and the production of low quality goods. Yet such considerations are largely irrelevant when the political advantages derived from this steady expansion of international contacts are considered. The Peoples Democracies have seized upon their economic opportunities everywhere to establish a sense of their legitimacy, which was in question throughout the Stalin era and obviously under open challenge in 1956. The need and desire for a measure of international respectability is naturally most urgent for East Germany and Hungary, but only slightly less important in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Rumania, all of which enjoyed a tradition of contact and acceptance in the international political and commercial community before the Communist seizure of power.

The Current Scene

On balance, there can be little doubt of the progress made toward establishing a measure of order and stability in Eastern Europe since 1953 and more specifically since the crisis of 1955-56. Hopes of a thorough break between any one of the states in the area and the Soviet Union no longer seem as realistic as they appeared a decade ago. The trend of the bloc toward diversity within circumscribed limits and greater flexibility in economic and cultural policy is an accepted fact.

On the other hand, there is no evidence that the Communist world has really learned to deal effectively with the problem of ideological schism. The fact that the East European parties have supported Khrushchev against China and Albania on the issue of peaceful coexistence is understandable in the light of their geographical position, size and World War II experiences. It is less clear what effect the most recent rapprochement with Marshall Tito may have in the foreseeable future. Even though a recurrence of internal party dissensions on the scale of 1955-56 seems unlikely, it is difficult to see how this development, any more than the recent extreme swing toward revisionism by the Italian Communist Party, can be wholly ignored in states which are still beset by many difficulties and in which the regimes, despite tight party control, have not won the positive acquiescence of many intellectuals and at least a section of the party membership.

Nowhere are problems and dilemmas more evident than in the German Democratic Republic. Erection of the Berlin wall on August 13, 1961, has largely stopped the refugee flow, but the manpower gained from bottling up some 50,000 workers previously employed in West Berlin has probably been offset by the introduction of military conscription in 1962. The magnetic attraction of the West certainly has not been eliminated: the wall has simply made it possible for the regime to apply coercive methods with less vulnerability, and even coercion has failed to end opposition among intellectuals and professional people. The growth rate of industrial production has steadily declined while food and power shortages during the winter of 1962-63 have threatened to become catastrophic for the entire economy. The peak of destalinization reached at the 22nd CPSU Congress in October 1961 still left Ulbricht's dictatorial powers unimpaired, but the campaign caused Pankow renewed embarrassment and uneasiness. Most recently, the regime has had to abandon its belligerent tone concerning the much delayed peace treaty and to admit with reluctance the priority of economic factors in current relations with the Federal Republic. This is unlikely to raise Ulbricht's prestige or to bolster the morale of party activists.

The situation in Hungary is hardly more satisfactory. The country remains a police state, and Kadar's efforts to assure the people that all those who are not active enemies of the regime have a good future has met only with widespread apathy. The raising of industrial work norms in 1960 and 1961 caused general resentment, as did the final thrust of the collectivization drive. The aftermath of the 22nd Soviet Congress provided what was probably a welcome opportunity to dismiss the remaining members of the Stalinist old guard and a belated occasion to expel Rakosi and Gerö from the party. But there has been no increase in public enthusiasm nor any discernible move toward greater liberalism.

Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria continue to have relatively strong Communist leaderships. Yet the purge of former Interior Minister Barak on rather improbable charges of Stalinism and personal misconduct did reveal the presence of considerable tension within the Czechoslovak party prior to its 12th Congress in December 1962, at which First Secretary Novotny appears to have

[5] This point will be developed in detail in the author's contribution to *Communism in Africa*, Z. Brzezinski, ed., to be published this year under the auspices of the Hoover Institution, Stanford University.

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reasserted his full control. In Bulgaria, the final ouster of Vulko Chervenkov from both the party and the government confirmed suppositions that Khrushchev's mid-1962 visit to Sofia was aimed at bolstering the position of Todor Zhivkov in the face of continuing pressure from both the right and the left. As for economic difficulties, both countries have had their share. Food shortages occurred in Bulgaria in the summer of 1962, and the Czechoslovak Five-Year Plan adopted in 1961 has now been abandoned in favor of an interim arrangement which is to run through 1964.

Only in the case of Poland does one get the impression that destalinization has really been carried through, that the government is moving rationally to solve at least some of its problems, and that it enjoys public acceptance however reluctantly bestowed. Intellectual freedom has been restricted, and discussions of the fundamental nature of the Communist system, restimulated by the latest Soviet Party Congress, have not been allowed to turn into dangerous polemics. Friction with the Roman Catholic Church continues, particularly since the passage of the School Reform Law in July 1961 which has placed severe limitations on religious instruction. Yet the equilibrium first established in 1957 has not been wholly destroyed.

AS FOR THE foreseeable future, it is almost inevitable that preoccupation with problems posed by the European Common Market will increase substantially throughout Eastern Europe.[6] Food and fuel exporters such as Poland and Rumania have a legitimate cause for concern, as do the manufacturers of industrial goods like Czechoslovakia and East Germany. Their trade is likely to be hurt not only in Europe itself but in African states with special ties to the Common Market and elsewhere. The mounting attacks by all Communist spokesmen charging that the EEC is an adjunct of NATO and an insidious instrument of neo-colonialism are a clear indication of this concern.

Closely related to this issue is the future role of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA or Comecon). Obviously, a major effort is underway to formulate basic guidelines for future action: this was the chief concern of the 16th session of CMEA convened in Moscow on June 7, 1962. There is little question about the desired goals—which include a greater inward orientation, more independence from non-Communist sources of supply, and further progress toward a genuine division of labor along economically rational lines. The problem is rather whether such plans can be implemented without excessive coercion and whether this essentially Soviet prescription can offer a viable solution suited to Eastern Europe's long-term economic and commercial needs.

Last but not least, one must consider the general climate of feeling in Eastern Europe under Stalin's heirs. In strictly human terms, there has probably been as much frustration and unhappiness in the last decade as under Stalin, even though it has been of a different order. The division of Europe has been prolonged, and perhaps for that reason, more generally accepted. The prospects for any recurrence of popular revolt have dimmed. Propaganda efforts notwithstanding, each of the East European societies seems to have split into two cultures: the Communist—and the apolitical and sometimes crassly materialist, which is less and less concerned with aspirations that are clearly beyond attainment. Even in Poland, the small minority seriously interested in Communist ideas is probably dwindling to leave the field clear for party functionaries and ideologically acceptable technicians, whose main mutual concerns are the maintenance of personal power and the preservation of domestic tranquility. Among thinking people in Poland and Czechoslovakia the prospect of German unification—remote as it is—is probably regarded with mixed feelings; any serious move in this direction would give rise both to a flood of expectations and to a new set of fears, rational or not. The Sino-Soviet controversy seems to have stirred singularly little passion either among the public or in the Communist elites. The latter probably regard the Chinese with fear and distaste and consider their militancy a menacing Asiatic eccentricity quite alien to any truly European ruling party. The problem posed by Yugoslavia is, on the other hand, vividly perceived: the continued existence of Marshall Tito's republic is probably viewed with bewilderment, hostility and concern in all East European capitals, with the possible exception of Warsaw.

To sum up, there has undeniably been a change in the climate of Eastern Europe. Much of the fear which was the hallmark of the Stalin era has been dissipated. The decade has seen a marked increase in the volume of public discussion and in the amount of information available to the average citizen. Irrationality is no longer an ever-present element in everyday life. Yet when all ameliorative aspects have been weighed, the fact remains that in no country of the area has there been a real dilution of the totalitarian element in the system of rule: it remains the characteristic feature of all political, economic and social institutions in Eastern Europe under communism.

[6] On this point see *The World Today*, July 1962, pp. 269-70, and January 1963, pp. 30-36.

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The Importance of Being Djugashvili

By Peter Wiles

THE WRITER HAD the good fortune to be on March 6, 1963, at the Institute for the Advanced Contemplation of Human Affairs in Fordograd. The annual self-criticism meeting in the Explanations Division was slightly expanded in view of its decennial character, and a visitor unknown to me was permitted to help the self-criticism along by simply making criticism—after all, said the Fellows of the Institute, it's *supposed* to be "criticism and self-criticism" anyway, isn't it?

The visitor made a strange impression on me. Initially he seemed to be of the type that, following Professor Lord David Cecil, one might call a flat-brow, or, following the late Lord Ferners, a dry blanket. After he left, however, the Fellows agreed on their diagnosis: he was a vulgar factologist. As such, therefore, he will here be identified. The situation was structured for masochism, so they let his abuse run on; yet there was force to many of his contentions, which I reproduce here as nearly verbatim as I can. His interlocutors were sundry senior Fellows, all household names, of course, to the readers of *Problems of Communism.*

I had originally identified their remarks by name. Now indeed the Fellows this year are of the most various views. There is an open and paid-up member of a Western Communist party, some are fellow-travelers, one is an orthodox Western economist specializing in the industrialization of Southeast Asia, another a professional historian whose "period" is Peter the Great. Several, of course, are Sovietologists of this and that speciality. Also present were a high air force officer from a NATO country, of the "clobber-the-bastards-to-preserve-our-spiritual-values" school, an elderly Russian émigré of violently monarchical views, and Mr. Enver Hoxha, on sabbatical leave from Tirana.

The curious thing is that as I revised my manuscript it didn't seem to matter much which of the Fellows had spoken which line. In particular their hostilty or friendliness to communism seemed to be irrelevant. I have therefore thought it politic to preserve the anonymity of these speakers, whom I have labeled collectively, Historical Determinist.

The Discussion

HISTORICAL DETERMINIST: Well, here we are again to discuss the annual chestnut. And yet, you know, despite the naiveté, if you will pardon the strong expression, of some of the work done at this Institute—and I include here my own—I still say that Stalin's regime was an inevitable consequence of rapid industrialization.

VULGAR FACTOLOGIST: No, because the terror, the lawlessness, the falsification, the application of extreme state measures against senior party opponents, all began twelve months *before* Stalin swung left. He was still a Bukharinite when he began to be a Stalinist.[1]

Mr. Wiles, now Professor of Economics at Brandeis University (Waltham, Mass.), is a leading scholar on the Soviet economic system. His most recent book is The Political Economy of Communism *(Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1962).*

[1] About in October 1926. *Cf.* Ruth Fischer, *Stalin and German Communism,* Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1948, p. 569 and W. Reswick, *I Dreamt Revolution,* Chicago, Regnery, 1952, Chaps. 13-15. I except, for fairness' sake, such earlier intimations of Stalinism as the possible poisoning of Lenin (L. Trotsky, *Stalin,* New York, Harper, 1941, pp. 376-382) and the probable medical murder of Frunze (in November 1925: Fischer, *op., cit.,* p. 489).

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H.D.: All right, don't quibble. It would have been an inevitable consequence had it not happened first. You can't have that kind of industrialization without that kind of leader. The people would have revolted against a milder leader—especially the Russian people, who were and remain fundamentally a band of disorderly and undisciplined peasants; even the party would have revolted.

V.F.: I agree that so much misery could only have been *imposed* by a very strong dictator, and must also have *resulted* in some kind of dictatorship. But before we go on to your view that the misery was productive of something, I must quarrel with the notion that *Russians* can only be governed tyrannically, and would otherwise revolt. It is rather their extreme docility that impresses me. Compared with other nations their history shows no specially high frequency of revolt and disorder, only a specially high frequency of tyranny. As imaginative scientists, clever mechanics and willing subjects (look at the history of their church) they would seem to me to be an exceptionally easy people to govern and industrialize. It is rather the circumferential minorities who gave, and give, trouble to the government in Moscow. I may instance here their reaction to two of Stalin's major lunacies: collectivization and the *agrogorod* scheme.[2]

H.D.: Nonetheless you have admitted that such a dictator was necessary. And here let *me* admit that I'm shifting my ground a little. The word "necessity" is ambiguous. Stalin was a prerequisite, not so much an unavoidable consequence, of the economic developments.

V.F.: Only if "economic developments" be taken to mean government-imposed misery. I deny utterly the necessity of that misery. Look at the NEP.[3] There is not a single competent Western statistical study of the NEP in existence; it is as if Soviet rule had begun in 1928. Yet we know that the latter years of the NEP, even after the easy period of basic reconstruction, showed heavy and growing government investment, and rapid progress in industry, education and real wages. In face of this record and of our ignorance, how can you say the misery of the First Five-Year Plan was necessary for further growth?

H.D.: Because they had come to an impasse: everybody, even Mensheviks and Monarchists, said so at the time.[4] The kulaks had to be liquidated, the grain supply assured, and the walls of the "little stone house" of the Soviet economy broken through. Moreover there was nothing new in any of this: Peter the Great and Witte [5] also laid such burdens on the peasantry.

V.F.: But they did not lay *equal* burdens. They did not drive the ablest peasants off the land. They did not, by their policies, ensure the slaughter of half the livestock. They did not requisition the seed grain or export grain during the subsequent famine.[6] Nor in fact was any emergency measure needed in autumn 1927 to ensure the grain supply, nor did the measures taken actually ensure it. The 1927 harvest turned out to be quite normal, and the 1928 harvest, being a little bigger, actually permitted *less* forcible methods of requisition to be successful. Yet, it was during this latter period, the autumn of 1928, that Stalin executed his final swing to the left. That is, he did so at a moment when the grain panic was truly over. As to an economic impasse, this is a loose and meaningless phrase. However many observers agreed with Stalin, I am bound to ask *why* economic growth in, say, 1929 under a continued NEP could not have been as great as in 1928 or 1927? What technical economic obstacles were there?

H.D.: It is easy to apply hindsight to the 1927 harvest, and chase might-have-beens. The fact is that what happened happened, and even the most hard-boiled Western statisticians show an increase in growth after 1928. It was, of course, the new command economy that caused the increase, so there must have been technical obstacles to growth by the old methods.

V.F.: I make no apology for chasing might-have-beens, since that is precisely what you yourself did in your

[2] The agrogorod scheme was conceived in 1949, apparently with Stalin's approval, by Nikita Khrushchev. The plan involved the resettlement of peasants into large specially constructed "agro-cities," with apartment buildings instead of farmsteads, and a further reduction of household plots. The plans were shelved mainly because of the enormous construction costs entailed and also because of probable peasant opposition. —*Ed.*

[3] New Economic Policy, practiced by the Soviet government 1921-28 with the aim of restoring the economy by making concessions to private enterprise in agriculture, trade, and industry. —*Ed.*

[4] *Cf.* Alec Nove, "Was Stalin Really Necessary?," *Encounter* (London), April 1962.

[5] Count Sergei Yulevich Witte (1849-1915), Russian Prime Minister in 1903-6.—*Ed.*

[6] Compare the famines of 1891 and 1932. The latter was caused, not as is commonly supposed, by the collectivization of two years previously, but by Stalin's panicky requisition of the seed grain for military stock. This was his reaction to the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in September 1931 (*cf.* W. Duranty, *USSR*, Philadelphia, Lippincott, 1944, Chaps. 16 and 17).

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opening statement. To say a thing was inevitable *has no other meaning* than to say that all the might-have-beens have been seriously examined and proved impossible. I, who say the thing was not inevitable, am neither more nor less guilty than you. I'm merely taking a different view on particular might-have-beens.

H.D.: Cut the cackle and get back to my growth figures.

V.F.: Oh yes, well, your figures are simply wrong, that's all. Your Western statisticians make no allowance for the decline in quality, in both manufacturing and building; nor do they deduct livestock slaughter as depreciation of capital. Nay more, the astounding fact is that there is no expert Western calculation of national income growth in 1928-32, any more than there is one for the last years of the NEP. Bergson,[7] for instance, compares the national incomes merely of 1928 and 1937. While we can't really be certain until this work is done, I present my own rough calculation: real national income grew at an annual rate of 7½ percent in 1926-28, and at rather less in 1928-32.[8] Of course, it was different bits of the total that grew, but that seems to be the general picture.

H.D.: Then growth must have been all the more rapid in 1932-37, to reach the acknowledged levels of 1937.

V.F.: *Touché!* The Second Five-Year Plan was indeed a remarkable period, because superficially the economy grew as fast as during the First FYP, but quality improved as well. So I am far from denying that the Stalinist growth rates exceeded, say, the American. I am merely pointing out that they fell short of what Bukharin, Rykov and Tomsky achieved. Anyway, which would you rather do: starve for eight years and feast for one, or keep up an unspectacular progress throughout? In those intervening years people lived and died. And then in 1937 the Great Purge had begun. . . .

H.D.: Well, none of us—er, excuse me, Mr. Hoxha, few of us—would wish to deny that that was counter-productive, and the entirely avoidable product of Stalin's paranoid personality. . . .

V.F.: If this fantastic event was avoidable, why wasn't collectivization avoidable? Besides, I bet you never said that until you read Khrushchev's Secret Speech. Why should *he* be your mentor in what was and was not avoidable?

H.D.: Don't interrupt. I had as a matter of fact long been puzzled by the rationale of the Great Purge. What I wanted to point out was that when the invasion came the country was ready for it, and only such a tyrant could have done it. Look at Witte, for instance: he was not tyrannical enough and the result was the Japanese victory of 1904.

V.F.: But in that war Russia had no allies, and even then her defeat was really only a naval one; indeed a technical miscalculation—as you surely well know. Moreover Witte had opposed the venture. In 1941 on the other hand, the USSR had, or shortly acquired, very powerful allies indeed. As to preparedness, I omit for fairness' sake the undeniable fact that Stalin was not tactically ready for war and rejected copious intelligence as to German intentions. What about this famed strategic readiness? Why did his infantry surrender in hundreds of thousands, and what was it that finally made them fight?

H.D.: Well, of course—if you're going to get into mere chance military technicalities, when you're supposed to be talking about Historical Explanations—I know as well as you do that the infantry wouldn't fight because it was made up of peasants who resented collectivization, and that it began to put up serious resistance only when the news filtered through to it that the Germans were killing their prisoners.

V.F.: Then there you are. You have admitted that without collectivization the country would have been *better* prepared to fight, that the Ukrainian villages would not have welcomed the enemy with the traditional bread and salt, that all those troops and all that territory would not have been lost. Military morale is entirely on a par with tanks and guns in historical status, and it was not a matter of chance.

H.D.: But where would these arms have come from? Without collectivization, no industrialization, you know. They evidently couldn't have had *both* the guns and the morale.

V.F.: That stuff about collectivization being necessary to release labor for industry has no basis in fact or logic. In 1928 there had long been an over-supply of rural laborers flocking into the towns, and there wasn't even full employment in the towns until two years after collectivization. Moreover, the new industrial system led to the most notorious waste of labor, with people standing about waiting for raw materials, and so on. Besides,

[7] Abram Bergson, *The Real National Income of Soviet Russia Since 1928*, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1961.

[8] The 7½% figure is in 1926-7 prices, and based mainly on *Kontrolnye tsifry narodnovo khoziaistva SSSR na 1928-1929 god*, Moscow, Gosplan, 1929. The rate of growth in 1928-32 was about 9% (1928 prices) or 4½% (1937 prices), making no allowance for quality deterioration or livestock slaughter.

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Stalin actually reduced the work week after 1928.[9] The labor supply story is rubbish, however often it's repeated.

H.D.: You are knocking down a straw man. I am thinking of the compulsory grain deliveries. The kolkhoz was necessary to ensure the food, not the labor, supply to the growing towns.

V.F.: Then why didn't it? Why did white bread disappear from the towns? Why was there rationing in the towns between 1929 and 1935? Why could a worker get no milk or meat any more? Why didn't agricultural production increase from 1937 to 1952?[10] If we may exonerate the kolkhoz from the 1932 famine[11] it's just a total absurdity to say it was necessary to feed people: it didn't feed people, while the NEP did.

H.D.: Well, you may have something there. What I should have said was that the compulsory deliveries were necessary as a source of *taxation*. Just as Witte, so Stalin had to tax the peasant, and Stalin had a more efficient way. And not only did he tax the grain; through his kolkhoz system he could also force the peasant to save. It just is not true that he starved agriculture of capital: on the contrary, he made it provide its own capital, by compelling accumulations in the "indivisible fund." And only a great tyrant could have done that.

V.F.: You see how when you really get down to cases, and substitute a few brass tacks for the passive acceptance of myth, I am rendered helpless. Indeed, you have yourself just exploded a myth: that Stalin didn't invest in agriculture. I agree with every word you have just said, and can only reply that a lesser tyrant would surely have done just as well. For without collectivization, one, there would have been no livestock slaughter; two, there would have been less petty theft; and, three, peasants would have done an honest day's work. So agricultural incomes would have been higher, indeed much higher; and my hypothetical lesser tyrant would have been able to skim off the same amount of capital, while everybody would have been happier.

H.D.: *What* lesser tyrant? You are always prating of brass tacks—name me a name. Do you think Bukharin, whom you evidently favor so much, could have brought the country through the war?

V.F.: No, nor had I Bukharin in mind: he would surely have lost out to someone, he was such a natural murderee. But before we leave him, what makes you think there would have been a war? Any Soviet leader —I repeat, *any* Soviet leader—except Stalin would have used the German CP differently, and Hitler would never have taken power. Most alternative leaders were Jews, and the one alternative Gentile, Kirov, is known to have opposed friendship with Hitler. So did Bukharin.[12] It is certain that on the major issue of foreign policy Stalin alone was cynical enough and anti-Semitic enough and isolationist enough to favor Hitler; therefore he was the most disastrous of all possible leaders. When he prevented the German CP from forming an alliance with the Socialists, he dealt his own country a worse blow than collectivization.

H.D.: I cannot dispute the probability of what you say on foreign policy. But the other leaders, too, mostly favored collectivization. Kirov was a leader in it, Trotsky called it inevitable, even from exile. What makes you think it would have been different under either of them?

V.F.: Only this: that they would all, if faced with the responsibility, have shrunk from the use of force, and therefore they would not have carried the plan through. Or rather they *would* have carried the *official* plan through: the First Five-Year Plan called for merely 13 percent collectivization by 1932; and this was decided upon *after* the grain crisis of 1927—which wasn't a crisis anyway—had been settled. I dispute the wisdom of even one percent collectivization, but Stalin suddenly went off the rails in late 1929[13] and achieved 71 percent by 1934. Even Trotsky condemned the use of force.[14] Forcible collectivization was quite clearly not a way out of the agricultural difficulties that Trotsky's industrialization policies entailed.

H.D.: You forget that the political power of the Soviet state was threatened by the *kulaks*. I personally, Heaven knows, have little sympathy for Communists, or com-

[9] Solomon M. Schwarz, *Labor in the Soviet Union,* New York, Praeger, 1951, Chap. 6; Warren Nutter, *The Growth of Industrial Production in the Soviet Union,* Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1962, p. 348.

[10] The official index of 115 in 1952 is 6% above that of 108 in 1937, allowing correctly for territorial change. Meanwhile population rose 16%.

[11] *Cf.* footnote 2, p. 3.

[12] Boris Nikolaewski, *Sotsialisticheskii vestnik,* October 1956. Bukharin spoke in this sense at the 17th CPSU Congress in 1934. Kirov had done so beforehand, but at the Congress itself he refrained, for the sake of unity.

[13] *Cf.,* e.g., I. Deutscher, *Stalin,* London and New York, Oxford University Press, 1949, pp. 319-320.

[14] In his message to the CPSU Central Committee of March 20, 1930; *cf.* Victor Serge, *Vie et mort de Trotsky,* Paris, 1951, p. 221.

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munism; I also know no economics, and cannot judge that side of the case, but as a technical necessity of power these people had to be liquidated for the survival of the regime.

V.F.: The trouble with all you people is that, whatever your personal views, you can only see Communist countries through Communist spectacles, and specifically through the spectacles of the particular Communist clique that is in power at the time. Some of you lacquer things over with a Hegelian morality: *die Weltgeschichte ist das Weltgericht*, the real is the rational, whatever happens—except possibly the Great Purge and the Doctors' Plot—is right. Some of you are commendably free from that sort of cant, and never confuse what is with what ought to be. But you do all take the view that "the man on the spot knows best"; the Communists may be in crime, but they are not in error. Now I am indeed afraid of their courage and their discipline, but not of their intellects. I think they are sometimes very stupid, just like other people. I have already pointed out one capital error of foreign policy and several of economics. *Why* then should a Marxist analysis of Soviet politics in 1928, or indeed any other year, have been right? *What* threat, concretely, did the kulaks pose in that year? Was it, however big or small, greater than in 1927?

H.D.: Lenin said it was growing all the time.

V.F.: And Bukharin said it wasn't. Moreover, I say it wasn't, and it seems to me I am a better judge of that than any Marxist. Think of the machine tractor stations —they had begun before collectivization, and were actually servicing the kulaks. You don't shoot the tractor-driver, if you're paying him. Think of the growth of industry and towns and education. How could rich peasants pose a *growing* threat to such a society? Moreover, you have to explain to me why Tito didn't fall when he decollectivized his agriculture in 1953—an action he took to remove political tensions and *strengthen* his regime.

H.D.: He didn't allow actual kulaks: there's a very low upper limit to holdings. And anyway Yugoslavia isn't Russia.

V.F.: On the contrary, Yugoslavia *is,* so to speak, Russia; I can see no important difference. That Tito has not permitted kulaks is his own error; but surely if he could buy internal peace at the expense of allowing individual peasants, Russia could have had internal peace at the expense of allowing kulaks. "A man," said Dr. Johnson, "is seldom so innocently engaged as when he is making money." Well, the kulaks were making money. Moreover, in 1933 kulaks were deliberately tolerated along the Manchurian border of the Soviet Union.[15] Now you know how paranoid Stalin was about security in border provinces: why do you think he did that?

H.D.: A few kulaks are good: many are bad. As for your Yugoslavia, it went through a nasty Stalinist period in 1947-50, and China has been doing the same since the Hundred Flowers wilted in 1957. This means that for good or for ill, and however much you niggle at this or that detail of the reasoning, each independent Communist regime needs its Stalin to establish it, liquidate its enemies and develop the economy. Thereafter, of course, it will relax.

V.F.: Stalin didn't liquidate the regime's enemies, he liquidated his own. Moreover, the Yugoslav parallel surely won't stand up. When Tito was a Stalinist he was either Stalin's obedient subordinate or trying to recover Stalin's good graces. However, I grant you that there may well be an esoteric myth of the necessity of Stalinism among Communist elites, or at least among the Chinese Communist elite.

(*Interruption in strong Albanian accent*: "*There is.*")

There is no reason to suppose that this myth is confined to the academic mind. But of course if such a myth *has* arisen, if Mao sees himself as a Chinese Stalin, later to be succeeded by a Chinese Khrushchev, then his attitude is in itself an adequate explanation for Chinese Stalinism, and the latter doesn't have to be any more objectively desirable or inevitable than Soviet Stalinism. Do you think that what has happened since the Hundred Flowers has been good for China?

[15] John D. Littlepage and D. Bess, *In Search of Soviet Gold*, London, Harrap, 1939, Chap. 11.

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H.D.: This may seem cynical, but I do. If China is to be a great power she must establish her military prestige —and she has, in the Himalayas. Millions of deaths from starvation she can easily afford—and she has; continued dependence on the USSR she cannot—and her imports have shrunk.

V.F.: Well, at least you are a consistent "Stalinist." It is true of course that Mao has done some things, such as pursue a forward foreign policy, which Stalin would certainly not have done, even *with* an atom bomb. But if we don't press the analogy too far into details, it surely holds. My objection is to the *necessity* of Chinese Stalinism, not its existence. Chinese history shows Mao turning the heat on and off as with a tap: first hot, with the Three Antis and the Five Antis and collectivization; then cold, with Bandung and the Hundred Flowers; then hot again, with the Great Leap Forward and the communes. Now look carefully at that intermediate "cool" period: Is it your doctrine that it was an unfortunate aberration which harmed China, or what?

H.D.: No, I would compare it to the Soviet Second Five-Year Plan: when Stalin legalized the private plots and the one-cow-per-family and the kolkhoz market, developed light industry more rapidly than heavy, switched to the more agreeable foreign policy of the Popular Front, and substituted Socialist Realism for the mere assassination of literature that had preceded it. Stalinism is very tough, and you need periods of relaxation. If Stalin himself saw this, why not Mao? I might add that with the Hundred Flowers Mao hoped to use popular criticism to correct the party; well, in the Second Five-Year Plan Stalin was also conciliatory to the people in order to purge the party. Of course we have here a little difference—Mao's idea of purging the party does not include torture, false confessions and liquidation. But then these parallels are only meant to be general guidelines.

V.F.: Well, here is a dissertation subject for someone. You have drawn a surprisingly impressive analogy. *But*: Yugoslav development and—dare I say it?—Cuban development are not at all the same. Indeed nearly every Communist regime is more or less free today to choose or not to choose Stalinism.

(*Movement at the back of the room*)

And you will be hard put to it to extract any pattern explaining that choice. Thus the Albanians, if I may say so, chose it because they hate the Yugoslavs, and persisted in their choice because geography protects them from coercion: the Czechs, Bulgars and East Germans flirted with Chinese Stalinism, but are unprotected by geography and are coming to heel. The view that Stalinism is necessary for poor Communist countries, on an Asiatic standard of living, breaks down when we look at Czechoslovakia and East Germany. It also fails to explain Mongolia. That is, we have here two rich countries whose leaders needed Stalinism for their own political survival, and a poor country that always follows in the Soviet wake anyhow. In fact all the small Communist countries have made a choice connected in one way or another with geography, and *not* with their stage of development.

H.D.: True, but that leaves the heart of the thesis untouched. Many of these little countries—Bulgaria, Mongolia, North Vietnam, North Korea—may be dismissed as just areas that are only formally outside the boundaries of the two great poles of attraction. What you have now to explain is the astounding coincidence —as you must view it—that when the USSR was poor and needed building up *she* was Stalinist; and that she relaxed when she became richer, while poor China, which now seeks development, is Stalinist in turn.

V.F.: Well, first, to repeat, most of these little countries are *not* just "areas," they *have* made—or tried to make —independent choices, and these do *not* conform to your rule. I don't even agree to your inclusion of North Vietnam there, since this country, though as poor as any, has still in fact not made its choice. Secondly, as I've already tried to demonstrate, Stalin actually slowed up Soviet economic development; and that not only in 1928-32, the entity that Sovietologists have neglected to separate out, but again in 1937-40, which is a well known and well documented period.[16] I therefore utterly deny the operation of any objective necessity, and now that the first shock of your analogy between the Hundred Flowers period and the Second Five-Year Plan has worn off, I admit the parallel gladly and turn it against you. *The principal exponent of the Stalin-was-historically-necessary myth is Mao Tse-tung.* He is applying it, including the relaxation period. He has chosen to discard the merely criminal element, which is a further disproof of the view that *that* forms any necessary part in the syndrome. For the rest the parallelism is so exact as to be suspicious. The original sequence of events resulted from a single personality; its repetition is due to the deliberate decision to imitate on the part of another single personality, or perhaps

[16] The average annual rate of growth of per capita GNP in 1937-40 was 1%. *Cf.* Abram Bergson, *op. cit.*, p. 225.

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of a committee of personalities. In both cases it is a wholly subjective choice.

H.D.: Come, come, this is ridiculous. Great nations are not subjected to great historical sequences of events at the whim of one man. There *have* to be objective reasons.

V.F.: It is certainly necessary that there be no technical obstacle to the choice made; there have to be no objective impediments. But this leaves a simply enormous range of choices open to a strong government. Now a Communist government is as strong as any the world has known: in particular it possesses in its ideology and its party an almost perfect incentive and an almost perfect executive instrument. Its leaders or leader operate secretly, and whatever they say is automatically above criticism. The ideology is very flexible and justifies *any* policy in the short run, *many* policies in the long. Why then should not the whim of one man be the principal determinant of history?

H.D.: Because, of course, you can't buck the large technological and social tides of history.

V.F.: A weak government can't buck them, but what about a strong one determined to do precisely that? Take, for instance, the "tide" of an emergent managerial elite. What makes you so sure that the new Soviet boarding schools will not indoctrinate the young with the party spirit, as they are meant to do? And that the insistence on technical and above all on part-time higher education, will not succeed in its objective—to prevent the emerging of a new consciousness among the younger educated generation and of a managerial elite that could dominate the party? [17]

Or again, wouldn't you have said in 1953 that mass terror and show trials were impossible in the 20th century, that this was the Age of Reason? Yet Stalin bucked that trend very nicely, and so did Hitler.

H.D.: Yes, I might have made that error. To err is human. But now with more assurance I tell you that China and Russia are subject to one law they can't buck and that in the Russian case this goes all the way back to Peter the Great. The law is that it's a hard world, and a potential great power will never become one if it remains economically underdeveloped, and to develop you have to have a tyrant.

V.F.: That is so vague a statement I might agree with it. It leaves on the field of play infinitely more moderate people like Witte and Stolypin, somewhat more moderate people like Lenin, and innumerable might-have-beens like Trotsky and Kirov and even Bukharin-Rykov-Tomsky. You don't *have* to build St. Petersburg and the Kolyma gold fields on the bones of slaves: on the contrary, it's counter-productive. Your statement leaves open extreme differences in the *degree* of general beastliness; it doesn't touch the question of the *optimum* of tyranny. You haven't even begun to prove the necessity of Stalinism.

H.D.: I can only repeat: so great and decisive an event, largely repeating itself in another country, cannot have been due to personal whim.

V.F.: That is mere dogma. Be specific. *Why not?*

H.D.: If only because history and sociology and political theory and economics are serious subjects. To hold that Stalinism as a human phenomenon was without other real explanation than chance and individual personality is to reject the very foundation of the social sciences.

V.F.: OK, if the facts warrant it, I do just that. Indeed as a social scientist myself I am *bound* to do so if the facts tell me to. I think you are all taking an attitude I can only call a sort of intellectual trade unionism. I reject utterly all a priori claims of any particular discipline to monopolize a subject matter, or the right to give all the explanations within a particular field. And incidentally, I question your inclusion of history among the -ologies. Surely historians at least should rejoice in the *particular* explanation of the *particular* phenomenon. Indeed one historian has: George Kennan.[18] In my humble way I am quoting him—with a few extrapolations. I repeat, then: if Stalin had had a different father and mother, we wouldn't be sitting here today.

H.D.: So we've caught you: you *do* reject the very foundation of the social sciences.

V.F.: In this case, or rather in these two cases, yes. Not necessarily in others. Why not?

(*Pause*)

The question is not rhetorical.

* * *

At this point coffee was brought in, and the meeting broke up.

[17] *Cf.* Peter Wiles, "Die Macht in Vordergrund," (*Soviet*) *Survey* (London), April 1959.

[18] *Russia and the West under Lenin and Stalin,* Boston, Little, Brown & Co., 1961, Chap. 17.

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Bolshevism and the Individual Leader

By Howard Swearer

"The Soviet Communist Party, more than any civilian organization known to history, depends upon the personalities of those who rule it from the top."*

NOWHERE IS THE confusion engendered by Marxism-Leninism's dual claim to be both a scientific analysis of social development and at the same time a guide to action—*i.e.*, by its concurrent determinist and voluntarist aspects—more clearly revealed than in dealing with the role of the leader in history. Moreover, no other issue better illustrates the gap between Communist theory and and practice. Because of the dogmatic handling of theory and the official insistence on the unity of theory and practice, the role of the leader, for Communists, is not just an esoteric matter of historical methodology to be discussed at conferences of historians. Destalinization raised in blunt and unavoidable form the question: What influence did Stalin have on the historical development of Soviet society? The question is a perilous one and has evoked bloc-wide debate because most of the obvious answers threaten the legitimacy of the Soviet system and the Marxian analysis as propounded by Soviet theoreticians.

Marxism and the Role of the Leader

The roots of present Communist theoretical and practical difficulties over the role of the leader are deeply embedded in the Marxian concept of historical materialism, according to which the laws of historical development can be scientifically derived and projected into the future through an analysis of the changing modes of economic production and resulting class conflicts. Coupling this with Marx's thesis that "it is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but on the contrary their being that determines their consciousness," it is evident that the hero in history has been pulled from his pedestal. Engels provided the classical statement of Marxist doctrine on the role of the individual in history, a statement that is still cited by Soviet theoreticians as the last word on the matter:

That a certain man, and precisely that man, arises at a particular time in a particular country is, of course, pure chance. But eliminate him and there will be a demand for a substitute, and this substitute will be found, whether good or bad, but in the long run he will be found. That Napoleon, just this particular Corsican, should have been the military dictator made necessary by the exhausting wars of the French Republic was chance; but if a Napoleon had been lacking, another would have filled his place. This is proved by the fact that the man has always been found as soon as he became necessary: Caesar, Augustus, Cromwell, etc.[1]

In other words, history operates through great men, but these leaders emerge in response to a definite social need arising from economic necessities, and their personalities will be suitable to carry out the particular, historically necessary function.

It should be noted that Marxism, in pointing out the limits placed on men by their environment and the complex interweaving of causal factors in historical development, served as a useful counterweight to such concepts as Carlyle's overdrawn and romantic thesis that only

* Leonard Schapiro, *The Communist Party of the Soviet Union,* New York, Random House, 1960, p. 590.

[1] *Osnovy Marksizma-Leninizma,* Moscow, 1959, p. 190, citing *K. Marks i F. Engels, Izbrannye pisma,* Gospolitizdat, 1953, pp. 470-71.

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great men are of consequence. Also, unlike other deterministic historical methodologies such as those of Hegel, Spencer, and Condorcet, Marxism must be credited with some concern for empirical evidence and with at least an attempt to explain the role of great men who carry out the necessary laws of historical development.[2]

The attention of the early Russian Marxists was perforce focused on the role of the individual because they were competing for leadership of the Russian revolutionary movement with the *Narodniki* (Populists), who placed greater emphasis on the influence and responsibility of the "critically thinking" individual and less on the inevitable movement of social and economic forces. George Plekhanov, in an essay published in 1898, defended Marxism against the *Narodnik* charge that it completely negated the role of the individual by swallowing him in the inexorable flow of historical development.[3] In doing so he gave the theoretical formulation of the issue some further twists which might have led to revisionist heresy had he followed his analysis to its logical conclusion.

Plekhanov acknowledged that "by virtue of particular traits of their character, individuals can influence the fate of society"; and, furthermore, that the appearance and disappearance of influential persons may be "accidental." [4] He noted, for example, that Mirabeau's death was historically accidental and influenced the course of the French Revolution. Even when Plekhanov asserts that "the character of an individual is a 'factor' in social development only where, when, and to the extent that social relations permit it to be such," [5] this is a far cry from Engels' contention that each society produces its historically necessary leader. Few would deny that a leader must be influenced by, and work with, inherited habits and institutions; but—as Plekhanov implies—different leaders "accidentally" selected by history may handle the crust of custom differently and, by their actions, may initiate different developmental trends.

Evidently discerning the dangers of this line of reasoning, however, Plekhanov beats a hasty and not always consistent retreat to orthodoxy. He states that an *"accident is something relative* [which] appears only at the point of intersection of inevitable processes." [6] More important, he dogmatically asserts that in the last analysis these inevitable processes are always economic, and that "no matter what the qualities of the given individual may be, they cannot eliminate the given economic relations if the latter conform to the given state of productive forces." [7] Plekhanov concludes that "talented people can . . . change only individual features of events, but not their general trend; *they are themselves the product of this trend.*" [8] Thus, after a promising beginning, he comes round full circle to take refuge in a dogmatic reassertion of the validity of historical materialism: in the "last analysis" leaders cannot basically affect the historical process.

LENIN, THE REVOLUTIONARY activist, by his personal actions and driving will, as well as by his theoretical innovations concerning the role of the professional revolutionary party, the primacy of "consciousness" over "spontaneity," and the telescoping of revolutions, cut deeply into the determinism of Marxism. In the first decade of this century, Plekhanov accused Lenin of rejecting the concept of "an economic necessity which calls forth in the proletariat a demand for socialism"; and Trotsky prophetically charged him with advocating methods that would lead to the substitution of the party organization for the party, the Central Committee for the party organization, and finally the dictator for the Central Committee.[9]

Lenin himself did not admit to the charge of perverting historical materialism and continued to assert the primacy of economic factors and the impossibility of "making" a revolution until historical forces had matured. A similar capacity for self-deception—or perhaps historical humility—was also displayed by the post-revolutionary Trotsky. In his *History of the Russian Revolution* (1930) he attempted to demonstrate the inevitability of the various stages of the revolution, even asserting that the major actors were historical stereotypes whose counterparts could be identified in other revolutions. However, his detailed recounting of events so clearly underlined the prominence of Lenin's role and his own admiration for Lenin's leadership that it implicitly undermined the book's theoretical premise.

Thus, the events of the revolution itself subjected the orthodox Marxist treatment of the leader and his role

[2] Sidney Hook, *The Hero in History,* Beacon Press, 1957, chapt. V.

[3] George Plekhanov, *The Role of the Individual in History,* International Publishers, 1940.

[4] *Ibid.,* pp. 41-42.

[5] *Ibid.,* p. 41.

[6] *Ibid.,* p. 43.

[7] *Ibid.,* p. 45.

[8] *Ibid.,* p. 52.

[9] For an excellent discussion of the assertion of voluntarism over determinism in Communist ideology and practice, see: Robert V. Daniels, "Soviet Power and Marxist Determinism," *Problems of Communism,* No. 3 (May-June) 1960.

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to evident strain.[10] Then, during the 1920's, Stalin, building on the Bolshevik organizational principles bequeathed by Lenin, proceeded to fulfill Trotsky's 1904 prophecy by adeptly and ruthlessly consolidating the party's control over the Soviet Union and the international Communist movement, and at the same time his own personal control over the party. By 1929 this twin process had proceeded to the point where Stalin could launch the "second revolution" of forced-draft industrialization and collectivization—a revolution which enabled him to establish the Stalinist totalitarian system.[11]

It was at this point that Communist theory on the role of the individual began to catch up with practice, although there never was an official repudiation of the orthodox Marxist position. In part, the shift of emphasis to the significance of individual endeavor was a natural consequence of the developing cult of Stalin, who now became the *Vozhd* (leader) and who obviously was not the kind of man to wish to share power and glory even with impersonal laws of historical development. Greater concern with the role of the individual was also a necessary psychological and philosophical accompaniment of the "revolution from above"; for, in a very real sense, Stalin's policies were an attempt to pull Russia out of its historical rut and accelerate the slow pace of advance ordained by "natural" economic laws. The Soviet people were commanded to storm the economic barricades under the battle order fixed by Stalin. Marxism, it was now declared, provided "the foundation for the active, operative, creative role of the subjective factor in history to transform possibility into actuality." [12]

Once this became the new orthodoxy, the position of the individual was re-evaluated in one field after another. M. N. Pokrovsky's ultra-Marxist school of historiography, which portrayed history merely as the playing-out of predetermined economic forces through class struggles, was condemned in 1934 as vulgar economic materialism. Historians were ordered to write "in an animated and entertaining form with an exposition of the most important events and facts in their chronological sequence and with sketches of historical personages." [13] The way was now opened for the glorification of Russian patriots and Czars in history, literature and the theater. In psychological theory, the view of the individual as a kind of human geiger counter registering impulses generated by social and economic forces was rejected, and man acquired consciousness, purpose, and some capacity to affect the course of events.[14] As a corollary, he was also held responsible for his actions. Pedagogical theory and practice soon fell into step. The *Short Course,* though asserting that Communist policy does not depend "on the good wishes of outstanding men," in effect denied limitations on the leader by singing paeans to Stalin and rewriting history for his benefit.

Destalinization

So long as Stalin ruled, inconsistencies and even direct contradictions in Communist theory concerning the role of the individual could be publicly repressed since exegesis is the prerogative of leadership. However, when the heirs of the great *Vozhd* decided to renounce him, the doctrinal contradictions could no longer be simply ignored. Since 1956, a number of theoretical explanations of the "cult of personality" have been advanced,[15] but the most definitive and carefully reasoned official analysis was offered in *Fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism,* published in 1959.[16] This work attempts to explain, on the one hand, how the orthodox Marxist characterization of the rule of the individual remains valid, how great leaders are a fundamental feature of the socialist system, and how the Soviet Union survived Stalinism essentially unscathed; and, on the other hand, how the Soviet Union became afflicted with the "cult of personality" and what harm resulted.

Given the incompatible nature of these elements and the practical political implications involved, it is not surprising that the theoretical synthesis fails to be convincing. The work begins with an affirmation of the important role of the leader in society:

Leaders work out and formulate the policy of a class, a state, a party, organize its enforcement, and direct the activity of thousands and millions of people.

[10] Sidney Hook forcefully argues that Lenin's role in the Russian Revolution was decisive. See Hook, *op. cit.,* chapt. X.

[11] For a discussion of the impact of industrialization on the development of Stalinism, see: Alec Nove, "Was Stalin Really Necessary?," *Encounter,* April 1962, and a comment by Hugh Seton-Watson, "Really Necessary?," *ibid.,* May 1962.

[12] M. B. Mitin and I. Razumovsky, *Dialekticheskii i istoricheskii materialism,* Moscow, 1932, Vol II, p. 405.

[13] Daniels, *op. cit.,* p. 14, citing the decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks,) "On the Teaching of Civic History in the Schools of the USSR," May 16, 1934.

[14] Raymond A. Bauer, *The New Man in Soviet Psychology,* Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1952, chapt. 6.

[15] The most notable being: Khrushchev's secret speech to the 20th Party Congress; the Central Committee Resolution of June 30, 1956; Khrushchev's October 17, 1961, report to the 22nd Party Congress.

[16] *Osnovy Marksizma-Leninizma, op. cit.,* pp. 187-94.

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A Garland of Stalinisms

The Sun . . .

The heart of every Soviet citizen is warmed by his love of Stalin. In all languages of the world, humanity glorifies his name, the name of the promoter of popular happiness, of the head of working humanity.

—Pravda, *December 10, 1949.*

The Father . . .

He is friend of the sun
He will disarm all his foes.
Your name is on our lips,
Your heart is in our hearts,
Your will in our deeds.
Stalin, the father, has sixteen daughters—
Sixteen loving Republics.

—Pravda, *December 11, 1949.*

The Ubiquitous . . .

Stalin! Always we hear in our souls his dear name. And here, in the Kremlin, his presence touches us at every step. We walk on stones which he may have trod only recently. Let us fall on our knees and kiss those holy footprints.

—*From Zemlia Russkaia [Russian Land], book published by Komsomol, 1946.*

Author of Creation . . .

O Great Stalin, O Leader of the Peoples,
Thou who didst give birth to man,
Thou who didst make fertile the earth,
Thou who dost rejuvenate the centuries,
Thou who givest blossom to the spring . . .

—Pravda, *August 28, 1936.*

Omnipotent (?) Sire . . .

I love a young woman with a renewed love and I shall perpetuate myself in my children—all thanks to Thee, great educator Stalin. . . . And when the woman I love presents me with a child, the first word it shall utter will be: Stalin.

—Pravda, *February 1, 1935, quoting a writer by name of Avdienko.*

That naughty Yossif . . .

. . . I feel no more than in my twenties since Stalin taught me to understand the meaning of life and art. . . .

—Izvestia, *December 2, 1936, quoting a venerable Soviet actress.*

He drives . . .

Stalin is the driver of the locomotive of history.

—Pravda, *December 26, 1939.*

He personally . . .

. . . foresees and determines the plan for the development of our country for long historical periods. . . .

—Pravda, *December 21, 1949.*

. . . examined all the main questions of Soviet technical history. . . .

—*Radio Moscow, December 28, 1949.*

. . . attended to gas conversion in Moscow.

—Moscow Bolshevik, *April 9, 1949.*

. . . [was responsible] for planting eucalyptus trees on the coast of the Black Sea, cultivating melons in the Moscow region and extending the cultivation of branched wheat. . . .

—Pravda, December 21, 1949.

. . . bestows daily attention on the development of public health. . . .

—Medical Worker, *November 5, 1952.*

. . . inspires Soviet male and female physical culturists to achieve new successes in sport for the glory of the great socialist Homeland.

—Pravda, *May 26, 1952.*

He is . . .

. . . the greatest Marxist, the great Leninist, the brilliant continuer of the great cause of Marx-Engels-Lenin. . . .

—Soviet State and Law, *No. 4, 1950, p. 79.*

. . . the greatest scholar of our epoch. . . .

—Pravda, *November 25, 1946.*

. . . the creator of the Soviet Armed Forces, the great military leader of modern times . . . the creator of the progressive Soviet military science. . . .

—*N. Bulganin in* Pravda, *December 21, 1949.*

. . . the greatest man on our planet.

—*K. Voroshilov,* in Stalin and the Armed Forces of the USSR, *Moscow, 1951, p. 81.*

. . . the best that humanity possesses. For Stalin is hope; he is expectation; he is the beacon that guides all progressive mankind. Stalin is our banner! Stalin is our will! Stalin is our victory!

—*Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev, as quoted in* Pravda, *January 31, 1937.*

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The leader, however, "is not an accident in the historical process, but is an objective necessity." He is not an independently creative force, for he always corresponds to the needs of a particular class or state and is occupied with putting into effect the laws of social development. In this manner, the role of the party and its current First Secretary is justified.

However, we are then told that some leaders operate against the objective laws of history. These are the leaders of the reactionary classes, the "Hitlers and contemporary imperialist politicians," who undertake "adventurous" actions. Marx and Engels, it should be noted, believed that capitalist leaders were, for the most part, acting out a historically necessary role. True, on occasion, a leader might not be in accord with contemporary economic and social forces and therefore might retard the natural course of social evolution for a time. This phenomenon, of course, was considered especially likely to occur in a fully matured capitalist society just prior to the revolution; but it could only be a temporary aberration, for otherwise the whole Marxian analysis of the instrumental role of the leader would have been brought into question. According to the *Fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism,* however, all Communist leaders are by definition "progressive", and all others "reactionary"; in sum, the orthodox view of the role of the leader in history now applies only to "progressive" societies and their leaders.

More surprises are yet to come as the authors turn specifically to the "cult of personality." They state flatly that "the cult of personality *contradicts* Marxism-Leninism" (italics added). They thus shift the ground of the argument and, in so doing, involve themselves in a serious methodological error—*i.e.,* a confusion of descriptive and normative theory. Up to this point the authors had claimed Marxism-Leninism to be a valid description of the role of the leader in society (or at least in "progressive" societies); now they state that the cult of personality, *as actually practiced by Stalin,* is contrary to Marxism-Leninism. In the latter context, obviously, Marxism-Leninism is used in the sense of a guide or a norm; but what does this do to the ideology's claim to represent actual historical truth?

What impact did Stalin have on Soviet society? We read that he abolished democratic procedures, underrated the capabilities of the people, and in general "introduced into the socialist movement phenomena contrary to its nature." Yet, we are assured, "these negative phenomena did not change the socialist nature of Soviet society"; the inexorable laws of socialist development overcame Stalinism and continued to score successes, although these successes "would have been greater if it had not been for the mistakes of Stalin." The further revelations about Stalin at the 22nd Congress must have raised questions in the minds of many Soviet citizens about the official designations of successes and failures and about the ranking of "primary" and "secondary" characteristics of society.

How was it possible for the cult of personality to appear, of all places, in the first socialist country? The answer is critical for the legitimacy of the Soviet system and its current leadership. Stalin, we are told, possessed qualities—he was "a good organizer and theoretician" and had "an iron will"—which fitted the needs of the working class. Unfortunately, however, he also was endowed with pernicious "secondary" traits: "rudeness, intolerance of the views of others, pathological suspiciousness, and capriciousness." These "secondary" traits came into play only because of the centralization of power, which was necessitated in turn by three unusual circumstances: 1) the construction of socialism in a backward country, 2) capitalist encirclement, and 3) the cruel class war and attacks by enemies of the party.

THIS EXPLANATION IS not without meaning, but it raises a number of further questions. What criteria determine which personality traits are primary and which are secondary? Moreover, were the supposedly secondary traits ascribed to Stalin the result of structural defects in Soviet society (or were they, perhaps, remnants of a bourgeois mentality lingering in the recesses of Stalin's personality)? The extenuating circumstances listed above did indeed encourage Stalin's consolidation of power; but then, centralization of authority is also good Leninist doctrine. After all, it was Lenin who pushed through the resolution of the 10th Party Congress in 1921 against factionalism in the party. Moreover, Stalin constructed his political machine in the 1920's, before the "construction of socialism" really began; in fact, the consolidation of power was a precondition for the frenetic industrialization drive. Finally, the special circumstances cited were nowhere foreseen in original Marxism for the simple reason that the revolution it envisioned was to be worldwide and was to occur when capitalism was ripe for the plucking and industrialization already far advanced. This may be petty theoretical quibbling, but after all the Soviets claim that their revolution was guided by Marxist principles.

The admission that centralization of power enabled Stalin's pernicious traits to come into play points, to be sure, in the right direction. We are, however, given no analysis of the political structure logically required

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to explain this development. Soviet ideologues beg the question by applying the Marxian categorization which makes the political structure secondary to the economic and social system—even though the major impact of Leninism, in both theory and practice, was to assert the primacy of the political will of the party and its leader. Furthermore, since centralization of power was a major precondition for the emergence of Stalinism, assurance is lacking that the cult of personality will not be (or is not being) repeated, notwithstanding Soviet claims that "Leninist norms" have been restored.

This troublesome theoretical problem, which Soviet ideologists never succeeded in resolving, again became acute in late 1961 and 1962 after the extension of the attack on Stalin at the 22nd CPSU Congress. It was the foreign Communist parties, however, which were most concerned with obtaining satisfactory explanations of the personality cult: Khrushchev was satisfied to use Stalin in a heavy-handed way as a scapegoat for all shortcomings in the Soviet Union—even for some which developed after the old dictator's death—and to exploit the issue of Stalinism as a weapon against his political opponents. *Pravda* on November 11, 1961, glibly dismissed the fundamental question by remarking that "the cult of personality was a superficial boil on the perfectly healthy organism of our party."

Some foreign Communist parties which had been pressing since 1956 for a "profound Marxist explanation" of Stalinism—especially the Italians and Poles—were obviously not satisfied with the Soviet answers.[17] At one Communist party congress after another in late 1961, the issue of Stalinism was broached, but never squarely met. Gomulka essayed an explanation but did not go beyond previous Soviet statements. Togliatti, head of the faction-ridden and maverick Italian party, was no more ready than in 1956 to accept the ritualized Soviet formula on Stalinism. In November 1961 he told the Italian Party Congress that "the problem of Stalin is a grave and profound one transcending individual denunciations of inhuman actions and impinging on fundamental questions of the working class and Communist movement which inescapably must be tackled." [18]

Foreign Communist leaders could not ignore the theoretical problem of the cult of personality because their own leadership of their respective parties was brought into question and because Stalin had ruled the world Communist movement for so long that many of them were implicated as his lieutenants. Moreover, the very legitimacy of the Communist ideology and system was at stake, as the eminent Polish theoretician, Oskar Lange, implicitly admitted when he stated in December 1961: ". . . the worship of personality and everything it involves does not constitute some kind of unavoidable stage in the process of building socialism. . . ." [19] Inevitably, destalinization has been closely connected with the growth of polycentrism and, in some parties such as the Italian, with demands for more internal party debate. The Chinese clearly perceived this connection and consequently were appalled by the dethroning of Stalin.

Even though many foreign Communists, in the absence of any thorough explanation of Stalinism, were apprehensive that it might be a cancer instead of just a "superficial boil," their party leaders could probe no more deeply than the Soviets themselves for fear that this would lead to a dangerous investigation of the sources and exercise of political power in the Communist world. Only the Yugoslavs could suggest, for the most part cautiously, that Stalinism had its roots in bureaucratization—or, as Djilas put it in more extreme fashion, in the rise of the "new class."

The Leader in Western Analyses

The role of the leader not only bedevils Communist politics; it also presents a difficult methodological problem for Western students attempting to present a balanced analysis of Soviet society. Not infrequently the personality, policy orientation, and *modus operandi* of the leader pale into insignificance in analyses which stress the operating characteristics of the system, the organizational push of the ideology, the imperatives of social and economic forces, or the tenacious cultural and anthropological heritage of prerevolutionary Russia. Social scientists legitimately focus their attention on institutions, both formal and informal, and look for identifiable, and to some extent, predictable patterns of development. Individuals add a capricious element, especially when they are powerful leaders about whom little is really known. Even analyses relying on the

[17] For a description of the reaction of foreign Communist parties to Soviet explanations of the cult of personality in 1956, see: "Anatomy of Tyranny," *Problems of Communism*, No. 4 (July-Aug.) 1956; Jane Degras and Walter Z. Laqueur, "The Aftermath of Destalinization," *Problems of Communism*, No. 5 (Sept.-Oct.) 1956.

[18] For a more detailed exposition of the reactions of foreign Communist parties to renewed attacks on Stalin at the 22nd Party Congress, see: Alexander Dallin, "Long Divisions and Fine Fractions," *Problems of Communism*, No. 2 (March-April) 1962; "De-Stalinization in Eastern Europe," *ibid.*, No. 3 (May-June) 1962; *Survey* (London), No. 42 (June) 1962, devoted to "Polycentrism."

[19] Quoted in K. A. Jelenski, "Poland," *Survey, loc. cit.*, p. 60.

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concept of totalitarianism and methodologies stressing the organization and use of power often tend to treat the leader as a kind of *deus ex machina*—although their emphasis on the concentration of power and on the lack of restraints upon the leadership necessarily point up the importance of the characteristics of the particular leader.

Analyses of this sort certainly have their value in demonstrating that the leader cannot be considered in a vacuum. The leader must indeed interact with society, and the nature of that society inevitably colors his perspective and in effect places some restraints on him. Though the leader in the Soviet Union has far fewer limitations on his power than does his counterpart in a constitutional democratic state, the myth of the omnipotent totalitarian leader is just that—a myth.

On the other hand, there are those who devote their primary attention to the motives, drives and perspectives of the leadership. Perhaps the best known approach of this type is that which assumes that since the present Soviet leadership has been steeped in the doctrines of Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism, a careful reading of the Communist classics will elucidate the leader's thought processes and give clues to his *Weltanschauung*. This comes as close as we can get to putting the leader on the couch, so to speak, and undeniably has its value. However, it cannot treat with certainty a particular leader's particular reaction to a particular situation. Moreover, this approach is generally static, providing little scope for predictions of change, either in the psychological "code" or in the actual policies of the leadership. Finally, the conflicts within the Soviet leadership after Stalin's death and the current disputes within the bloc belie any firm unity of policy orientation and cast doubts on the assumption that, because Communists have a common ideology, it makes relatively little difference in historical development who the particular leader happens to be.

Again, some journalists and Kremlinologists tend to explain events and policies almost entirely in terms of the struggle for power within the Kremlin. This is certainly a crucial ingredient in policy formation in this highly politicalized society. However, the Kremlinologist is frequently so preoccupied with following the leadership struggle—a most tortuous, laborious and tricky "art"—that he fails to probe into the policy implications of the struggle; or he assumes that all policy is merely a by-product of the struggle—the froth thrown up by the turbid waters of the Kremlin political sea. This may lead to a type of power determinism that fails to give sufficient consideration to how power is used and how the policies espoused by various leaders are related to outstanding societal problems. Even if we assume that policy preferences are motivated primarily by personal political considerations, it is clear that the power struggle inevitably tends to focus on policy issues as the contestants attempt to enlist political support and differentiate themselves from one another. Policy differences tend to harden into ideological disputes, thus reinforcing the intensity of the struggle. Victorious contestants sometimes may cynically reverse their positions: both Stalin and Khrushchev afterwards adopted some of the policies of the rivals they had defeated. Nevertheless, to an appreciable extent the leader remains burdened with the policies on which he rides to power.

In discussing the different approaches to the role of the leader in Soviet society, the author has to some extent overdrawn them in order to highlight the methodological issues involved. Actually, the best representatives of each approach are well aware of its limitations and either have consciously given excessive emphasis to their particular methodology for heuristic purposes or have balanced it by correctives.

The Leader and the Soviet System

More specifically, then, what is the impact of the Khrushchev leadership on Soviet development? The following attempt to explore this question briefly does not pretend to offer a comprehensive and balanced appraisal of post-Stalin Soviet Russia; nor is it predicated on the assumption that the force of leadership is the sóle creative factor in societal development. A full analysis would have to consider a host of factors, including *inter alia*: the social and economic forces at play; the built-in dynamics of the various institutions, political, economic, administrative; the role of ideology; and, particularly, the impact of foreign affairs. Moreover, many of the Soviet policies of the interregnum period of the mid-1950's cannot necessarily be attributed to Khrushchev. Nevertheless, because of the highly centralized and all-embracing nature of the political system and the continuing stress on voluntarism in the official ideology, both of which inevitably lend greater force to the will of the leader than is the case in any pluralistic constitutional democracy, a major difference between the Stalin and Khrushchev eras is precisely the reflection of the differences between the two leaders. A Khrushchev cult has now replaced the Stalin cult and, like its predecessor, is already marked by exaggerations of Khrushchev's historical role. But some new ingredients have been blended into the current cult.

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Ironically, the Marxian contention that the role of the leader is necessarily secondary because a society produces the kind of leader appropriate to its needs—or, to give the proposition a Plekhanovian twist, that while the emergence of a particular leader may be accidental, he can operate effectively only if his personal qualities conform to the society's character—is probably truer of Western democracies than of the Soviet Union because the members of a democratic society have a greater say in determining the choice of the leader. The Soviet leader, on the contrary, may tend to become relatively immune to societal pressures: certainly, in the Soviet Union today, few would argue that during his last years Stalin was completely in tune with the needs and aspirations of Soviet society at large. Moreover, it is still good dogma that the leadership should not merely hold onto the coattails of society but must "consciously" mobilize the forces of "spontaneity" to fulfill goals beyond the ken of the ordinary citizen. Society's needs are in effect to be *created* by the leadership. By way of illustration, Stalin's ruthlessness may have made him the appropriate person to lead the Soviet Union during the *Sturm und Drang* of collectivization and forced industrialization, but the decision to modernize in this fashion was not "historically necessary"; it was taken by Stalin for a number of reasons.[20] In a very real sense, then, whether consciously or not, he created the conditions that made his particular talents necessary.

TO COME TO THE recent era, Khrushchev is obviously a product of his environment and is in tune with it. His policies can be explained by reference to obvious needs of Soviet society (although here, again, some of these needs are created by his own policies, *e.g.*, the continued frenetic push for ever higher production). This does not necessarily mean, however, that some considerably different sort of leader with different policies might not also have been attuned to the society's needs, since a particular need may often be met in a number of ways. More important, a society's needs are rarely, if ever, wholistic; they are diverse and sometimes mutually conflicting, and they are espoused by differing groups—even in the "monolithic" Soviet Union. The forces and institutions of Soviet society in the mid-1950's might have ruled out many types of leaders, but they did not ineluctably call for a Khrushchev.

Khrushchev's opponents in the party Presidium certainly believed in the possibility of lines of development different from those laid down by him, and their programs undoubtedly appealed at least to some segments of Soviet society more than did Khrushchev's. The latter's political success does not necessarily mean that he was better suited to the times than his opponents; rather it indicates that he was a shrewder political operator. The precariousness of Khrushchev's position in June 1957 should give pause to anyone who believes that his victory was historically inevitable. Had, say, Malenkov, or Beria, or Molotov—all products of Soviet society—been successful in their individual bids for power, there can be little doubt that the Soviet Union would have developed somewhat differently. Moreover, over a sufficient period of time, the alternate development possibilities would not necessarily have been merely minor variations on a constant major theme of evolution. The Soviet leaders are not as goal-oriented as is sometimes believed, in large measure because the goals are so vague. At present, these goals largely boil down, in domestic affairs, to continued high production at the expense of all else. Although any successor to Stalin would have started with the same common heritage, it is not difficult to imagine that had one of Khrushchev's rivals gained predominance in his stead, the recent course of Soviet development could very possibly have been different.

THERE ARE AT LEAST three inextricably interrelated dimensions to an analysis of Khrushchev's personal impact on Soviet historical development: 1) the interplay between inner Kremlin politics and national policy; 2) the influence of Khrushchev's background and personal experience upon his actions as a national leader; and 3) Khrushchev's individual style of leadership. The present Soviet leader has shaped his policies with an obvious eye to buttressing his own political position; but his selection of issues and emphases have been influenced by his personal experience. His style of leadership, or mode of operation, is again closely connected with his political needs and previous experience, but it also derives from his physiological and psychological makeup. His enormous energy and drive are the products of a robust physique, an uninhibited personality, and the politician's usual dose of egoism.

Making no pretense at completeness or scientific analysis, let us examine three areas where Khrushchev's hand seems particularly evident. Perhaps the most egregious example is agriculture, which Khrushchev virtually made his private domain. Certainly, given the abysmal state of agriculture in 1953 as a result of Stalin's one-sided policies, something had to be done

[20] On this point, see: Nove, *op. cit.*, and A. Erlich, *The Soviet Industrialization Debate,* Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1960.

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to bolster production regardless of who assumed the leadership. Khrushchev had had wide experience with agriculture not only in the Ukraine but also as a Central Committee Secretary for several years before Stalin's death; moreover, he had definite and drastic ideas for agricultural improvement, as evidenced by his abortive proposal for *agrogorods* (agricultural towns) in 1951. It was quite natural, therefore, that he became the chief spokesman on farm problems in September 1953. Moreover, the seriousness of the agricultural situation made it an ideal issue for him to exploit in order to enhance his authority within the Presidium as well as in the country at large. With his bold programs for the virgin lands, for structural reforms, more incentives, and other improvements—necessarily entailing greater investment of all kinds in agriculture—he was able to seize the political initiative. We now know that his policies were attacked by several Presidium members, including Molotov and Malenkov, who probably acted out of a mixture of political and economic motives. It consequently seems safe to conclude that had someone other than Khrushchev been in charge, agricultural policies would have evolved along somewhat different lines.[21]

A second post-Stalin development attributable in considerable measure to Khrushchev has been the strengthening of the party and the extension of its controls throughout Soviet society, particularly at the regional and lower levels.[22] By enlarging the scope of party responsibilities, Khrushchev as First Secretary increased his own powers vis-à-vis those Presidium members who were based in the state administration, the police, or the military. At the same time, by reason of past experience and outlook, he was more of a party *apparatchik* than any of his major rivals for power, and hence more likely to rely on the party apparatus as an administrative instrument. Had Malenkov, for example, emerged victorious instead of Khrushchev, it seems probable that he would have placed greater reliance on the technically competent industrial bureaucracy and less on the more politically oriented party machine.

Thirdly, Khrushchev has instituted a new style of leadership which might be loosely termed "totalitarian populism." He travels extensively, making contact with the masses and with lower officials, both to give instructions directly and to gather information. In 1961 he spent 32 days inspecting farms. He is less dogmatic, at least verbally, and recommends practical studies to see what will work. He calls for greater mass participation in combatting bureaucracy, eradicating "anti-socialist" activities and habits, and raising production. Khrushchev's "folksy" image is linked with policies to undercut the ossification of new social classes, *e.g.*, the 1958 educational reform, steps to broaden the party base, new wage policies. These measures, in conjunction with the lessening of terror, have had the effect of creating more ferment and conflicting pressures in Soviet society.

CERTAINLY THE KHRUSHCHEV style appears compatible with the requisites of the system in its existing stage of development; but that Khrushchev adopted this particular style can hardly be said to have been inevitable —especially since it meant a radical break with Stalin's methods. In part, Khrushchev's style derives from the restless and dynamic nature of the man. His long exercise of party power in the Ukraine, somewhat isolated from Stalin's direct influence, afforded him an opportunity to develop the techniques he now applies more intensively on a national scale. His often voiced pride in being a self-made man naturally affects his view of the development of a self-perpetuating middle class whose sons and daughters disdain physical work and have not learned the lessons of active participation in production. Finally, his leadership style is an effective political technique for solidifying his position and building up support among the lower administrative rank and file. More than once he has stolen the initiative from his political opponents by appealing directly to the masses, as he did in inviting public discussion of his industrial reorganization proposals in March 1957 when the party Presidium was badly split on the issue.

To emphasize only Khrushchev's departures from the Stalinist heritage would tend to make him appear a liberal or even a radical. In fact, he may more aptly be characterized as a dynamic conservative in the sense that he is attempting to conserve what he believes to be fundamental in the revolutionary heritage by modifying and adjusting leadership techniques and secondary institutions to conform to a changing economic and social situation. To have stood pat might have courted more radical upheavals, or stagnation. However, there is no assurance that over the long haul his alteration of methods might not to some degree affect his goals. This was precisely the fear of Molotov and other political opponents of Khrushchev who were more firmly wedded to the status quo.

[21] On Khrushchev's agricultural policy, see: Alec Nove, "Soviet Agriculture Marks Time," *Foreign Affairs,* July 1962; my chapter, "Agricultural Administration Under Khrushchev," in a forthcoming book on Soviet agriculture to be published by Kansas University Press.

[22] For a fuller discussion of this point, see: H. Swearer, "Changing Roles of the CPSU Under First Secretary Khrushchev," *World Politics,* October 1962.

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To label Khrushchev a dynamic conservative is not to minimize his forceful actions nor the modifications he has wrought in the system. He certainly views himself as a purposeful leader who is consciously shaping society. If Khrushchev goes down in Soviet annals as primarily an impatient tinkerer with the system, this will be in some measure the result of historical timing. Both Lenin and Stalin lived in epochs that afforded them greater opportunity to shape historical development than Khrushchev has had, inasmuch as they were in charge of forging new political, economic and social institutions. After more than four decades, the forms and habits of Soviet society have crystallized. Khrushchev, to be sure, is not satisfied with many aspects of the established system and continues his efforts at social engineering; but his alterations do not cut as deep as those of Lenin and Stalin. Despite the continued lack of formal restraints on the exercise of his power and the repeatedly demonstrated compulsion of the leadership to interfere in all facets of the national life, Khrushchev is less of an architect of Soviet development than either of his two predecessors.

In part, this is because the institutions which confronted him had already become a legitimized part of the revolutionary heritage. He could criticize them for inefficiency, but not as pernicious institutions, whereas Stalin had been able to effect profound changes because these were directed against the ideologically discredited bourgeois heritage. Destalinization undoubtedly allowed some scope for Khrushchev's reformist instincts by tending to undermine parts of the Stalinist institutional legacy; however, he could push destalinization only with circumspection, for fear of undermining the legitimacy of the entire heritage. A frequent device for escaping from this cul-de-sac has been to drape a departure from Stalinist policy in the cloak of Leninism and to charge that Stalin perverted Lenin's policies.

KHRUSHCHEV'S REFORMIST TENDENCIES are also held in check by the influence of his own background and by his evident reluctance to tamper with the more fundamental features of the existing system. He will not countenance a dilution of the power monopoly held by the leadership and the party. The paramount domestic goal remains ever higher economic production. Despite some modifications and the public airing of still more radical proposals, the economy is still run primarily by administrative fiat. Khrushchev views reforms largely in terms of altered administrative techniques: one sweeping upheaval after another has hit the huge Soviet bureaucratic structures in recent years—but still without solving the basic administrative problems. The mass participation Khrushchev has advocated should not be interpreted as a concession to demands from below for democratization, or as a step to institute a popular check upon the power of the political leadership. He is attempting, rather, to stimulate a carefully controlled degree of mass participation designed to promote active public support of his regime and to enlist the people more effectively in the task of fulfilling the leadership's goals.

Khrushchev also is basically a less decisive leader than his forerunners because of an altered political situation partly of his own making. It is clear, for instance, that in recent years there has been a good deal of pulling and hauling over policy issues within the ranks of the Soviet political elite. To be sure, the Stalin regime was not quite as monolithic in reality as it appeared from afar; but it is indisputable that under Khrushchev disagreements are being more forcefully and more frequently expressed in public. A number of factors contribute to this phenomenon, which may be loosely termed bureaucratic pressure-group politics. In part, it may be a hangover from the interregnum period when the top leaders were in open disagreement. It is also a result of Khrushchev's political methods. To enlarge his sources of information and build up support for his regime by giving lower-level officials a vicarious sense of participation in decision-making, Khrushchev consults a wider number of advisors, including administrators in the provinces. Thus, he necessarily encourages a more candid and less dogmatic discussion of problems. Officials are less reluctant to speak up because useful proposals may bring promotion, and because reprisals against dissidents, though still severe in terms of demotions, at least are not lethal. As a result, while Khrushchev's words may be final, he may frequently find himself acting as a mediator among various competing segments of the bureaucracy. Even his wholesale reforms have the mark of compromise, and more than one reform has become badly eroded when put into practice.

It is tempting to suggest that Khrushchev is waging a rearguard action against the forces of spontaneity in Soviet society, forces which must eventually bring vast changes in the system because—unlike in the West, where spontaneity is usually considered a conservative factor—the political and administrative structure is greatly out of step with social and economic development. In the last ten years it has been readily apparent that the Soviet leadership faced a welling-up of pressures for change—pressures from writers, historians, economists, and others who were more and more boldly

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testing, and pushing beyond, the boundaries of orthodoxy. Yet, there are other spontaneous forces in the USSR which are deeply conservative, or even reactionary, as exemplified by those groups who have a vested interest in the system constructed by Stalin (note the continued attacks on Stalinists in the bureaucracy). And Khrushchev's sympathies undoubtedly lie, at least in part, with this latter group from which he originally derived. He perforce finds himself in the position of trying to maintain a dynamic balance between these two loosely defined and opposing sets of forces.

Finally, Soviet society in general has become more intricate, educated, and sophosticated (though this is certainly more true of the urban than of the rural population), and therefore less amenable to wholesale experimentation. Moreover, Khrushchev is more familiar with existing conditions within the Soviet Union than was Stalin—a fact which paradoxically may restrict him in his exercise of power. If, as both Western observers and Khrushchev agree, Stalin was out of tune with society because he deluded himself by his own propaganda, was misinformed by fearful subordinates, and gleaned most of his information from reports by the police and his personal secretariat, his policy decisions were probably more clear-cut and sweeping than Khrushchev's, even when they were directives to hold the line. It is after all much easier to remain doctrinally pure and to divine the scientific laws of social development if one does not let himself become entangled in the complexities of practical social and economic problems, but instead remains—as the poet Tvardovsky put it—behind the "protected walls of the Kremlin."

Books on Stalin

By Francis Randall

STALIN MAY HAVE been the most important man who ever lived. It is not surprising, then, that there have been more biographies of Stalin than of any other man, even Napoleon. Unfortunately, most of these are Soviet propaganda pieces published in more than 300 languages. Serious historians of Stalin's career were always frustrated by the lack of documents on Stalin's early life, and by the all-pervasive secrecy, distortion, and terror of Stalin's Russia, which made access to any valuable documents in the USSR completely out of the question.

Nonetheless, during Stalin's lifetime a few Westerners and Russian exiles were able to produce substantial lives of the Vozhd (leader) and histories of the Vozhd's Russia. Some will be required reading for scholars even after the Soviet archives are thrown open. Others, however, have little to recommend them.

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The first, which appeared in 1931, was *Stalin,* by Sergei Dmitrievskii,[1] a Communist diplomat who defected from the Soviet embassy in Stockholm during the purge of the Right opposition in the late 1920's. To Dmitrievskii the overwhelming element of Stalin's career was his struggle with Trotsky, which he traced back almost to the turn of this century. The book is not very accurate; Trotsky said that Dmitrievskii's account of Stalin's first meeting with Trotsky bothered him until he realized that it was a paraphrase of his own account of *his* first meeting with Lenin!

Dmitrievskii did not claim to know Stalin's private life, yet spoke of his "primitive mind," and portrayed him as "a crafty Asiatic," "a blind power," who "rules Russia with bayonets" and wants to impose his Communist "faith" on Europe "at the tip of a Russian-Asiatic bayonet." Stalin was seen as a super-Nicholas I. At the end of his book, the Five Year Plan, which had

[1] Sergei Dmitrievskii, Berlin, Holzzimmer Verlag, 1931 (in Russian).

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just gone into being, inspired Dmitrievskii to purple lyricism:

The hammer blows are falling. Human arms are harnessed. The machines revolve . . . Machines beget machines, chiefly machines for the destruction of humanity. Every blow of a hammer, every revolution of a wheel seems to say, "Give us Europe!"

Perhaps Dmitrievskii's major achievement was to have anticipated half the clichés ever written about Stalin.

In the same year the first German biography of Stalin appeared—*Stalin, the Career of a Fanatic,* written by a deliberately mysterious German-Near Eastern writer using the Turkish name and title of Essad Bey.[2] Essad Bey was probably the only biographer of Stalin who knew Georgian, aside from Georgian Communists such as Lavrenti Beria. His book was full of rousing anecdotes about Stalin's years in the Caucasus, which according to the author, were related to him personally by unnamed Georgian princes and the like. The author made much of Stalin's romantic Caucasian background, with its wild mountains, wilder men, endless blood feuds, crafty treacheries, and implacable revenges. Similarly, a great deal of emphasis was placed on Stalin's continuation of the Georgian bandit tradition during the Bolshevik bank robberies of 1906-07. Essad Bey interpreted Stalin's prolonged vendetta against Trotsky as prompted by his Caucasian penchant for revenge for personal—and frequently obscure—slights.

The book's insights into Stalin's domestic life were bizarre. To cite one story:

One day Stalin's wife begged her husband to keep an eye on the baby. The child began to scream. Stalin went up to the cradle, groped helplessly about, and puffed the smoke from his pipe once or twice into its face. Naturally the baby howled. Ill at ease, Stalin lifted his offspring carefully out of the cradle, and stuck his pipe into its mouth The child then began to yell as though it were being roasted alive. At last Stalin too lost his temper. "There's a blackguard for you!" he roared, flinging the baby roughly back into the cradle. "He's not a good Bolshevik!"

To Essad Bey, Russia was "Eurasia," and Sovietization was accomplished by virtue of "Lenin's brilliantly organized machinery," and the "knout." "Asia," he colorfully averred, "has placed one of her most brilliant figures at the head of affairs . . . the colossal figure of Stalin, a Red Pope, a Red Genghis Khan, a knight, dreamer, and ascetic all in one." The Five-Year Plan was Stalin's use of European science to arm Eurasia for the conquest of Europe. He concluded with a flourish: "About him stands an army numbering millions . . . Stalin is the symbol of the greatness, the cruelty, and the power of Asia, who is threatening to hurl herself at the throat of Europe!" One man who bought this life of Stalin, who claimed to have read it several times, and who often acted as if he had indeed taken its "message" to heart, was Adolf Hitler.

THE BEST OF the early lives of Stalin was done by Isaac Don Levine,[3] a Russian-born American reporter. Like so many books on Stalin, this one was not red but purple. It began as follows:

The Land of Courage . . . The Land of Fear . . . The Caucasus . . . where East meets West, where South meets North, where all boundaries merge, where all ages converge—this is the cradle of Stalin.

And it ended with what the author imagined to be a "vision" of Stalin's in which his dictatorship was approved by Ivan the Terrible.

In spite of such bombast, Levine's book contained a great deal of material that has stood the test of time. The factual data on the history of the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks, on Trotsky and Stalin, is—as we know now from other sources—essentially accurate. Levine had a good idea of the horrors of collectivization and the early Five-Year Plan, although he tended to accept Soviet production claims as facts. This led him to see Stalin as a super-Atatürk, a perhaps necessarily harsh modernizer of his country.

Levine also fell prey to a weakness common to many biographers: he knew too much about Stalin's inner psyche. "Stalin's left hand is warped. It will not open. Is it possible that the iron claw of Bolshevism is not Stalin's mailed right fist at all, but that impotent left hand . . .?" In the middle of the Civil War, Levine assured his readers, Stalin "prosaically consummated the great love affair of his life." Following that, he secluded himself in the Kremlin, avoiding the limelight and public honors. As for Stalin's other personal habits, Levine had him occasionally sipping a little Georgian wine, smoking his pipe incessantly, talking very little, and having "no vices."

By 1935, on the eve of the Great Purges, Stalin had begun to sponsor flattering biographies of himself. In that year a French Communist, Henri Barbusse, published the most readable of these, *Stalin, a New World Seen Through One Man,*[4] which had been approved personally by Barbusse's good friend Stalin. Not unexpectedly, the book was consistently official—*e.g.*,

[2] English edition: Essad Bey, *Stalin, the Career of a Fanatic,* New York, Viking Press, 1932.

[3] Isaac Don Levine, *Stalin,* New York, Cosmopolitan Book Corp., 1931.

[4] English edition: Henri Barbusse, *Stalin, a New World Seen Through One Man,* New York, Macmillan Co., 1935.

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Trotsky "was always a Menshevik" and Lenin consulted Stalin every day in 1917. But there was a certain amount of substance in the book, for Barbusse lived in France and had to deal with people who had access to uncensored material on the Soviet dictator. For instance, he discussed the documents that prove Stalin's insubordination to his commander, Trotsky, during the battle for Tsaritsyn (later Stalingrad) in 1918. He argued seriously that Stalin's strategy had been right, and that his disobedience at a critical moment saved the Revolution. In addition, his style had a certain verve: "I told Stalin that the bourgeoisie in several European countries are always saying he is a dictator. He leaned back and laughed heartily . . . (But) he does not seize every opportunity he has to laugh aloud." Barbusse wrote the best Stalinist life of Stalin, but ambition should be made of sterner stuff.

BORIS SOUVARINE, at once a Russian and a Frenchman, had been a French Communist of Trotskyite sympathies, but he broke with communism in 1925 to pursue a distinguished career as an historian and critic of the Soviet Union. In 1935 he published *Stalin, a Critical Survey of Bolshevism*,[5] a biography which took its protagonist up to the murder of Kirov in 1935, and which to this date has not been surpassed in length, documentation, or value. Souvarine had no special taste for purple prose. He scarcely mentioned Stalin's wives and was not at all interested in Stalin's pipes.

Souvarine gave full weight to Stalin's Georgian origins, but like Trotsky (with whose views he was naturally familiar), he was less impressed by Stalin's romantic background than by his "mediocrity," less by his physical appearance than by his dullness, colorlessness, and by Stalin's virulent resentment of personalities more articulate and dynamic than he. Of Stalin's characteristics, he wrote:

The first is a will to power disproportionate to the will to know . . . The second is a narrow realism, efficacious within strict limits, and with it a lack of appreciation for theory or general ideas—a temper of mind inherited from his peasant ancestors . . . The third is a religious education overlaid with a travesty of Marxism consisting of elementary formulae learned by heart like a catechism, and lastly Oriental dexterity in intrigue, unscrupulousness, lack of sensitivity in personal relations, scorn of men and of human life.

This passage will suffice to show that Souvarine was still a man of the European Left. To him, Stalin was a "travesty" of Marxism, rather than its logical culmination, as the conservatives would have it. He saw him as a man who failed to appreciate theory, rather than as one who carried theory to excess, as British or American empiricists might suggest. Souvarine admired Rosa Luxemburg for having praised Lenin's revolution "without losing her critical sense," and tried to do the same himself. This left him with the problem of explaining how a great though mistaken man like Lenin could have been followed by Stalin.

Like Trotsky, Souvarine was enough of a determinist to insist that Stalin's dicatatorship was "a product of circumstances." With Trotsky, he thought that the triumph of Stalin was the triumph of a gigantic bureaucratic machine that Lenin had tried to curb in his last years. Again like Trotsky (but unlike Stalin—or Tacitus) he believed such monstrous tyrants develop their characters only under the degenerative impact of absolute power; it was not a bloodthirsty and hypocritical Stalin who had hoodwinked Lenin in 1905 or 1917, but a man whom Lenin had selected as a dull but useful tool. Unlike Trotsky, he added that in the struggles after Lenin's death, Stalin "owes his political fortune to his antagonists"—their ineptitude, and their limitations of character.

Stalin's natural profession, to Souvarine, was that of a seeker after power, first *with* the Bolsheviks, then *against* his fellow-Bolsheviks, and finally in the world at large. Consequently he maintained that Stalin, since 1928, had been building not "socialism" but "the knouto-Soviet state"—the vast system of unparalleled terror and coercion that the world knows so well—for ultimately military purposes. To Souvarine Stalin was no Atatürk. He eyed Soviet production claims coldly and at great length. He recorded the very mixed success of the Five-Year Plans, and the ghastly fiasco of collectivization. The murder of Kirov and the mass executions that followed it were seen as straws in an ill wind. When Souvarine came to write a postscript on the Great Purges for the English edition of his book in 1939, he could claim, sadly but legitimately, that his analysis had been borne out.

Souvarine's superb biography was vilified, of course, by Stalinists and their allies for twenty years, and was carped at by conservatives for being soft on Lenin. But were it not for its authorship, it—or many parts of it—could well be printed in the Soviet Union today. Wasn't it, after all, Malenkov and his officials who in effect admitted that Soviet economic difficulties in the early 1930's were as bad as Souvarine had said? And hasn't Khrushchev by now come around bit by bit to admitting the validity of Souvarine's picture of Stalin's character

[5] English edition: Boris Souvarine, *Stalin, a Critical Survey of Bolshevism*, New York, Alliance Book Corp., 1939.

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and Stalin's terror? If anything, he has been more severe on the Kirov murder and on Stalin's isolation from his people as of the early 1930's. Still, the differences in purpose and tone are obvious, and one would be hard put to imagine Souvarine's work being replaced by a collection of Khrushchev's speeches—or by anything else, for that matter.

AT THE END of his life, Trotsky began a biography of his enemy: *Stalin, an Appraisal of the Man and his Influence.*[6] All things considered, his heroic efforts at "socialist objectivity" were remarkably successful. Still, there was a determined and rather petty effort to prove that Stalin had not really become a Bolshevik until as late as 1904. He insisted not only that Stalin played no major role in the Bolsheviks' seizure of power in October 1917, but that Stalin wouldn't even commit himself to the *coup* until he saw it was successful. Above all, Stalin was "mediocre"—though not a "nonentity."

In his book, Trotsky displayed his Marxist-Leninist determination to find an impersonal class explanation of Stalin's victory. "Stalin took possession of power," he wrote, "not with the aid of personal qualities, but with the aid of an impersonal machine. And it was not he who created the machine but the machine that created him." This was a restatement of his classic thesis that the Communist Party in the 1920's suffered from a "bureaucratic degeneration" of which Stalin "was merely the instance." Good Leninism, but not such convincing history.

[6] Leon Trotsky, *Stalin, an Appraisal of the Man and His Influence,* New York, Harper & Brothers, 1941.

SURPRISE AFTER 25 YEARS

Below are two commentaries on the murder of Kirov, party leader in Leningrad and Politbureau member, which marked the opening of the Great Purge: the first was written in the 1930's in Paris by Boris Souvarine; the other was spoken by Khrushchev himself at the 22nd Party Congress.

The assassination of Kirov at Leningrad in 1934 was an event of symptomatic significance. . . . Despite the obscure and persistent reasons for deception by the "genial" Stalin on this violent death, there was little doubt from the outset that the GPU had contrived the crime—the murderer served only as an instrument, and the major responsibility fell on the all-powerful General Secretary . . . The 117 executions ordered by the "great and beloved leader" after the crime, the imprisonment of 97 former representatives of the old Bolshevik opposition of Leningrad—which had been dissolved—with Zinoviev and Kamenev at their head, the condemnation of the twelve Stalinist chiefs of the local police, and finally the deportation to Asia of some 100,000 innocent inhabitants of Leningrad could deceive nobody. Stalin did not have the courage to make known the exact circumstances of the murder, or the real motives of the murderer, any more than the charges brought against the so-called instigators and accomplices. (The verdict was only pronounced after proceedings *in camera.*). . . Three years later, Stalin, "the adored," was to astonish the world by proclaiming to all and sundry that the principal assassin was none other than Yagoda, his closest colleague, the Chief of the GPU in person, the man whom he had promoted to Commissar for the Interior, "sword bearer" of the regime.

—Boris Souvarine, Stalin, New York, Longmans, Green, 1939, pp. 597-599.

The mass repressions began after the murder of Kirov. . . . The more deeply we study the materials relating to Kirov's death, the more questions arise. It is noteworthy that Kirov's assassin had previously been twice arrested by the Chekists near the Smolny, and that weapons had been found on him. But both times, upon someone's instructions, he had been released. And this man was in the Smolny, armed, in the very corridor along which Kirov usually passed. And for some reason or other it happened that at the moment of the murder the chief of Kirov's bodyguard had fallen far behind S. M. Kirov. . . .

The following fact is also very strange. When the chief of Kirov's bodyguard was being driven to the interrogation—and he was to have been questioned by Stalin, Molotov and Voroshilov on the way, as the driver of the vehicle later said—an accident was deliberately staged by those who were to bring the chief of the bodyguard to the interrogation. They reported that the chief of the bodyguard had died in the accident, although actually he had been killed by the persons escorting him.

Thus the man who guarded Kirov was killed. Then those who had killed him were shot. This was apparently not an accident but a premeditated crime. Who could have committed it? A thorough study of this complex case is now under way.

—N. S. Khrushchev at 22nd Party Congress, Pravda and Izvestia, Oct. 29, 1961.

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While Trotsky was at work on the chapter in which he accused Stalin of having had War Commissar Frunze murdered on the operating table for resisting the GPU takeover of the Red Army, and in which he hinted that Stalin had poisoned Lenin, he was ice-axed to death by one of Stalin's assassins. His blood flowed over some of the notes of this most tragic of all lives of Stalin.

After tragedy, farce. Emil Ludwig, who had written biographies of all manner of folk from Cleopatra on down, finally got around to Stalin in 1942 when in exile in Southern California. (Trotsky had called him "the court portrait painter of the bourgeoisie.") The result was *Stalin,*[7] a very widely read and rather dreadful life of the dictator that reflects the period when he was often viewed benignly as the only power capable of stopping the spread of Hitlerism. Ludwig recorded Stalin's progress from simple tunics to elaborate uniforms candied over with medals. He described how Stalin puffed on his pipe, and what he drew when he doodled (flowers and boats). To Ludwig, Stalin was the real "Man of Destiny." Soviet production figures were all true; the Soviet Constitution of 1936 was "the third great document of modern humanity." "The Russians are the only people who have broken the reign of money." Theirs was a land of "social justice" and "no exploitation." Stalin's resistance to the Nazis was based on "moral factors." All things considered, historical writing has benefited more from Ludwig's *Cleopatra* than from his *Stalin.*

Stalin's reputation in the West had sunk very low by 1948, when Bertram D. Wolfe, once a prominent leader of the American Communist Party, brought out *Three Who Made a Revolution,*[8] a joint life of Lenin, Trotsky, and Stalin up to 1916. Only a small part of this book—which has rightfully come to be considered as a classsic of its genre—was devoted to Stalin, but in such deadly chapters as the one called "How History Is Made," Wolfe pulverized Stalin's self-made myths about his early career with enough documentation to insure that these, at least, will not be "rehabilitated."

The next year, during the Berlin Blockade, Isaac Deutscher, once a member of the Polish Communist Party, later a Trotskyite, and since the 1940's a writer on Communist affairs for the British press, published his *Stalin—A Political Biography.*[9] Deutscher's work has taken its place beside Souvarine's as one of the most skillful accounts of Stalin's career. Not given to Freudian speculations or sensational revelations about Stalin's private life, the author presented a rather dispassionate picture of Stalin's activities before 1917, regarding them as mere preparation for his subsequent rise to absolute power.

Deutscher's *Stalin* has many merits. Yet at the same time, his addiction to a very specific philosophy of history was responsible for serious flaws in his study. History to Deutscher is a vast, organically interconnected, deterministic and teleological process. The Russian Revolution—both its democratic (March) phase and the subsequent Bolshevik *coup*—was a titanic yet necessary leap on the part of a society whose internal contradictions could no longer be resolved by any means short of violent upheaval. All revolutions, Deutscher suggested—the English, French, and Russian alike—follow the same pattern, part of which is to embody tragedy in the full Hegelian sense of the term. Revolutionaries—Independents, Jacobins, Bolsheviks—seize power in the hope (justified, according to Deutscher) that their actions meet with the full approval of the people. But then civil war ensues, with the forces of the future pitted against the resisting forces of the past, and so bitter is the struggle that the revolutionaries have no choice but to constitute themselves into a military dictatorship in order to assure the survival of the revolution. The cost of this transformation is to create a chasm between themselves and the people at large. As the dictatorship consolidates its power, splits occur within the ranks of the revolutionaries. Some perish, some protest against the new brutal (yet inevitable!) methods and are cast aside, some waver between tragic alternatives, some accept the transformation and push grimly on in their determination to build a new world, a process in which the current generation is sacrificed on the altar of posterity.

From all this one can deduce Deutscher's highly controversial interpretation of Lenin's regime: it started

[7] Emil Ludwig, *Stalin,* New York, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1942.

[8] Bertram D. Wolfe, *Three Who Made a Revolution,* New York, Dial Press, 1948.

[9] Isaac Deutscher, *Stalin, a Political Biography,* New York, Oxford University Press, 1949. For a full critique of Deutscher, see Leopold Labedz, "Deutscher as Historian and Prophet," *Survey* (London), April 1962, pp. 120-44.

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with full revolutionary idealism, but was transformed by the Civil War into a dictatorship. Lenin was a tragic hero, embodying all historical tendencies in his complex mind. Trotsky, admired by Deutscher as a tragic hero of almost Greek proportions, was late in realizing the drift of things, and was crushed in the course of his protest. Stalin accepted the burden of history—unconsciously, for he was compelled to believe and maintain that the people were still with him—and set out stolidly to construct the future.

This led Deutscher, when he came to the Five-Year Plan period, to return to a version of the view that Stalin was a a super-Atatürk. The Russian Revolution—in his view—differed from its predecessors by its ability to survive, however transformed, and to press on with its "task" of building the future. Deutscher set down the chaos, the failures, the lies, and the horrors of the early 1930's, but he insisted that industrialization was successful in creating the foundations of a socialist society, and that modernism would thus eventually be followed by democracy. He did not state so plainly in his book as he has in some of his lectures since, that "in spite of all, collectivization and the Five-Year Plans were historically progressive, and perhaps historically necessary," but that is what the reader is led to believe.

Deutscher presented the Great Purges as a horror, but as a horror with a certain extremist chain of reasoning behind it, not as an outpouring of Stalin's paranoia. He pictured Stalin as the real and generally competent commander of the Soviet forces during World War II, which he thought was Stalin's finest hour. He was unhappy about Stalin's turn at the end of the war, but did not perceive the dictator's growing irrationality which a few years later threatened to throw Russia into another cataclysm of purges and repressions.

Deutcher's biography, which all serious students of communism have read, was of course vilified by Stalin's agents. Ironically, it may survive as the most able attempt to salvage something of Stalin's reputation. If published in Moscow today, it would probably be attacked by the new leaders as an apology. Many of them may have some qualms about the unqualified blessings of forced collectivization. The Kremlin's line on the Great Purges bears very heavily on Stalin's personal manias. And every month we are treated to some new account of Stalin's panic, rigidity, and generally criminal incompetence during the war.

In Stalin's last years, biographies poured forth all over the world. One of the last of these was hopefully entitled *The Life and Death of Stalin*,[10] by Louis Fischer, a noted American reporter and writer of Russian origin, who was in many ways a fellow traveler until he broke decisively with communism during the Great Purges. By 1952 he was implacably hostile to Stalin as a man, as a ruler, and as a threat to the security and peace of the world. The book contained many anecdotes about Stalin's personal and public life, but made no attempt to equal works such as Souvarine's and Deutscher's. Fischer was equally bleak about the future. "Soviet citizens know that only death can remove Stalin." He suggested a triumvirate of successors dominated by Beria and supported by Molotov and Malenkov. Krushchev was not mentioned. Mushroom-shaped clouds lowered on the horizon. It was one of the less happy efforts of a very able man.

A few months later Stalin died. For ten years there has been no important new life of Stalin.

IT IS EASY to discount and ridicule many of the lives of Stalin. Some of the volumes betray a distressing intellectual and moral blindness. Even Souvarine and Deutscher were capable of rather irresponsible statements, such as references to "the Asiatic Stalin," with their assumption that Asia is a meaningful as well as objectionable cultural entity. Yet all things considered, it is amazing how well we have been served by some of those who wrote about Stalin when he was alive and diligently at work to suppress his past and distort the present. We owe much to a handful of Russians who had the luck to be abroad, able to write about their tragic land. We owe much to a handful of ex-Communists, especially ex-Trotskyites, who achieved the perspective to write about their tragic cause. As the ranks of those who lived when Stalin ruled become depleted, men will rely increasingly on such historians to tell them what Stalin's world was like, and why it must never come again.

[10] Louis Fischer, *The Life and Death of Stalin*, New York, Harper & Brothers, 1952.

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Chronology of Soviet Affairs: 1953-1963

I. Domestic Developments

1953

Mar. 5 Stalin dies.
Mar. 6 Party and government reorganization with Malenkov as ranking member of party Presidium and Secretariat and Chairman of Council of Ministers; Beria in charge of internal affairs, Molotov foreign affairs, Bulganin defense, with Zhukov as his first deputy. Khrushchev is listed after Malenkov in Secretariat. Voroshilov becomes Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet.

Mar. 14 Malenkov removed from Secretariat which is reduced in size.

Mar. 27 Sweeping amnesty for criminal and military prisoners.

Apr. 1 Retail prices cut.

Apr. 4 "Doctors plot" repudiated.

May 27 *Kommunist* calls for collegiality in party leadership and denounces "cult of personality" and "underestimation of the role of the masses."

June 26 Beria arrested (executed Dec. 23).

Aug. 8 Malenkov admits serious agricultural deficiences and announces "New Course" in economic policy. Increased food and consumer goods production promised. Material incentives of collective farmers raised.

Aug. 12 USSR explodes first hydrogen bomb.

Sept. 3 At CC Plenum Khrushchev elaborates Malenkov proposals (without attribution), including more lenient attitude toward private sector, increased procurement prices, and greater party role in agriculture.

Sept. 7 Khrushchev becomes First Secretary of CC CPSU.

Oct. 28 and 30 Party-government decrees call for increased and improved production of food and consumer goods.

1954

Mar. 13 Malenkov acknowledges that another world war would "mean the destruction of world civilization" and calls for "economic competition with the capitalist world." Committee for State Security (KGB), formed under chairmanship of Ivan Serov, to succeed former Ministry for State Security (MGB).

Mar. 28 Increased grain production through cultivation of virgin and fallow lands decreed (program expanded Aug. 17).

Apr. 26 Supreme Soviet reduces direct military expenditures for 1954 by 9 per cent (compared with 1953).

Apr. 30 Death penalty for premeditated murder reintroduced.

July 12 School reform: polytechnical education stressed, coeducation reestablished, uniforms for boys introduced.

Dec. 15-26 Second All-Union Writers' Congress reaffirms the principle of *partiinost* (party-mindedness) in the arts.

Dec. 24 *Pravda* announces that the principal fabricators of the "Leningrad Case," including Abakumov, former Minister of State Security, had been tried and shot.

1955

Jan. 7 Khrushchev stresses priority development of heavy industry.

Jan. 25-31 CC Plenum; Khrushchev attacks "New Course."

Feb. 8 Malenkov resigns as Chairman of USSR Council of Ministers; on Khrushchev's recommendation, Bulganin succeeds Malenkov.

Feb. 9 Marshal Zhukov succeeds Bulganin as Minister of Defense.

Mar. 11 Decree on decentralization of agricultural planning published.

May 24-28 Soviet planning apparatus split; Gosplan takes over long-term planning, Gosekonomkomissia short-term planning.

July 4-12 CC Plenum: Kirichenko and Suslov promoted to Presidium.

Aug. 13 Announcement of 640,000 cut in size of armed forces.

Sept. 17 Limited amnesty declared for wartime collaborators.

Oct. 8 Molotov apologizes in an article (dated Sept. 16) in *Kommunist* for ideological error and retracts his statements of Feb. 8 implying that socialism in the USSR had not yet been completed. This humiliation signifies opening attack on Molotov as well as Stalinism.

Dec. 21 *Pravda* honors Stalin's birthday.

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Dec. 28 Sharp rise announced in 1956 budgetary expenditures for scientific research.

1956

Jan. 15 Directives for Sixth Five-Year Plan published.

Feb. 14-25 20th Party Congress: Khrushchev's anti-Stalin "Secret Speech"; collective leadership stressed; "war not fatalistically inevitable"; Zhukov promoted to candidate member of Presidium; Bureau for RSFSR Party Affairs established.

Mar. 7-9 Demonstrations in Tbilisi, Georgia, against criticism of Stalin.

May 8 Annulment of 1940 restrictive labor legislation announced.

May 14 Additional 1.2 million cut in armed forces announced.

June 1 Molotov dismissed as Minister of Foreign Affairs.

June 28 USSR statistical handbook published: beginning of statistical renaissance; total population estimated at 200.2 million (below previous estimates).

July 2 *Pravda* publishes CC decree (of June 30) "On the overcoming of the Cult of Personality and its Consequences."

Sept. 8 Minimum wages and income tax exemptions raised.

Nov. 22 Molotov appointed Minister for State Control.

Nov. 30 *Pravda* warns of "unhealthy attitudes" among the Soviet intelligentsia.

Dec. 3 Several students expelled from Moscow University for protesting lecturers' official justifications of suppression of Hungarian revolution.

Dec. 20-29 Control over economy centralized with reorganization of State Economic Commission.

1957

Jan. 17 In partial retreat from destalinization Khrushchev declares that neither "Stalinism nor Stalin himself could be separated from communism".

Feb. 13-14 CC Plenum adopts decision on reorganization of Soviet economy; elects F. R. Kozlov as Candidate Member of Presidium.

Mar. 30 Khrushchev's "theses" on decentralization of Soviet economic management published.

Apr. 19 Government announces end of compulsory state loans.

May 7-10 Supreme Soviet approves Khrushchev's "theses" on reorganization of industrial and construction management.

June 22-29 "Anti-party group" (Malenkov, Molotov, Kaganovich etc.) purged; Zhukov and Kozlov elected members of party Presidium; role of Secretariat enhanced.

July 4 Compulsory deliveries to the state from private plots abolished as of Jan. 1, 1958.

Sept. 25 Sixth Five-Year Plan dropped; replaced by Seven-Year Plan (1959-1965).

Oct. 4 First Sputnik launched.

Oct. 26 Zhukov purged; party control over armed forces re-emphasized.

1958

Jan. 22 Khrushchev calls for liquidation of MTS (approved at June CC Plenum).

Mar. 31 Khrushchev replaces Bulganin as Chairman of USSR Council of Ministers.

May 6-7 Khrushchev announces expansion of chemical industry and increased production of textiles and footwear.

June 17-18 CC Plenum adopts decision on changes in agricultural procurement and pricing; D. S. Polyanski and N. V. Podgorny elected Candidate Members of Presidium.

Sept. 20 Khrushchev proposes reorganization of the Soviet educational system emphasizing vocational training.

Oct. 4 Brake on non-essential construction decreed.

Oct. 23 Boris Pasternak awarded Nobel Prize; purged from Writers' Union on Oct. 27.

Nov. 12 CC Plenum approves draft Seven-Year Plan.

Nov. 3 Party and government decrees shorten workday and order wage adjustments.

Dec. 22-25 Supreme Soviet approves revision of criminal judicial procedure.

1959

Jan. 15-22 First all-union population census since 1939 taken.

Feb. 5 Extraordinary 21st Party Congress approves Seven-Year Plan.

Feb. 8 Establishment of "voluntary people's guards."

Mar. 2 State Committee for Automation and Machine Building established.

May 9 Preliminary census returns show January 1959 population of 208.8 million.

May 18-23 Third Writers' Congress held; Khrushchev declares "complete rout" of revisionists and calls for era of reconciliation.

June 24-29 CC Plenum discusses mechanization and automation of Soviet industry.

1960

Jan. 9 Party decree on propaganda tasks issued.

Jan. 14 Khrushchev reveals USSR troop strength 3.6 million and announces planned reduction of 1.2 million.

May 4 CC Plenum meets after U-2 incident: Kozlov named Secretary; Kosygin, Podgorny, and Polyanski promoted to full Presidium membership.

May 5-7 Supreme Soviet approves phased elimination of income tax, revaluation of ruble, and reduction of work day; Brezhnev replaces Voroshilov as Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet.

July 13-16 CC Plenum emphasizes introduction of new technology; Kozlov gives secret report on Bucharest Congress.

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1961

Jan. 1 Ruble revaluated domestically at 10:1.

Jan. 10-18 Khrushchev dominates CC Plenum on agricultural shortcomings.

Apr. 12 Gagarin orbits earth.

May 5 Government decrees death penalty for economic crimes.

May 20 Khrushchev states that heavy and light industry will grow at equal rates.

June 19 CC Plenum endorses new draft party Program and gives "general approval" to draft party Statutes.

July 8 Khrushchev announces increase in Soviet defense budget and suspension of demobilization.

Oct. 17-31 22nd Party Congress: attack on Stalin and "anti-party group" resumed; new party Program and Statutes approved.

Nov. 1 Stalin's body removed from mausoleum to Kremlin wall.

1962

Mar. 5-9 CC Plenum reorganizes agricultural management and approves Khrushchev's anti-grassland campaign.

June 1 Government decrees price increases in meat and butter; lowers draft registration age to 17. Demonstrations over price rises subsequently reported in Rostov and other cities.

Aug. 7 *Pravda* publishes June 19 decree restricting private homebuilding.

Aug. 12-16 Nikolayev and Popovich orbital flights.

Sept. 22 Government postpones indefinitely income tax reductions.

Oct. 21 *Pravda* publishes Yevtushenko's poem "Stalin's Heirs."

Nov. 19-23 CC Plenum reorganizes industrial and agricultural management and changes organizational structure of party apparatus; both party and government agencies at *oblast* level and below bifurcated; Party-State Control Committee re-established.

Nov. Solzhenitsyn's novella *One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich* published.

Dec. 17 Party leadership meets with intelligentsia; rejects "peaceful coexistence with bourgeois art."

1963

Feb. 27 Khrushchev indicates shift in budget allocations in favor of military.

Mar 5 Anniversary of Stalin's death passes unnoticed.

II. Foreign Relations

1953

May 31 USSR renounces territorial claims on Turkey.

June 8 USSR requests exchange of ambassadors with Yugoslavia. (Tito accepts June 14.)

June 17 Strikes and riots break out in East Germany, are suppressed by Soviet troops.

July 27 Korean armistice signed.

Aug. 12 Soviets test first thermonuclear device.

Dec. 2 USSR and India sign first trade agreement.

1954

July 21 Geneva Conference on Indochina results in truce agreement, partition of Vietnam, neutralization of Laos and Cambodia.

Oct. 11 In bilateral agreement with CPR, USSR gives up base rights in Port Arthur and other special privileges in China.

Dec. 2 Soviet-Iranian boundary agreement signed.

1955

Jan. 5 USSR and Yugoslavia sign first formal trade agreement since 1949.

Feb. 2 USSR signs agreement with India to build Bhilai steel plant.

May 10 USSR submits broad arms reduction plan to London Disarmament Conference.

May 14 Warsaw Pact signed. Inclusion of East Germany and Albania represents new Soviet commitment.

May 15 Austrian State Treaty signed.

May 26-June 2 Top-level Soviet delegation led by Khrushchev visits Belgrade in a bid for better Soviet-Yugoslav relations.

July 18-23 Geneva Summit Conference.

Sept. 9-13 Adenauer visits Moscow, negotiates agreement with Soviets to establish diplomatic relations and receives promise of release of German war prisoners.

Sept. 19 USSR signs agreement with Finland relinquishing naval base at Porkkala.

Sept. 20 USSR grants East Germany "complete sovereignty," thus formalizing split of Germany.

Sept. 26 Nasser announces signing of arms-for-cotton deal with Czechoslovakia.

Nov. 18-Dec. 18 Bulganin and Khrushchev visit India, Burma, and

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Afghanistan in an attempt to enhance Soviet prestige in Asia.

1956

Apr. 17 Dissolution of Cominform announced.

Apr. 18-27 Bulganin and Khrushchev visit the UK, proclaiming the USSR's peaceful intentions toward the West.

June 1-23 Tito visits the USSR.

Oct. 19 USSR reaches agreement with Japan on normalization of relations; question of peace treaty deferred.

Oct. 19 Khrushchev and other top Soviet leaders intervene personally in Poland to prevent too radical a shift in the Polish line. Gomulka speech Oct. 20 denounces Moscow's past practices in imposing satellite status on East European countries.

Oct. 24 Soviet troops intervene in Hungarian uprising; are withdrawn from Budapest Oct. 31; intervene again on Nov. 4 to overthrow Nagy government and install Kadar regime.

Nov. 5 Proclaiming its friendship to Arabs, USSR threatens UK, France, and Israel with military intervention in Suez crisis.

Nov. 18 Moscow agreement on Soviet-Polish relations makes important concessions to Poland.

1957

Mar. 19 and 28 Bulganin warns Norwegian and Danish premiers against acceptance of NATO nuclear weapons.

June 18-22 Warsaw meeting revives dormant CMEA.

July 28-Aug. 11 Sixth World Festival of Youth and Students held in Moscow.

Oct. 4 Soviets launch Sputnik I.

Nov. 21 Moscow Declaration of the 12 bloc parties issued; designed to provide guidance to world Communist movement.

Dec. 26-Jan. 2 Soviet delegation at Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference in Cairo makes general economic aid offer to underdeveloped countries.

1958

Jan. 27 Soviet-American agreement on cultural and scientific exchanges signed in Washington.

Sept. 7 and 19 Khrushchev letters to President Eisenhower support CPR over Taiwan, warn that attack on CPR is attack on USSR.

Oct. 23 Khrushchev announces Soviet offer of aid to Egypt in building Aswan dam.

Oct. 31 Three-power nuclear test ban talks begin in Geneva.

Nov. 27 USSR formally demands transformation of West Berlin into "free city," announces intention to liquidate Soviet occupation of East Berlin and turn over West Berlin access controls to East Germans.

1959

Jan. 4-20 Mikoyan visits the US on "goodwill" tour.

July 14-23 Khrushchev visits Poland, endorses Polish autonomy in domestic affairs.

July 23-Aug. 2 Vice President Nixon visits USSR.

Sept. 15-27 Khrushchev in US on official visit.

Sept. 18 Khrushchev addresses UN General Assembly, proposes total universal disarmament.

Sept. 30-Oct. 4 Khrushchev visits Peking in attempt to patch over public differences with CPR leaders.

Nov. 17-28 Mikoyan tour of Mexico marks growing Soviet interest in Latin America.

Dec. 1 The US, USSR and ten other nations sign Antarctic Treaty.

1960

Feb. 14 USSR announces five-year sugar purchase agreement with Cuba, following Mikoyan visit.

Feb. 21 USSR announces plan to establish Peoples' Friendship University in Moscow for African, Asian and Latin American students.

May 1 Soviets shoot down U-2 plane over Soviet territory. Khrushchev announces pilot is alive and in Soviet hands on May 7.

May 14-19 Khrushchev in Paris for summit talks; breaks off talks on May 17 after one session when his demands on US reconnaissance flights are not met.

May 20 and June 15 Soviet notes to Japan warn against ratification of US Security Pact.

June 24 Twelve bloc regimes sign communique in Bucharest designed to support Soviet doctrine under criticism by CPR.

July 15 Khrushchev threatens direct Soviet intervention if "aggression" against the Congo continues.

Aug. 12 Western news sources report Soviet technicians leaving CPR "in great numbers."

Sept. 19-Oct. 13 Khrushchev attends UN Assembly in New York. In September 23 address calls for changes in UN Secretariat, demands "complete" eradication of colonialism. Interrupts Macmillan speech September 29.

Nov. 6-30 Communist summit conference on Sino-Soviet differences held in Moscow, produces "1960 Moscow Statement" whose formulations reflect basic disagreements between China and USSR.

1961

Jan. 6 Indonesia and USSR sign arms agreement.

Feb. 9-19 Brezhnev tour through Morocco, Guinea and Ghana is first trip to Africa by a top Soviet leader.

April 12 Soviet cosmonaut Yuri Gagarin achieves successful orbit of earth and returns safely.

June 3-4 Kennedy-Khrushchev summit meeting in Vienna.

June 4 Khrushchev *aide-mémoire* to President Kennedy outlines Soviet proposals on transformation of West Berlin into "demilitarized free city."

Aug. 13 East Germany establishes "Wall" sealing off East Berlin.

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Oct. 17 Khrushchev opening address at 22nd CPSU Congress in Moscow publicly attacks Albanian leadership for deviation and other sins.

Oct. 27-28 US-Soviet tanks face each other in direct confrontation across Berlin sector border.

Dec. 3 USSR breaks off diplomatic relations with Albania.

1962

Mar. 14 Eighteen-nation disarmament talks begin in Geneva.

July 26 Moscow begins significantly increased shipment of military goods and technical personnel to Cuba.

July 21 Fourteen-nation declaration on Laos signed at Geneva, setting stage for Laotian settlement.

Aug. Khrushchev article in the Communist journal *Problems of Peace and Socialism* attacks European Common Market, urges greater economic integration in the Soviet bloc.

Oct. 28 Khrushchev agrees to US demand for removal of Soviet offensive missiles from Cuba.

Nov.-Dec. Communist Party congresses in Bulgaria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Italy are the scene of mounting and increasingly explicit Sino-Soviet polemics.

Dec. 3-21 Tito visits USSR, addresses Supreme Soviet and is prominently feted by Khrushchev.

1963

Jan. 7 *Pravda* editorial denounces the Chinese for warmongering and splitting world communism.

Jan. 14 Shipment of Soviet MIG-21 planes to India indicates a degree of Soviet support for India in border conflict with CPR.

Jan. 15-21 At SED Party Congress in Berlin, attended by Khrushchev, the Chinese party is harshly attacked and its delegate's speech interrupted.

Feb. 7 Moscow notes to Bonn and Paris protest against Treaty on German-French Cooperation.

Feb. 22 Defense Minister Malinovski warns that attack on Cuba would mean World War III.

AND WHAT OF THE FUTURE?

Among individual people, one can hear talk of some kind of absolute personal freedom. I do not know what they have in mind here, but in my opinion there will never be absolute personal freedom, not even under full communism. "We do not believe in 'absolutes,'" V. I. Lenin once replied to the advocates of "absolute freedom." Even under communism the will of an individual must be subordinated to the will of the collective. If this does not occur, then anarchical self-will will usher disarray and disorganization into the life of society. . . .

Can there be, under communism, violations of public order, deviations from the will of the collective? Yes, it is possible. However, it is obvious that they would be isolated instances. One shouldn't think that cases of mental affliction will not occur, or that spiritually sick people cannot become violators of the rules of communal life. I don't know what kind of means, but surely some means will be employed against outbursts of madmen. After all, even now there is a straitjacket which is placed on madmen, thus depriving them of the possibility of acting wildly and causing harm to themselves and those around them. . . .

Having eradicated the consequences of the personality cult of Stalin, the Communist Party has removed all obstacles to the initiative and activity of the working masses, and has created the best possible conditions for the development of the creative forces of the people.

A new period in the life of the party and the people has arrived. While overcoming the harmful effects of the personality cult, the party has been and is following determinedly the course leading to the restoration of Leninist norms in the life of the party and state, to the further development of socialist democracy and the mobilization of all forces in the massive construction of communism.

But this does not mean that now, after the condemnation of the personality cult, the time has come for laissez-faire, that the reins of government have supposedly been loosened, that the public ship is sailing according to the will of the waves, and that everyone can act on his own as he pleases. No. The party has been following and will continue to follow, consistently and firmly, the Leninist course that it has fashioned, implacably rejecting any ideological vacillations and attempts to violate the norms of life of our society.

—N. S. Khrushchev, speech at meeting of party and state leaders with representatives of literature and art (March 8, 1963), *Pravda*, March 10, 1963.

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Literary Gazette on *Problems of Communism*

The following article appeared in Literaturnaia gazeta *(Literary Gazette) of February 26, 1963, under the title, "Not Even for Free!" The author, Harry Freeman, is identified as an "American journalist."*

ONCE EVERY TWO MONTHS a magazine comes out in the United States under the title, *Problems of Communism*. The title is extremely risky in the conditions in America today, with its McCarran and Smith Acts. Even more suspicious is the fact that the names of the editors are not shown in the magazine. A person raised on the "works" of J. Edgar Hoover, of course, decides that he has before him a subversive publication involved in the "Communist conspiracy." It cannot be that the Federal Bureau of Investigation has not subjected the activity of the editors of this journal to the most thorough check! How have they managed to publish without interference? How have they escaped being brought to trial for violating the McCarran Act?

This is simply explained: *Problems of Communism* is an organ of the United States Information Agency, Washington's propaganda instrument.

The question immediately arises: Why does the American government need to squander huge sums from the budget on publishing the magazine *Problems of Communism*? It ought to look into its own problems first—the USA has more than enough.

Our government is now very angry with De Gaulle, who did not accept Washington's plan to create a "multilateral nuclear NATO force" and is trying to keep American frozen poultry out of the French market. The Kennedy government is also very dissatisfied with Ottawa's behavior. Canada has ungratefully refused to accept our gift—nuclear weapons—and (just imagine!) prefers to have the larger Canadian industrial enterprises owned and run by Canadians, and not by American capitalists. Even with our friend Franco not all is well. We want to keep our military bases on the blood-soaked Spanish soil, but the Generalissimo is trying to make us pay for this as dearly as he can.

Since we have got onto the subject of problems, we cannot fail to be reminded also of the host of domestic problems facing the United States. Five million unemployed Americans want work. There is a problem for you. Negroes are more and more insistently demanding equal opportunity in jobs, housing, education, recreation and even, imagine, the vote. There is another problem for you. Other acute problems also exist: youth, housing, schools, medical services. This list could be continued almost to infinity.

But for the United States Information Agency, all this simply does not exist. They are preoccupied with one thing: How to hide the true picture from society and to foist upon a skeptical world the notion that the United States is the best country on earth and "the American way of life" is the happiest and most enviable.

Gilding America, the alchemists of the Information Agency at the same time blacken the socialist world. It is in slander of the socialist countries and Communist parties that the magazine *Problems of Communism* specializes.

The magazine prints pseudoscientific articles, written in ponderous style and strewn with footnotes. It is not calculated for the mass reader, it is intended to lead the intelligentsia astray. The Voice of America and other organs have the job of conducting the grosser forms of propaganda. The slanderers who fill the pages of *Problems of Communism* with their scribbling are cloaked in academic gowns and pretend to be scholarly.

But the Information Agency spends money in vain on this clearly hopeless project. With all its attempts at a scholarly appearance, the magazine is incapable of hooking even the most credulous reader: the malicious tendentiousness of this propagandist's organ strikes the nose, as the saying goes.

The editors of *Problems of Communism*, who prefer not to give their names, maintain that their alleged purpose is "to provide analyses and significant background information on various aspects of world communism today." But the true character of this "analysis" and "information" becomes quite clear to even the most innocent.

One need not go far for examples. The latest issue led off with an article entitled, "Liberalization—A Balance Sheet." It came from the pen of an English bard, one Robert Conquest, who is recommended to readers as a "specialist on the USSR." The author sets himself the goal of summing up the development of the USSR over the last decade. On the debit side of the summary balance compiled by Mr. Conquest are gathered all the hoary anti-

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Soviet fantasies, repeated countless times before Goebbels and after Goebbels. Well, and what does Mr. Conquest set down to the credit of the Soviet system? Exactly nothing! He totally ignores the rise in the standard of living in the Soviet Union, the headlong growth of the Soviet economy, the triumphal successes of Soviet science and technology, the flowering of Soviet culture. Even the biggest fool who looks at the article will quickly grasp that "accountant" Robert Conquest simply has unclean hands and that all his bookkeeping is a complete fake.

Conquest's article is by no means exceptional. The articles treating Czechoslovakia, Poland, Cuba and other socialist countries and the Communist parties of India and Indonesia are similarly "scientific." All these are based on the same sort of swindler's arithmetic as Conquest's article and repeat nonsensical anti-Communist fabrications.

Who are they, these learned men who compile falsified political balances, for which an accountant in any country would be slapped into prison?

They are, above all, "refugees from Eastern Europe"—such is the euphemism adopted by the American press to designate counterrevolutionary émigrés who cannot bear the sunlight of the new social system. To their number belong Edward Taborsky, who fled Czechoslovakia and found asylum at the University of Texas; Paul Landy, a Hungarian journalist who hitched his fate to the counterrevolution; Richard Wraga, a reactionary Polish émigré. Then there follow renegades from the progressive parties of the West, who echo the wolf howls of the anti-Communists. And, finally, there are young American "specialists on communism" trained at special institutions of learning in the art of lying and misrepresentation.

In the United States territory *Problems of Communism* is sold at a price of 35 cents. Abroad it is distributed free by the more than 100 US propaganda offices scattered around the world.

How many people are enticed by the free gift remains unclear. It is difficult to imagine that many readers could be found who would not lose all interest in this magazine on acquaintance with the first issue that fell into their hands. And since this magazine is printed on heavy, slick paper, it is no good for anything even in the most underdeveloped country.

FROM THE EDITORS:

We are reproducing Mr. Freeman's article not because of its intrinsic value, but simply because it may help to give our readers a better idea of how "facts" are presented to the Soviet public. In doing so, we shall permit ourselves a few brief comments.

First, the matter of information. What has Mr. Freeman managed to tell his readers about our journal? Clearly—very little. His studious avoidance of any concrete facts about our journal falls short of even the most commonplace standards of Soviet journalistic practice. Now if Mr. Freeman were a Soviet citizen, with no access to literature which his leaders think he should not read, his performance would perhaps be more excusable. But Mr. Freeman lives in the United States, and he is free to read any publications he pleases, from the *Literary Gazette* to *Problems of Communism*. Then why all this reticence?

Note, too, that there is virtually nothing in his piece about particular articles we have published, and no attempt is made to discuss or refute any specific facts or opinions we have offered. Those readers who have read our publication for any length of time know that our range of authors is—to say the least—wider than that indicated by Mr. Freeman (who obviously thinks it a despicable crime to have escaped Rakosi's prisons), and that the facts about the rise of living standards in the USSR have not been "totally ignored," either by Mr. Conquest, or by any other of our contributors—to mention two of the more or less concrete charges levelled by our critics. But no doubt it is easier to condemn without offering illustrations, and to generalize without having one's comments "strewn with footnotes." Easier—but hardly more convincing.

Another charge levelled by Freeman is that the editors of *Problems of Communism* "prefer not to give their names." Surely the implication of this statement is absurd: would Freeman want us to believe that just because, say, the *World Marxist Review*, the "Theoretical and Information Journal of Communist and Workers' Parties," does not list the names of its editors, there is (to use Mr. Freeman's phrase with regard to us) "something suspicious" about it? Whether or not the names appear on our masthead is, of course, merely a matter of formality. If Mr. Freeman is curious about names, all he has to do is correspond with us. No secrets here, let him rest assured.

Then there is the matter of patently irrelevant data. Now this is hardly the place either to discuss the foreign policy of the United States, or to show that the US Information Agency does *not* shrink from discussing the problems of Negroes in the United States. More importantly, however, as our readers know, these are manifestly not subjects that lie within the purview of *Problems of Communism*. To drag in irrelevancies, however, is an old Soviet stratagem—a variation of the old adage that "offense is the best defense." Ask any Soviet spokesman about, say, the restoration of the death penalty in the

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* Just on the question of living standards—because it illustrates the author's habit of facile distortion—the reader is referred to the following articles that have appeared within the past two years: "The Soviet Economy in Transition," by F. Seton (No. 1, 1961), "'Catching Up and Outstripping': An Appraisal," by I. Erro (No. 4, 1961), "Recent Trends in Soviet Farm Incomes," by A. Kahan (No. 6, 1961), "Forward to Communism?," by R. Greenslade (No. 1, 1962), and "The Peasant vs. the Consumer," by S. Bialer (No. 5, 1962). A simple glance at each yearly index for *Problems of Communism* will easily dispose of Mr. Freeman's other claims.

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USSR, and three times out of four you will get a disquisition on unemployment in the United States. Ditto Harry Freeman.

Finally, Harry's penchant for vulgarity. Of course, some people prefer the term "earthiness." And so when Mr. Khrushchev says that an abstract painting looks as if a little boy had relieved himself on the canvas, there will be those who will say that this is charming—so *earthy*, mind you! Similarly with Mr. Freeman's final comment about the quality of our paper. Suffice it to say, that in this regard we have no intention whatever to compete with *Pravda et al.*

Now (we wonder)—will the *Literary Gazette* republish this reply? Any thought of *quid pro quo?*

Correspondence

EDITORS' NOTE: Readers are welcome to comment on matters discussed in this journal. Letters should be addressed to the Editors, *Problems of Communism,* US Information Agency, 1776 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, Washington 25, D.C. (Please note: Subscription orders or inquiries should be addressed according to instructions on the back inside cover.)

TO THE EDITORS: May I register in your columns a minor, but not unimportant, suggested identification of a Soviet figure—the mysterious Rodos mentioned in Khrushchev's secret Speech at the 20th Congress of the CPSU (February 1956)?

Khrushchev said at the time:

Not long ago, only several days before the present Congress, we summoned to the Central Committee Presidium session and interrogated the investigative judge Rodos, who in his time investigated and interrogated Kossior, Chubar and Kosarev. He is a vile person with a bird brain, and morally completely degenerate. And it was this man who decided the fate of prominent party workers; he made judgments also concerning the politics in these matters, because, having established their "crime," he provided therewith materials from which important political implications could be drawn.

The question arises whether a man with such an intellect could alone conduct the investigation in a manner to prove the guilt of people such as Kossior and others. No, he could not have done it without proper directives. At the Central Committee Presidium session he told us: "I was told that Kossior and Chubar were enemies of the people and for this reason I, as an investigative judge, had to make them confess that they were enemies." (Indignation in the hall).

He could do this only through long tortures, which he did, receiving detailed instructions from Beria. We must say that at the Central Committee Presidium session he cynically declared: "I thought that I was executing the orders of the party."

It has always been thought peculiar that such an official should actually be interrogated in the Presidium itself (I have speculated on reasons for this in my *Power and Policy in the USSR,* New York, St. Martin's Press, 1961, pp. 274-5). But my suggested identification of the man, if correct, adds somewhat to the significance of the whole thing.

The man I have in mind is Stanislav Frantsevich Redens. Alexander Orlov (in the *Secret History of Stalin's Crimes,* New York, Random House, 1953) mentions him as one of the few top NKVD officials carried over from Yagoda's regime to Yezhov's, and does not number him among those later removed. Nora Murray, who knew him personally, writes (in her *I Spied for Stalin,* New York, Wilfred Funk, 1951) of his still being in office in 1940, and being removed that year or the next (her dates are not clear), but only on transfer to a minor post in Central Asia. Thus, he would have been available at the center at the time of the investigation of the case of Kossior and the others. Mrs. Murray, indeed, says Redens was *later* arrested and liquidated, but her evidence about this is much more hearsay.

The earlier political cases were always conducted by people of his rank, such as Mironov, Slutsky, Molchanov, etc. Redens had been of this circle as chief of the NKVD of the Moscow Region, ranking with Zakovski, Agranov and other major figures as Commissar of State Security First Grade (Decree of Nov. 26, 1935, quoted in *The Soviet Secret Police,* by S. Wolin and R. Slusser, New York, F. A. Praeger, 1957, pp. 378-79). Wolin and

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Slusser, incidentally, are wrong in stating (p. 380) that Orlov reported Redens as purged.

The most significant point is something else: that Redens was married to the sister of Stalin's wife Nadezhda Alliueva. This of course implies that he was personally known to Stalin's circle, including many members of the 1956 Presidium, and his denunciation was not of some obscure agent of Beria's, but of a figure to whom the whole Stalinist ruling group might be thought sensitive. The quite close resemblance of "Rodos" and "Redens" coupled with the rarity and oddity of names in this form (at least in pre-1940 USSR), seem almost conclusive. If the identification has been made before, I have not seen it, and apologize to whoever has anticipated me.

ROBERT CONQUEST
London, England

IN FUTURE ISSUES

Ilya Ehrenburg and His Memoirs ..... *Victor Erlich*
The Rehabilitation of Soviet Writers ..... *Hugh McLean*
Communism and Agrarian Problems in Latin America ..... *Victor Alba*
Disillusionment in the Chinese CP ..... *A. A. Cohen and C. F. Steffens*
Incentives and Profitability in the Soviet Economy ..... *Harry G. Shaffer*
Khrushchev and the Economists ..... *Rush V. Greenslade*
Notes on the Soviet Elite ..... *Seweryn Bialer*

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Where to Obtain *Problems of Communism*

NOTE: In the United States, *Problems of Communism* is available on sale at the Superintendent of Documents, US Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C. Price per copy: $.35; subscription price: $1.50 a year; additional $.50 for foreign mailing if orders are placed in the United States. Outside the United States, single copies or subscriptions may be obtained free of charge through requests addressed to the nearest office of the United States Information Service. Following are the locations of USIS offices:

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TOGO—Lome
TUNISIA—Tunis
UGANDA—Kampala
UPPER VOLTA—Ouagadougou
ZANZIBAR—Zanzibar

LATIN AMERICA

A list of USIS posts where the Spanish-language edition (*Problemas del Comunismo*) may be obtained is published in its current issue. The English edition is also available at these posts and in Brazil (Rio de Janeiro, Belo Horizonte, Brasilia, Curitiba, Porto Alegre, Recife, Salvador, Sao Paulo.)

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